Once Western officials recognize this fact, they must recommit to supporting Kyiv. Putin's latest budget puts the Russian economy on a war footing. He is engaged in a conflict of attrition against Ukraine's soldiers, against Ukraine's population, and against Ukraine's supporters. To stop him from winning, U.S. and European production lines need to consistently provide arms to Ukraine, and U.S. and European militaries need to offer systematic, large-scale training to modernize Ukraine's army. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States must also persuade the developing world that Ukraine's struggle is just and that the oppressive power is Russia. That way, they do not lose the battle for the global South.
As they take these steps, Western officials must recognize that supporting Ukraine's fight for independence is overwhelmingly in their interests. Any outcome that leaves Putin with a substantial part of Ukraine will enable him to claim he fought NATO to a standstill at the gates of Russia. He will declare victory and rearm for new waves of direct or indirect conflict.
The Russian Way of War | Foreign Affairs
While it remains taboo to admit, it's now nearly impossible to deny that the West, in particular Washington, does not want a complete Ukrainian victory.
You only have to look at months and months of public statements, which are best summed up by the tired commitment to support Ukraine for "as long as it takes," echoed from Washington to Paris to Berlin. On U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin's Nov. 20 visit to Ukraine, the wording "here for the long haul" was chosen.
As long as it takes for what?
"We think the Ukrainians can change the dynamic on the battlefield and achieve the type of effects they want to push the Russians back without ATACMS," then-U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl said in January, adding that they are not needed for targets "directly relevant to the current fight."
This was not a line of argument but an open lie.
Ukraine finally received the older, shorter-range version of the ATACMS in October (these have a stated maximum range of only 165 kilometers and carry cluster munitions rather than a single high-explosive warhead) and immediately put them to good use.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has openly admitted his fear of Ukraine using these missiles against the bridge, and it wouldn't be a stretch to suggest that Washington has the same qualms about the long-range ATACMS.
On the same day as Austin's visit to Kyiv, a tweet by the U.S. Mission to NATO said that Washington is "focused on setting conditions for a just, durable, and sustainable peace." The post generated plenty of angry backlash from Ukrainians, taking it as an admission that the U.S. would not support Ukraine until victory. The fact is, we knew that already, but the problem is that so far, even the "setting conditions" part is not being done. Dwindling arms supplies and internal political divisions set conditions not for a durable peace but instead for Moscow to be vindicated in its plan for victory.
But if complete victory is seen as neither possible nor desirable by Ukraine's partners, the next best thing would be setting conditions for Russia to want to negotiate, but that can only be achieved by putting pressure back on Moscow. There are few options left: either properly arm Ukraine for a more effective counteroffensive than last time or, perhaps, give Kyiv the long-range missiles to destroy the Kerch Bridge, the Black Sea Fleet and, with them, Putin's dream of a Russian Crimean paradise.
The second question is, "What incentive will you give to Russia to not quickly break any ceasefire deal and finish what they started?" This is the "just, durable, and sustainable" peace that Washington frequently refers to.
