The_Sony_Girl1 said:
You know, when they released it too soon with no games, and pissing off retailers.
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That's only the tip of the iceburg as far as the Sega Saturn is concerned. Sega of Japan fucked up in every way, shape, and form. Well, except for the games. Sega's Saturn games were pretty damn good and a lot of them still hold up. But here's a list of all the things (that you didn't mention) that fucked up the Sega Saturn and ruined Sega forever.
- Difficult hardware: The Sega Saturn was too difficult to program for. Sega had some of the best game developers at the time, but most of everyone else outside Sega preferred Sony's machine which was designed for bad programmers.
- Sega of Japan destroying everything Tom Kalinske had built: Tom Kalinske was responsible for reviving Sega in the early 90's, transforming both the company and the brand. He transformed Sega of America from a 50 team group who's only responsibility was to market Sega of Japan's games in the US to a powerhouse of over 300 people who had it's own development studio and who had a kick ass marketing agency on their side. When Kalinske took the job, Sega of Japan's Hayao Nakayama promised Kalinske that Sega of America would be autonomous. For a little while, that promise was kept, but slowly Japan took over and eventually overruled everything Kalinske wanted and had said. Kalinske didn't think the 32X was a good idea, especially since it was so close to the Saturn release. Sega of Japan forced him to release it. Kalinske tried to form a partnership with Sony and felt it would be best if Sega's next system was a collaboration effort. Sega of Japan didn't want Sony's help. Kalinske then recommended that a simple single chip from SGI would be best for the Saturn. Sega of Japan disagreed and went ahead with their monstrosity. SGI would take their work to Nintendo for the N64. Kalinske formed a good relationship with the retailers, which Sega of Japan had destroyed. Kalinske had a really good marketing agency doing Sega of America's ads, but Sega of Japan felt the need to fire the agency when it came to making the Saturn's ads. Sega of Japan wanted the Genesis to be killed off in favor of supporting just the Saturn. Kalinske disagreed, saying that the Genesis had another good year or two in North America and the revenue from that system would be vital to Sega. Japan overruled him again.
- Too expensive: It's understood why the Saturn was expensive, but most consumers were not willing to support it at $400. Had Sega of Japan kept the Genesis alive just a little longer like what Tom Kalinske had suggested, then that extra revenue could have made up for some of the losses of selling the Saturn at $300.
- Loss of good people: Another consequence of Sega of Japan intruding on Sega of America's autonomy was the loss of good people. Tom Kalinske had developed a good team of people who made the Sega Genesis such a huge success. With Sega of Japan's interference, many of those good people left. Even worse, some of them were hired away by Sony. Sega of Japan had effectively take over Sega of America, but had absolutely no idea what they were doing.
- The dissolution of Sega Technical Institute: Many people know about the tragedy of Sonic X-treme. Yes, it missed it's Christmas 1996 release, but did it really have to be cancelled? Why couldn't it have been released in 1997? Sega could have used such a game in what would become one of their worst years ever. Also, why desolve Sega of America's development team who had assisted with the Sonic sequels and made their own games? The Saturn needed all the games it could get. Sega Technical Institute could have made the games Sega of Japan didn't have time to make.
So yes, the whole Saturn experience was one huge clusterfuck from the moment it was started to the moment when it was discontinued. Not only were the wrong decisions made regarding the system itself, but Sega as a business was in no position to be releasing such a system. The corporate environment had become full of arrogant people who had created a toxic environment within both Sega o America and Sega of Japan. As for Sega of Europe, the pretty much agreed with most of what Tom Kalinske had wanted, but they mattered less to SOJ than the US.