fishamaphone said: Only major disagreement I have with the above is Virtua Boy sticking with carts. Remember, it was released in '95. And it was a more-or-less "portable" system. And, most importantly, you held it to your face. Too many moving parts, too fragile a concept, and too much heat generated.
The mistake they made with Virtua Boy was in not waiting a year for LCD tech to get good/cheap enough so that the whole console wasn't merely "repeatedly scan a red laser across your eye." A more-than-one-color Virtua Boy, with non-headache-inducing LCDs could have possibly saved late-90's Nintendo.
Sega: waiting until 1999 to release the DreamCast. They knew Sony was a juggernaut, and they knew Saturn was ready to be cannibalized. If they'd had a 2-year head start instead of just the one, they may have had enough momentum to get over the "zOMG EMOTION ENGINE!" hype, even with a machine that really *was* inferior to the PS2.
Nintendo: waiting until 2001 to release GameCube. The last two years of N64's life were agonizing. I think Nintendo played their cards well with GameCube, maintaining market presence and positioning themselves so that Wii's success would be possible, but they could have stopped the bloodletting that was happening on N64, similar to how Microsoft would later do with the original X-box.
Nintendo: Not figuring out a way to get into the European market with the NES. Seriously, if it weren't for Nintendo's lack of presence in Europe, Sega may have never gained foothold with the Master System, and would have had a much harder time marketing the Genesis. I know there were legal problems with Atari, but Atari was dead by this point, and I imagine *some* settlement could have been reached. Nintendo has historically done poorly in Europe (Wii seems to be changing that), and almost every prospective competition has used this fact as a trojan horse.
Microsoft: Buying Rareware. Rare is the kind of development studio that is only useful if you're already dominating. They'll give you an assured smash hit every two years or so, but basically their games will only be attractive to people who already purchased the console (with the exception of maybe Goldeneye). Nobody bought an SNES for DKC. They had an SNES already, and DKC was a kick-ass game they could brag about to their Genesis friends. Nobody bought an N64 because of Banjo-Kazooie, but it was one of N64's top-selling games. Likewise, the people who bought Grabbed by the Ghoulies and Perfect Dark Zero were already X-box fans. If X-box had been a stronger platform, Grabbed by the Ghoulies would have been a much more important game than it was, and Perfect Dark was simply overshadowed by Halo.
Sony: E3, 2006. No explanation needed.
Sony: Half-assing the PS2 hard-drive almost as badly as Nintendo half-assed GameCube's online functionality. If they'd added $10 to the price and made it more like what the 64DD was supposed to be, then supported and advertised it decently, it could have seen success on par with Eye Toy. |
Your Sega comments are off base. I will tell you what Sega's mistakes truly were. Sega of Japan should have just let Tom Kalinske do his job and Sega of America. The most successful Sega console was the Genesis and lion's share of its user base was built in the US under Kalinske. He told Sega of Japan not to release the 32X. They didn't listen and it was a major reason he resigned. I mean if I have sold less than 4 million consoles and I have an employee that has sold 26 million consoles, I would think he would know his market better than I.
The resignation of Kalinske created a domino effect at Sega of America that resulted in the Saturn's abysmal failure in the US. The early launch fiasco being one of them. That Saturns early launch hurt the DC's ability to get stocked at several major retailers in the US. Bernie Stolar, Kalinske's replacement, was completely incompetent. He basically did to Sega of Japan, what they did to Kalinske. He pressured them to kill of the Saturn, which was doing well in Japan, and shift efforts to it successor. Stolar didn't bring some of Sega's better titles from Japan to the US, mismanaged the ad campaign for the Saturn, etc. Not only that, his actions lowered consumer confidence in Sega in Japan. The Saturn should have been the Japanese equivalent of the Genesis for Sega. Instead, the Saturn was killed off too early because Stolar so royally botched the Saturn in the US.
Sega's biggest mistake was not listening to Kalinske. If they had listened to him, I can guarantee you that they'd still be in the hardware business today. I'm not saying the Saturn would have outsold the PS1 or even the N64, but if Kalinske was around it would have been a viable system in the US for a lot longer than 3 years. Without the 32X fiasco, consumer confidence in Sega would have been higher and based on his record, I can assure you that Kalinske could have gotten better third party support for the Saturn. Sega of Japan and there less than 4 million Mega Drive sales thought they new the US better than Kalinske and his 26 million Genesis sales. Dumb move, dumb move that slowly killed the whole company.