Rise of atheism: 100,000 Brits seek 'de-baptism'

[Final-Fan]

appolose said:

   Well, I did my best to categorize everything and bring it together but I found it difficult this time for some reason. I think you’ve overlapped some things or repeated some things so it’s been hard bringing any “systematic” clarity.
   There’s no need to argue paragraph by paragraph, just point by point. I’m not making new points just because there’s a paragraph necessarily.
   I’m very sorry for my sharpness in this post, I’m just very tired of trimming it out and finding less abrasive ways of saying things right now. I always seem to make a rough draft that’s very abrasive then slowly work it out 0_o. I’m not writing/categorizing as clearly as I’d like right now and it’s irritating me.

Justification
My Case Against It

(From IV.)
Until and unless you can show that this is not true, it seems to me that your assertion that justification is impossible/meaningless/futile/etc. is groundless (since an example of a justified belief exists).
(From I.)
The consequence of [justification required knowledge, so without preexisting knowledge nothing can become known and therefore justification is an impossible requirement] would not be that justification is unnecessary (see ONJ), but rather that knowledge is impossible.

A.   Apparently you haven’t understood/agreed with what I’m explaining as the ‘meaninglessness’ of justification. I’ll try to say it differently. (The next three paragraphs are just attempts to say it differently over and over again. Realize they are not separate points.)
(1.1)    If we were to call justification ‘support’ I could say that the only support we can make for knowledge is knowledge. That is to say, knowledge is fundamental for the question of gaining knowledge. We recognize this clearly when trying to do this little ‘justification’ thing.
   Justification begs the question in epistemology. (Perhaps to be more specific, as with the example of rationalism: All that ‘supporting’ one proposition involved was finding other propositions you apparently already knew that implied the proposition you wish to conclude with.). The concept of support or evidence makes sense in other subjects but not for something fundamental like knowledge and the specific question of how to attain it.
(3)   Thus, justification is not something we can say is “unnecessary” or “necessary” for epistemology; it would only represents already having knowledge. The word refers to nothing in the subject of epistemology – nothing aside from the concept of knowledge already. Thus it doesn’t represent some middle process in between belief and knowledge. It doesn’t arbitrate between them. It’s one of them already. It doesn’t represent any of the words we use in place of it (e.g. support, proof, evidence) because knowledge has no support for knowledge but itself (which is not a support at all in the sense people of epistemology or seeking – that is, gaining knowledge without actually having it in the first place).

B. To address a different issue you brought up, which is diverging a bit from just first understanding justification: I believe you’re claiming my position on justification makes knowledge impossible. (I don’t think you’re agreeing with my position of course since you argue for justification later, right?)
    This is the skeptic’s conclusion but if you notice… it doesn’t actually follow. Stated more clearly, “I don’t have any support (method to apply) for knowledge other than knowledge therefore I can’t have any knowledge”. Really, there’s an assumption there. It’s not a definitive statement – that is to say, concerning logic, the conclusion is not actually a necessary implication (putting the propositions into logical form would help show that as well). The only thing that follows is that we don’t have any support/method for knowledge. That is to say, we don’t have something to apply (again, which indicates knowledge) to a belief to test for knowledge.
(2)    Thus, with meaningless justification offering no insight, if I were to assess the situation now: we’re just still… looking for knowledge. The question is still the same at this point, “How do we know?”. Well, not by finding support/evidence for knowledge obviously. Is that the only way to get knowledge? (No… but lets not get ahead of ourselves, even though you know where this is going.)
   Do we agree that justification is simply meaningless to epistemology?

    You seem inherently stuck on the notion of ‘proving’/‘justifying’ and I can certainly understand why because for some reason (perhaps some picture of the situation in our mind)  it’s easy to confine “obtaining knowledge” to something you must do through some process in your own mind as if that is the only means of obtaining it. But well, that’s not logically necessary. (Again, not pushing this further than that yet.)
   Of course I would refer to my example of sense data as obvious knowledge without any notion of justification but we’re arguing about that ahead… (sort of)

Your Case for Justification?
(From III. )
In response to “Relating…”:  when justification occurs, (1) a belief has to exist to be justified and (2) the belief must be true for justification to be possible.  So obviously knowledge (JTB) occurs in every instance that justification occurs.  But that does not make justification unnecessary in any way (see ONJ).

(3)  I’m not really sure what you’re saying or what relationship it could have with the subject.

On the Necessity of Justification
I have to say, you stated your contention here very well.
   My definition, or rather, further clarification of epistemic knowledge is not merely “true belief” but also “that which is indubitable”. This is certainly what is meant when we speak of knowledge in epistemology. *sigh* Preemptive: That’s what “I’m” talking about anyway. If one can doubt it, we’re right back to the criticism of Descartes which practically defined the whole subject to begin with. It’s not certain, it’s not indubitable, it’s not knowledge.
(4.1)    When I say inability to doubt it, I mean it literally. I do not merely mean one doesn’t happen to doubt it. I’m speaking of its impossibility. There are many beliefs available to me that I can doubt. It’s not impossible. But, as in the example of experience alone - the sense data: the red, cold, etc. one literally can’t doubt. It’s impossible as it “won’t go away”. It’s just there and there aren’t any possibilities to make it go away. The experience is apparent. There’s nothing I’m ‘examining’ or ‘aware of’ other than the experience in this simple instance. It’s a very simple recognition. To sound pretentious I’ll bring up Russell. From this simple recognition he posed the basic axiom: “There are experiences” or rather “Experiences exist”. However you describe it, it inexorably means it’s known and prior to any further information about it and prior to any further information on it’s relationship to some process of the mind.
   Thus the ‘characteristic’ of indubitable (5) (*wants to say indubitibility but it’s not a word*) is what separates true belief from false beliefs (or rather, just beliefs yet undetermined in truth value).
    (Again, this of course was what I meant to exemplify in the sense data example.)
    Now before challenging this point, can we please just come to a common understanding on justification in reference to ‘meaninglessness’?

Side Note
(4.2)   Perhaps take this as a side note or just an expansion on my example of sense data previously. Ignore it if you still disagree and just address the specific sense data example following:
    There always seems to be an instance of accepting knowledge already without the notion of justification. Any time we grant being inherently aware of something it recognizes this. Whether just being “conscious of your own existence”, existence in general, experiences, or any other axiom argued by a philosopher. There is something being known without an apology, without a defense, without a case, without a progression of steps leading up to the inexorable conclusion. It’s just intrusively “entering” and you can’t make it go away, you can’t make it not what it is, and doubt is simply nonexistent.

The Example of Sense Data
Claim of Justification Still Occurring
II.
(1.2)  As I see the entirety of what you said here and previously on this as sophistry… I truly don’t know what you’re saying. But as for a few phrases that stuck out to me:

We believe we are in pain, therefore we know we are in pain.

(1.3)    Um… I hope you realize how that statement seems to go against everything you’ve said. I think it’s ambiguous and a part of your explanation of something so I wont take it too literally. All I can tell is that you’re equating whatever it is you mean by it with “rationally proving” and I don’t see much further clarification for that here.
   Whatever you come up with for an explanation keep an eye out for assertions about reality (including the way your mind works) that you would have to know already.

Claim that Example is Belief not Knowledge
It seems to me that what you have described is not actually “knowledge” but “belief”.  When you refer to our inability to doubt something (e.g. sense data) you are only repeating that we believe it (or saying that our belief is absolute). 

(6.1)   I’m a little confused here – You claimed that ‘justification’ was actually occurring in the example of sense data I gave (making it knowledge by your standards) but then here you’re saying my example only describes belief?
(6.2)   I describe knowledge as something you can’t doubt, but you say that this is the characteristic of belief, not knowledge. Interesting. Knowledge is less certain than belief? The ‘inability to doubt” is a characteristic of belief but not knowledge, to which I ascribed it to?
   Perhaps you’re merely trying to say the “inability to doubt” is not a sign of knowledge. I’ll assume that for your sake. If that being the case, I think then there’s been a misunderstanding on what I mean by the inability to doubt. I address it in “ONJ”.

Other
VI. 
I used “input” instead of “revelation” because I didn’t want to imply agreeing that the input in question is in fact “knowledge” as I believe you define “revelation” to be.

(7)  No seriously, I have no idea what you’re talking about, like at all. Hopefully it’s some old confusion on terms.

VII.
You're saying you thought I might think you were saying one type of possibility was excluded, but not the other.  How could revelation be “impossible without exception” and yet have either of those types of possibility?

(8.1)   What?... because if impossible was taken only to refer to the one sense of possibility I explained then “without exception”, being the qualification of that word, only refers to that one sense of possibility. The plane can’t possibly run out of fuel, without exception. Flying pink unicorns cannot possibly exist, without exception.

   Further I had the distinction between the “kinds” of possibilities in my mind when I first wrote it. I just wanted to avoid such a long explanation about something so trivial that seemed like it could come off as fairly impalpable. I half expected a giant argument on the distinction I made. (I’d really like to say something about that “distinction” and the way you took to it but… I better not.)
   I think there’s been a misunderstanding on the two types I gave anyway because I really don’t have a clue as to what you’re talking about in the next bit.

(8.2)   I find this criticism of conciseness concerning two words in a qualification form at the end of the sentence very desperate compared to the original sentence’s insanity. We’re going from highly unclear to clearer and more concise, not scrutinizing a single distinct English device.

 Or, for that matter, how can a theory be possible at all in terms of probability?

…what?

Either it’s proven or not, or disproven or not.  Theories can’t be “probably proven”.  Your objection makes no sense to me in the context of the statement we are talking about.

(8.1)   I really don’t get it. We’re merely talking about acknowledging the possibility of something here. Why, all the sudden, are we talking about whether the possibility/theory has been proven or disproven? ...Or whatever it is you’re talking about.
   It’s a possibility that this apartment building I’m in could catch on fire. That’s it. That makes sense right? Do I need to also state whether it’s proven or disprove as to whether or not it will catch on fire for the statement to have a meaning?
   There’s a possibility that there’s a man in Poland right now eating his shorts. There’s a possibility aliens exist. There’s a possibility God exists. I don’t know what being able to prove or disprove has to do with first acknowledging a possibility.

Empiricism
I think that if revelation could be shown to produce knowledge then empiricists would be all over it; that the reason it is not part of empiricism is the fact that it does not.

(9.1)   For your sake I’ll say sure (even though I feel  tad ridiculous to embrace a ‘hypothetical’ use of a word… I’d feel embarrassed in front of empiricists), yet the point here has been that the common use of the word empiricism refers to the use of senses and building knowledge from it (making an even clearer divide between it and propositional revelation which doesn’t need ‘building’ in that sense at all). That’s just what they mean by it. And thus that’s what I meant by it. Revelation wasn’t meant by it, whether one believes it’s possible, impossible, proven, or disproven.
   An interesting thing to point out is that you seemed to accept the distinction between empiricism and rationalism without quibble yet there actually have been empiricists who’ve believed and posed that rationalism and all it represents is also subsumed in the category of “sense experience”.
(9.2)   And “shown”? That anything like ‘prove’? Really funny thing to say in regards to revelation if it’s the only means of knowledge and also if justification happens to be in question.

Would I be right in thinking that there is no accepted or proposed propositional input other than revelation?

(10)   That question is difficult for me to articulate for some reason. I think it’s just unclear to me. I mean, obviously rationalists and empiricists think they can account for propositions so you might say they think there’s an ‘input’ in whatever sense they’d define it. Obviously I hold that they can’t account for them so in that sense and from the implications of killing justification, revelation is the only one… but that’s avoiding some menial, mostly irrelevant clarification I don’t find useful to articulate.

Old Argument
-- I can see now that the difference of propositional and non-propositional input would justify two different groupings of input-reception,

(9.3)   I must point something out now. By making this distinction between “propositional input” and “non-propositional input” (sense data) I’ve, in a different way, had you acknowledge the problem of empiricism (as it only deals with ‘non-propositional input’).
   Whereas one method of exposing the problem of empiricism (as we started off long ago) goes into all the “possible interpretations” of sense data and asks how one chooses among them as they are all an equal possibility, one can cut right to the heart of the matter and clarify/define sense data – exposing that sense data, since it doesn’t give any propositions (also including ‘entities’ in a specific sense), doesn’t therefore give any interpretations in the first place (interpretations are of course composed of propositions). Therefore any interpretation of sense data at all would already be imposed and not derived from sense data.
   (Another way of saying this I’ve heard is: you can’t get ‘metaphysics’ from sense data.)

“WIMBPRAOTSD”
I believe I understand clearly, although propositional inputs that make a claim about one’s own mind would, I think, be a gray area outside of my statement of “what revelation does” but inside your explanation of propositional perception.

(11)  Not sure what you mean. In particular regard to “a claim about one’s own mind”.

Also, just to nitpick, I thought that our senses were not necessarily received from “the physical world”.  Rather, they are experienced – period.  If that wasn’t a boat you intended to rock, then never mind and feel free to ignore.

   Right right, not necessarily received from the idea of a “physical world” (contrast with the usual matrix, dream, etc.). Just trying to use a common ‘root’ in typical education for explaining the meaning of the word “senses”. I should have added some explanation in parenthesis, making it officially the millionth clarification by way of parenthesis.

(1.1)  Where in the example I laid out is other knowledge required to gain the knowledge that I am in pain, given the belief that I am in pain?  Do you mean "knowing" how to do logic? 

(1.2)  If you don't know what I'm saying, where do you get off calling it sophistry?  [edit:  Oops, I may have misread this.  Sorry.  You're saying you see it as sophistry, but you're giving me the benefit of the doubt and supposing that instead you simply don't understand me?]

(1.3)  I believe you are correct that you have not understood what I have said.  Perhaps the best solution is to take this specific part into a chat session where we can actually talk instead of spew giant text-walls at each other. 

(2)  This is tied deeply into the other question of the definition of knowledge, and in fact hinges entirely on it.  According to the common definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" then you are obviously wrong; even if justification is nonsense/impossible/unobtainable it is still a requirement that must be met (without which there is not knowledge).  If some other definition obtains then there is a possibility that there is another way to arrive at knowledge.  (Such as in what I respond to in (4).)  

(3)  It seemed to me [edit2: and still does; this was originally written for the second (3) marker] that you were saying that if justification made any sense at all, it was redundant with knowledge and should be disregarded on that grounds.  ("The meaningless “justification” is not occurring, rather (or not in any other sense than), knowledge is occurring.")  I was trying to show how justification could never occur separately from knowledge and yet still be an important consideration.  

(4.1)  Yes, I understand.  What I don't understand is why the fact that a belief cannot be doubted makes it knowledge rather than what one might call "absolute belief" (without dragging up the prior mess).  Undoubtable belief is IMO simply that and not knowledge -- it is not true by virtue of its indubitability.  

(4.2)  Sorry but I can't resist.  Also, it seems to me that this argument is very similar to that which I respond to in (4.1) as you can see by my grouping.  I do disagree because I don't think that one's acceptance of something as knowledge makes it knowledge, even if it is impossible to not accept it as knowledge.  

(5)  Go ahead and say indubitability.  I'll back you up.  (See (4.1).)  

[edit: (6.1)  No, the example of sensing red is knowledge, but what you described, i.e. undoubtable belief, was only belief.  In the case of this example it so happens (here we agree) that the subject also has knowledge of that sensation*, but (here we disagree) not IMO for that reason (simply because he indubitably believes it, without justification being necessary for knowledge).]

[*Hopefully that's not unclear enough to start another war?]

[edit2:  To expand:  In the cases we have so far discussed, sensations like red/pain/etc., the indubitable belief of sense-experience necessarily coincides with knowledge of sense-experience, but this is a situation that would not apply to, say, an indubitable belief that I have a body sitting in a chair right now.  I'm not completely sure that you would say this second belief could be indubitable, but since I presume you're going to tie this in with revelation ...  Anyway, this may be getting into ground you didn't intend to cover yet but hopefully you now understand me.]

(6.2)  [edit2:  Your assumption is correct.  But I didn't misunderstand.]  When I say that it (indubitability) is a characteristic of belief, not knowledge, I mean that if you point to this and say "AHA!  This is evidence (or whatever) of knowledge." I say, "No, only of belief."  I do not mean that knowledge could not be indubitable.  So sure, it can be a characteristic of knowledge, but that does nothing to support your point about indubitable belief necessarily/always being knowledge. 

(7)  If you've forgotten the subject, in this case, let's bury it.  

(8.1)  I can kind of understand why my response confused you.  But to backtrack somewhat:  you said you were trying to differentiate between "“it’s possible” in the sense of the probability of something occurring" and "“it’s possible” in the sense of specifically admitting it’s not a contradictory idea so it has the potential, at least, to exist in some reality".

But when you are speaking in the context of disproving a theory (which you were), that does not apply.  I can't disprove the theory of revelation in the sense of "this isn't at all likely to occur".  The only way I could disprove it is in the sense of "this is absolutely not right".  In that way your justification for putting in that extra phrase is invalid.  Unless, as you say, I am still misunderstanding your two types of possibility.  But as I understand it, the only possibility that exists in the context is the potential for disproving (or proving) a theory.  A theory can't be "probably" disproven, and once it's disproven the disproof can't "probably" be true.  

(8.2)  The reason I am criticizing your conciseness is because of the misunderstanding that resulted when you repeated yourself.  Because of your claim of conciseness, I thought that when you apparently repeated yourself that you had actually misunderstood something, because it would be silly to repeat yourself and then say you were being concise.  Also looking back at it you shortened things all the way from 24 words to 21 (I think) so you probably meant "clear" anyway.  Which I don't think it was (more than mine). 

(9.1)  That was merely the most recent point; AFAIK the reason this point even arose was my trying to use your revelation empirically.  So if empiricists would embrace revelation if it was proven I don't see that as irrelevant.  

(9.2)  How juvenile.  Aren't you trying to "prove" that your idea of revelatory knowledge is possible?  

(9.3)  But you already said "sure" (revelation is not part of empiricism just because empiricists don't believe it produces knowledge, and if it did then it would be embraced), which seems to me to go directly against your claim here that revelation definitionally could not ever be considered by empiricism.  

(10)  I thought that rationalists' propositions came from within themselves.  Your own thoughts are not "input" -- or do you disagree?  If you disagree that would alter my entire concept of your position!

(11)  I mean as in the example I've been using of justification (leaving aside for this point whether the example is valid or whatever).  The sensation of pain is happening in one's own mind.  So far we have used examples of propositional claims about what is outside one's own mind (i.e. red car, etc.), and that is what I spoke of when I referred to "what revelation does".  But "propositional perception" could perhaps ALSO include propositional claims about what is inside one's own mind.  (I have not given much thought to what such claims/perceptions might be.)

I'm a little pressed for time, but I was almost done with the double-checking phase so I'm sending it off.  Hopefully nothing was horribly overlooked.

[edit:  Added number markers to (your) quoted post -- oops!  Also added (6.1).]