I want to add two things to this discussion:
1) When designing the console, Nintendo surely took into account the fact that console generations last longer these days. A typical console generation lasted for 5 to 6 years back in the 90s and 2000s. But the Switch was Nintendo's primary console for over 8 years and generations in general last longer.
Nintendo is also afraid of hardware transitions as those are the riskiest times in the business: You can go from number one to dead last, from huge profits to bleeding money with every hardware transition in this business (granted, these situations are mostly a company's own fault - see Wii U or PS3 for example - but it is still a risky time). Thus, it makes sense to assume they put at least some extra power into the console to future-proof it a bit.
Nintendo didn't have to include features like HDR, Ray Tracing and 120fps support in a hybrid console in 2025. They could've gotten away with it. But what about 2028? 2031? Longer generations create predictability for Nintendo. With that in mind, it makes sense they'd rather charge 50$ more for the console as this is a long-term game they are playing.
2) The blue ocean strategy is not Nintendo's go-to strategy! They designed exactly one product around this and that was the Nintendo DS. The Wii was a disruptive product, engineered around Clayton Christensen's theory of disruptive innovation. And the 3DS and Wii U were neither disruptive products nor blue ocean business models.
The Switch 2 however is at least somewhat a disruptive product. Disruptive products are "crappy products for crappy customers", because they are lacking in a certain value metric other, established products on the market are great at. For the Switch family, that would be hardware power: Switch and Switch 2 are both weaker than their home console counterparts and hardcore gamers (which Christensen would call the "upmarket": The part of the customer segment that is willing to pay the most money to get the "best" products according to the stablished value metrics) scoff at them because of that fact. Disruptive products, however, excel in other value categories (for Switch that could be portability, ease of use of the software, etc.) the upmarket (hardcore gamers) don't deem to be important. Hence the comments that say "I don't care about portability, I would only use the Switch in docked mode anyway, so where is the power?".
However, Christensen's theory also predicts the disruptive companies to move upmarket, so they can get more of that very profitable segment of "premium customers". And that's (at least in some part) what's happening with the Switch 2: The absolute hardest of the hardcore gamers will still dismiss the Switch 2 as not powerful enough, but roughly 80% of the market will say: "Oh, these games look and rund good enough and the console is portable. Why buy a PS5 if I can play most games on the Go on Switch 2?"
The stablished upmarket companies (Sony in this case) can only do two things: Disrupt their own business model (Sony releasing a handheld console instead of a home console next gen, thus catering to the new values hybrid consoles bring to the table) or move even more upmarket (for example, releasing a PS5 Pro or a PS6 which is even more powerful but also more expensive).
To be clear: Christensen talks about disruptive technologies. And the technology here would be mobile chipsets. Mobile chipsets were laughably underpowered compared to chipsets in home consoles and computers some time ago. But thanks to diminishing returns, mobile chipsets can do most of the things most customers expect them to do these days. And this analogy isn't perfect as the Switch 2 is not from the ground up designed to be disruptive.
But think one generation ahead: If Switch 3 is as powerful as a PS5 Pro... how many people will be able to distinguish between games running on a portable Switch 3 and a TV-bound PS6 with the latest technology?