1. If you're now saying that the passage of time could also be an illusion, I think we're just about done with this.  It means you don't trust even your own mind, let alone the senses.  Even if all your memories are false, you still have memory.  More than that, if you deny (A) you deny that you exist at all, which takes contrarianism past the point of silliness.  I don't see how one's own existence (the bare fact, devoid of any particulars) can possibly be said to derive from sense data.  Even Descartes agrees. 

2. So your alternative to accepting the sensed world is to make up your own fantasy world, or have no world at all, correct?

1. Time is a physical concept, so it's resultant of sense data judgement.  So, in that context, it too could be "wrong".  And I do not see how that would mean I cannot trust my own reasoning, then.  When I was denying (A), I was denying the "living" part (as in, bodily).  Although, I might be pressed to think that "I" don't necessarily exist, either, although that may depend on what I mean by "I".  Also, Bertrand Russel disagreed with Descartes on that point ;)

2. Yes, that's correct.  Although, sense data could be used nontheless to support any view anyways, so it doesn't really matter, as I maintain that sense judgement is arbitrary.

1. If you're now saying that the passage of time could also be an illusion, I think we're just about done with this.  It means you don't trust even your own mind, let alone the senses.  Even if all your memories are false, you still have memory.  More than that, if you deny (A) you deny that you exist at all, which takes contrarianism past the point of silliness.  I don't see how one's own existence (the bare fact, devoid of any particulars) can possibly be said to derive from sense data.  Even Descartes agrees. 

2. So your alternative to accepting the sensed world is to make up your own fantasy world, or have no world at all, correct?

:)

Ahh, but see, my larger argument is this:

Every argument that I could possibly make in favor of empirical evidence (or anything else) must ultimately necessarily rely on empirical evidence.

Moreover, every argument that you (or anyone else) could possibly make about against empirical evidence must ultimately necessarily rely on your empirical evidence (and actually, also your appeal to my own).

For you to say "life is like this," you must be referring to some experience of life--that there are things that you've seen, heard, touched, tasted, and smelled that have led you to particular conclusions.  No one is born a skeptic, for instance; usually that comes in high school or later. ;)

And so, we're trapped, all of us, in empiricism's web.  If your demand is that I prove empricism via non-empirical means, I can't, and concede the point.  I cannot prove anything outside of empiricism.

However, I take solace in knowing that you cannot prove anything except by empirical means.  In fact, our very concept of proof comes from something that you later state doesn't really matter: consistency.

Fortunately, and as I've stated before, I don't see why any of us should labor to "prove" empiricism (which is actually impossible, if we grant that sensory data is axiomatic, which we have; axioms aren't things that you prove--they're... axioms).  The reliability of the judgements we make based off of our sensory data is confirmed and re-confirmed everytime we do something successfully based off of them: I see the apple; I move to pick it up and eat it; I succeed.

But why must it rely on empiricism to make an argument against it?  If it's not language, than what? Life (what people who assume empiricism call there experineces) does not equal the concept of reality (that which exists).  In any event, there is still no way to determine whether or not one's judgements are correct outside of more judgements.  And one can make a statment concerning reality without involving sense date, so I do not think empiricism is unavoidable.

And anything can be reliable (or, at least, as reliable as empiricism can be (e.g., dreams)); If I think that whatever statement I make in head currently is true is true, that would be 100% reliable).  I know that empiricism cannot be proven, and agree that's why it's an axiom, but that was my original point: to demonstrate empiricism is wholly axiomatic, on no different a plane than the theist.

None.

That's actually the entire point.

In that case, you can't say they are reliable, for that would be circular.

Well, if my case is that empiricism cannot be denied, for any attempt to deny empiricism must necessarily give credence to one's sensory data, and one's ability to make judgements based off of it...  then there's every reason to use empiricism; it's unavoidable.

But if you're claiming the discovery of an additional, sixth sense mechanism--direct info from God--I'd like to hear why you think it exists.

I agree with you logic on this, by the way; that if it can't be denied because the denial would entail an empirical argument.  But I'm not saying that this "sixth-sense" exists; I'm merely proposing an alternative (and, as such, a means of avoiding empiricism).

If you're sincerely interested in an honest pursuit of truth (and I'm not trying to imply that you're not, but it's something that only you will ever know), then at some point you'll have to realize that "isn't necessarily the explanation" isn't a good argument for or against anything at all.

Except that you're saying because language must come from senses, then sense judgement is unavoidable.  But if language doesn't, then it's avoidable.

It's a phrase that I can tack onto any kind of assertion, and while you might say "yes!  exactly!", I would say that to do such an arbitrary thing is meaningless and counterproductive.  Doubt is a fine thing... when there is good reason for doubt.  However, if and when evidence points to a conclusion, the right thing to do is to give tentative agreement to that conclusion on the basis of that evidence.

But it's my contention  the evidence doesn't point towards empiricism at all (evidence here being that language must be from empiricism).

If someone said to me "food allows us to survive," and I said "that isn't necessarily the explanation"... well... what am I saying?  Am I proposing a test--starve oneself and see the results?  No!  Of course not, because even in the event of starvation, we'd be no closer to "knowledge" because it would only be more "empirical evidence" and would continue to succumb to my "isn't necessarily" mantra.

Right.  If it's true that it isn't necessary, then ignoring that concept doesn't move you any closer to the truth, either.

The "isn't necessarily" thing wouldn't in this case provide anything to anyone--it wouldn't help and could only hinder.  And, moreover, the person saying it--me or anyone else--wouldn't at heart believe it.  Nobody who lives actually doubts that food is vital.  We all eat food, or we wouldn't be here, typing this.  No one is a skeptic through and through, because a skeptic through and through would be unable to survive; you might not be an empiricist intellectually, but this world is an empirical world, and to live in it, you do so through empirical means.

So you've concluded empirically, correct?

And so, I'm calling upon you to examine your own life and experiences (which is the richest body of experimental data you'll ever know) and realize that the decisions you make daily are based on your trusting your judgements and the evidence of your senses; realize that your continuing existence is predicated on the correctness of empiricism; and then, honestly, ask yourself if empricism is "just as likely" as anything else.

Yes, I agree that my desicision are based on empiricism; but that's only because I, personally, assume it.  My only contention is that it's an axiom amongst other equally likely.  And anything else I might have could be just as consistent.

Of course you can't test yourself out of the Matrix (except that, in the movie, they ultimately did... otherwise, there would have been no movie, which is their concession of my point).  But that means: if we're in a dream, or the Matrix, or brains in a jar... it doesn't really matter.  Everything that we care about is consistent and unaffected by that larger, unknowable scope.

If the things we care about are affected, then that means that our reality is impinged in some way by the Matrix... which, in our terms, would mean that we can sense it, and then the normal rules apply.

In other words, Occam's Razor applies here.  Or perhaps more directly, Carl Sagan's corollary of it--"The Dragon in my Garage" (which is an essay in his larger work, The Demon-Haunted World, though if you do a search for the essay, I'll bet you can find it online... excellent reading).  Those things that cannot be sensed by us at all... don't matter at all.

Which, again, only works if you assume empiricism anyways, as that would be necessary in order to think that all you cared about was true.

"Consistency lends nothing to plausibility"?????

Really???? :)

So I think :)

All of logic (and hence mathematics and also rational thought) is based on the idea of consistency.  In fact, "plausibility" is an absolutely meaningless sentiment when we scorn "consistency."  We posit things because they are consistent with known facts; what possible reason would anyone have to posit something that is completely inconsistent?  (The mistakes people make, ultimately, are positing things that are consistent with some facts, but inconsistent with others; but no one is so arbitary as to posit something inconsistent with everything, were that even possible, and no one would use the term 'plausible' for it.)

Yes, inconsistency would automatically mean the method of truth is false ("Flipping a coin ALWAYS yields truth" *Flips coin twice*, "Heads and tails.  Huh".)  However, it's opposite isn't true.  For instance "All cows eat meat.  This is a cow. Therefore, it eats meat" is completely consistent, but adds nothing to determine if it's true.

As to the theist, I would contend that where most theists get in trouble is by being inconsistent with the evidence of our senses.  But that's where I think all errant beliefs will ultimately wind up; the theists mistakes aren't particular to them--everyone is wrong about something, sometimes.

Internal consistency, yes.  But not necessarily consistency with the sensory data received from the outside world.  To be consistent with that data means reaching certain conclusions and not others; i.e. apples good, cyanide bad.

And why must one method of truth be reconciled to another?

As though theism were directly contradictory to empiricism?  Not at all: the Bible is read with eyes.  In fact, Biblical language is filled with empirical language and believers often insist that their faith is based on the evidence of the things they've witnessed, etc.

Yes, I understand that; I'm referring to the theist who decides a god exists aprt from (or despite) empiricism

Christ's followers, for instance, claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Christ; there probably wouldn't be a Christianity if not for that.

I don't reject theism because it's non-empirical, per-se.  (Even claims to non-empirical devices, like faith, will ultimately rely on empirical evidence to prove "that faith works," etc.)  I reject it because I do not believe the (empirical) evidence provided is sufficient.

I've mentioned it before. Here is the difference between your senses and empiricism and the sense of faith or god and whatnot. I walk up to all 6+ billion people, I punch them. Every single one will get hurt. I ask them abot their sense of faith, many will say that's just bullshit and a figment of other's imaginations.

But why must it rely on empiricism to make an argument against it?

"All cows eat meat.  This is a cow. Therefore, it eats meat" is completely consistent, but adds nothing to determine if it's true.

And why must one method of truth be reconciled to another?

Yes, I understand that; I'm referring to the theist who decides a god exists aprt from (or despite) empiricism