Rise of atheism: 100,000 Brits seek 'de-baptism'

[Final-Fan]

appolose said:

Final-Fan said:

Sorry for taking so long. Hopefully I can keep this up with my recent schedule.
This isn’t as precise as I want it to be, but I gotta just go with it now for time sake.

I disagree, because knowledge (AFAIK -- lol?) includes being aware of the justification, not just the fact that a belief is justifiable.  "Justified belief" not "justifiable".  Having worked out the justification is what makes that which is believed into that which is known, which it previously was not although the justification was still there, unrealized.

Sorry, what? 

What?  I thought that we agreed at least that knowledge is composed of belief, truth, and ???.  I would call those distinct parts, gathered together ... although I guess you may disagree judging by the next quoted part.

   It is the essential “characteristic” of knowledge, or rather, what makes a ‘belief’ knowledge of which I am talking about when I call knowledge fundamental: Certainty (indubitable). Saying knowledge is a mix of ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ is really just something that is displaced in a manner I don’t want to go into articulating (It has something to do with the difference between talking about knowledge as if it were outside of the mind and knowledge being a state one is in. There’s also another thing in my mind to articulate but I don’t want to get into it.) I agreed to the ‘combination’ previously in a sense for avoiding a possibly irrelevant or untimely clarification.
   I wish I could find it but I remember you asking previously something to the effect of how I knew when a belief was true if I didn’t have justification. That reflects exactly what I mean here. The “element” we are really after in epistemology is certainty (what I keep calling indubitability). That is what we are after in calling a belief knowledge. That is what justification was attempting to ‘create’ for a belief – to make it certain (which again, justification could only ‘perform’ by already having certainty in that which implied the belief in question). I’ll throw this out in the event you may find it relevant: After a person presents his case for what he believes justifies a particular belief about reality it would not be nonsensical to ask “are you certain about the things you said to support your case?”.
   In summary, knowledge, that which is certain/indubitable, is fundamental to epistemology - to having knowledge. Perhaps I could say it better as: certainty is fundamental and nothing that doesn’t already require it is [logically/necessarily] available to us to compose (or “build” up to) that state.

Either I have somehow been misunderstanding what you mean by "indubitable" or I believe we have a serious disagreement here.  Doubt, or lack thereof, as well as CAPABILITY for doubt, or lack thereof, is something I would think falls under the category of "BELIEF" and is not related directly to "TRUTH".  That is why I reintroduced "absolute belief" -- because it is what I would consider a synonym for indubitability, and so perhaps you see now why I am so skeptical of your assertion that indubitability guarantees (or reflects?) positive truth value.  IIRC, it was to try to illustrate this disagreement that I recently reintroduced the term.  (Disregarding the older mess.)

   The lack of the capability for doubt is what you categorize under the word belief? Sorry, that’s what I mean by knowledge though. If I accepted your use of that word I’d just specify that I’m talking about the ‘particular’ within your ‘category’ which I would call knowledge.
   Likewise, the capability for doubt is a characteristic of what I mean by the word belief.
   I have no problem if you consider “absolute belief” a synonym for indubitability…
   Realize that you’ll need to make a more articulate distinction by way of definition as this here only appears to find different words to refer to what I’m referring to.

First, I question whether being unable to conceive doubt of something is really a requirement of knowledge.  Secondly, I question whether indubitable propositional input can be consciously received.

   This relates to the previous bit I already addressed on the ‘composition’ of knowledge. I’m not sure how to join them clearly at this point. If you could count the explanations as one when you respond next it would be good.
   First, well, being absolutely certain of something (what I am using as synonymous with ‘being indubitable) is what I find epistemology has been after (certainly a description from Descartes when he introduced his ‘methodological doubt’). So that’s what I’m talking about when I speak of knowledge. I don’t wish to find something possibly incorrect, something as unstable as a ‘mere belief’. If you’re not talking about what I’m talking about, ok.

   Second, ok. I’d ask why but I don’t want to start another issue on the direction of this point (or rather another angle of this debate). Please keep in mind the difference between an analytical disagreement versus one about the particular nature of our reality. It would nice to know which kind of disagreement you are having when you say you disagree. (I would really hope it’s not the latter as that would force us to digress into another argument.)

I could be wrong, but that sounds like you're suggesting I included that term just because I was feeling trapped by the dwindling ambiguity in this thread.  I don't know how I could be expected to take that other than as an insulting accusation, unless perhaps it's supposed to be armchair psychology.

Ok if you feel that way. Not saying it is intentional of course. My purpose in saying it was for clarifying my perception of what’s happening in your position (in hopes you might recognize it but whatever).

Just double-checking:  when I wrote "in certain cases preexisting knowedge is NOT necessary for justification", you are telling me that you do not believe you understood what I meant when I put those words in that sentence?  (As opposed to not seeing how it would make sense for me to believe that statement, whose meaning you understood.)

   I understand the individual words, just not what they’re referring to together. Since my understanding of the meaning of justification obviously makes it literally nonsense. This isn’t an instance of me saying it’s not possible in our particular reality – because, as I’ve said before, this is an analytical issue (Wherein I say what I say about justification on the basis of definition.) So I’m just waiting for some explanation that shows something else to it or where I catch a different meaning your referring to.

I don't mind the delayed response too much, I've recently become INSANELY busy.

"Sorry, what?"

     It may help to remind you what I was responding to:  "What I’m trying to communicate is that justification in epistemology amounts to “establishing” that which it already essentially is. This is contrary to establishing that which it was not [...]"

     What I said was that having been justified is a change of essence from the perspective the person who has justified it, so a true belief is not already (before justification) essentially that which it is after justification.  Obviously it was true before, and let's say we believed it to be true, but now we've established that it's true.  The truth of it did not change; the belief (we're saying) did not change; a third aspect changed (from "not justified (by me)" to "justified").  

"It is the essential “characteristic” of knowledge, or rather, what makes a ‘belief’ knowledge of which I am talking about when I call knowledge fundamental: Certainty (indubitable). Saying knowledge is a mix of ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ is really just something that is displaced in a manner I don’t want to go into articulating (It has something to do with the difference between talking about knowledge as if it were outside of the mind and knowledge being a state one is in. There’s also another thing in my mind to articulate but I don’t want to get into it.) I agreed to the ‘combination’ previously in a sense for avoiding a possibly irrelevant or untimely clarification."

     This is borderline gibberish to me.  You seem to be saying, "Calling it 'belief and truth' is misguided for reasons I don't feel like going into AT ALL.  Also, I misled you earlier when I agreed to that description," without saying explicitly whether you are rejecting truth as a separate condition.  Is that anywhere near the mark?  
     For the record, I would say that knowledge is a state (one is in the state of knowing X) (perhaps this will help you understand the above point about justification) but truth is outside of the mind.  (Knowledge requires a mind; without, or outside of, a mind there is only truth.)  Thus the difficulties presented by requiring truth as a condition of knowledge.  

"The lack of the capability for doubt is what you categorize under the word belief? Sorry, that’s what I mean by knowledge though. If I accepted your use of that word I’d just specify that I’m talking about the ‘particular’ within your ‘category’ which I would call knowledge."

     The only way I can see to read this is that the ONE AND ONLY requirement of knowledge (in this method of acquiring it) is that one not be capable of doubting it.  
     This would mean that one of the following is true:  (1) knowledge (in your definition) is not necessarily of things (not beliefs -- your def'n.) that are true; (2) [edit:  some agent(s) or agency(-ies) (possibly including the nature of (indubitable) certainty?) either makes it possible for one to be certain of at least some true things (but that is not the case for any false things), or makes it impossible for one to be certain of any false things (but that is not the case for at least some true things), or makes it impossible to not be certain of at least some true things (but that is not the case for any false things)]; (3) if one is in a state of certainty (being incapable of doubt of a thing), that makes it true.  
     I realize that the second part was somewhat complicated, but it is my vain hope that it was not complicated in a confusing way (if read carefully) and that -- just once! -- there will be no failure of communication.  
     [edit:  old version of the second possibility in the second paragraph:  'some things have the nature of preventing us from conceiving doubt of those things (or other things?), but this is only the case with things* that are true' / '*The "those things (or other things?)" things.'  Hopefully the new version is better and/or less likely to be found confusing.]

"Likewise, the capability for doubt is a characteristic of what I mean by the word belief."

     To you the term "belief" can only refer to what I might call "doubtable belief" -- good to know.
     I see dubitability and indubitability both as reference to belief.  It is a reference to the state of mind of us having an opinion of something.  Dubitability is simply there being a possibility of us thinking, "could I be wrong?" and indubitability is (also simply) the impossibility of that.  I do not think that either of those states can affect whether the opinion is actually in accord with the truth.  

"I have no problem if you consider “absolute belief” a synonym for indubitability…"

     Nice.

"Realize that you’ll need to make a more articulate distinction by way of definition as this here only appears to find different words to refer to what I’m referring to."

     Using "absolute belief" was simply part of a demonstration of how I feel that "indubitability" is not actually separate from belief (my def'n.) as you think it is.  Absolute belief, to me, is simply a different type of belief, one that cannot be doubted but one that does not actually supply knowledge, by any definition that has truth as a necessary condition.  (See above response to "The lack of ...".)  

"First, well, being absolutely certain of something (what I am using as synonymous with ‘being indubitable) is what I find epistemology has been after (certainly a description from Descartes when he introduced his ‘methodological doubt’). So that’s what I’m talking about when I speak of knowledge."

     Hah!  Well, in that case, IMO, certainty would be one of those "necessary but not sufficient" deals.  (See above response to "The lack of ...".)

"Ok if you feel that way. Not saying it is intentional of course. My purpose in saying it was for clarifying my perception of what’s happening in your position (in hopes you might recognize it but whatever)."

     I ... look, you're saying I'm being intellectually dishonest, and you can say "now don't take this the wrong way" all day long but it doesn't change what you're suggesting.  Not saying you shouldn't call people out on shit they try to pull (even unconsciously or inadvertently) but don't pretend you're not accusing them of anything.  Because you are.  If I say someone has misspelled a word, I'm ACCUSING them of misspelling.  And I'm right.  And sometimes they get indignant.  But I'm still right.  In this case I'm insulted, and say you're wrong.  

"I understand the individual words, just not what they’re referring to together. Since my understanding of the meaning of justification obviously makes it literally nonsense. This isn’t an instance of me saying it’s not possible in our particular reality – because, as I’ve said before, this is an analytical issue (Wherein I say what I say about justification on the basis of definition.) So I’m just waiting for some explanation that shows something else to it or where I catch a different meaning your referring to."

     Well ... so you are saying that if the meanings of the words are what you think they are, then I, as an at least somewhat rational person, could not mean that when I said those words?  Would it be too much to ask you to take a look at my previous posts (relevant to that point) and take a stab at what you think I did mean (or might have meant)?  

P.S.  I thought about reorganizing the quotes so that I could put three in particular next to each other (I'm sure you can guess which), but I wasn't sure it was necessary.  If you like, go ahead and pretend I did.