Rise of atheism: 100,000 Brits seek 'de-baptism'

[Final-Fan]

appolose said:

Final-Fan said:

Futile Justification/Proof (Evidence/Reason/Support, etc.)

Keep in mind that we are looking to establish beliefs about reality and not that of the analytical/a priori (which, in itself, asserts nothing as to the existence in reality of its entities) and also not that of base sense data (of which I already acknowledge its status of knowledge).

 

Mere Definition

    (Realize I must use the terms interchangeably at times according to the general sense of the sentence.)

    The definitions of the former terms according to the specific sense we are reaching for in epistemology would indicate we are looking for evidence/reason sufficient to establishing a belief as true (or rather, conversely, establishing that everything in direct opposition of said belief is false). This could also be stated that we are looking for “infallible support” of a belief to ensure its truth. This is what is sought/meant in epistemic justification.

    Clearly we do not mean to find (or, rather, this does not mean), what one might express as, only “apparent”, probable, possible, or partial support/reason for a belief. We want justification, the actual, the solid, the inexorable, the absolute, etc. Anything less is not what we are looking for in epistemology lest we leave the door open once again to doubt/uncertainty.

    Keep in mind also that “proof” and other such terms can be ambiguous. We are not merely looking for a particular something that “lines up” with our belief, as many often use the term, but that which is inexorably sufficient to substantiate the belief as truth. That is to say, proof that a robber did in fact break into your house would be finding your door unlocked and your window broken. But those things may be proof for other beliefs too. So in terms of justification, the proof(s) we need is that which negates all the other possibilities - enabling us to say that our proof is sufficient to inexorably substantiate a belief. That is the meaning of epistemological justification.

 

Hypothetical Contradictions

    The Gettier problem, along with any other hypothetical situations offered by philosophers in which justification is reportedly established for a belief but then found to be unstable/questionable, must be meaningless as justification, by our specific epistemic definition, obviously did not take place. Justification did not occur as it did not deliver the certainty beyond all doubt we are looking for. Instead, it was an irrelevant or insufficient support that was offered. Thus such posited scenarios only do well to show that the means by which justification was sought failed to achieve justification at all. It was not sufficient to end all doubt, to establish as the inexorable truth.

    Specifically in the Gettier problem a man relies on, what is discovered to be, an insufficient interpretation of sense data. Although he happens to believe correctly as the scenario states he did not have justification for doing so since we see clearly his evidence/reason/proof was apparently open to another possibility (a proof that could support another belief). As it was clearly not sufficient to inexorably establish the truth it was therefore not justification. (Not getting of track but…the Gettier problem only exemplifies the problems of empiricism as criticisms have previously already shown.)

    For the sake of clarity, such scenarios would be comparable to suggesting “What if one actually knew (keeping in mind epistemic definition) that the earth was round but later discovered he was wrong?”. Or rather, what if one has sufficient evidence and reason to establish that the earth was in fact round… but later he discovered he was wrong. It’s plainly a contradictory suggestion. (To make it not so would take changes in the meanings of the terms knowledge and sufficient evidence. As if that was necessary to point out.)

 

The Problem of Justification

(1)    The simple problem with justification/proof is that whatever is brought as justification/proof also necessarily falls subject to the question of epistemology once again. It is no exception. You must know whatever it is you’re offering of reality for support as well.

    Stated plainly, justification is requiring knowledge to sufficiently establish… knowledge. Again, whatever you bring up of reality to support a belief of reality you apparently already must know it.

    (As I stated in the beginning, keep in mind the analytical/a priori realm of definitions, categories, and calculations safely assert nothing as to the existence in reality of its entities. We are not looking to establish such mere “homeless” ideas.)

 

    For instance, as in a specific request for a “reason”, the belief that “Socrates is mortal” is inexorably supported by the reasons (aka beliefs…) that “Socrates is a man” and “All men are mortal”. But of course, now you are faced with providing a reason for (another belief to support) those. Then to justify those beliefs you must find support for them as well. This would go on ad infinitum.

    Every body or abstraction you assert to exist in reality will fall prey to the epistemic question once more. (Unless you are to be inconsistent with your ‘skepticism’.)

 

    (Keep in mind that while sense data is something I say you actually do know as it occurs, it is their interpretation [what it represents] that we are looking for here, which is why I say” any body you assert”. Base sense data does not give you propositions in that, while you may have several individual logical subjects, you will have no predicate to offer it [that is, further information of which to modify the logical subject with e.g. unify it with some entity, place it in a class of some entity, give it a characteristic or nature which involves knowing the existence of an abstraction, etc.])

 

    Side Note: Even if one can explain basic truths of reality that, like sense data, are literally impossible to deny by way of your meaning, realize you can’t do much else with them. You certainly wont be building a world out of something like “A consciousness exists”. I’m not saying asserting or denying this idea but just mentioning it’s futility either way in our efforts.

 

    In the instance of requesting evidence one would plainly bring up something about reality that, again, requires the same process of justification.

    In case it arises: perhaps there could be brought up a type of evidential circumstance called, for lack a better term, “direct evidence” - like someone looking up into the sky and saying “look, the sun obviously revolves around the earth”… but that also falls to the same epistemic question in which we would merely digress to numbering possible interpretations and the whole criticism of empiricism.

 

Establishing “Probable Belief”

    Even arguments for “probable” belief can be indicted in the same way. Not only does establishing that which is “probable” simply not mean what we mean by knowledge and justification, but also the very process of numerating possibilities or, rather, ‘weighing’ the probability of our reality requires the same inevitable establishment of some knowledge of reality.

 

Justified Belief (Knowledge) as “Input”

    As I’ve said before, we already accept this in: Sense data. There is no use in asking me how I know if I’m really experiencing what I call red. I, along with anyone else experiencing sense data, am simply forced into that knowledge it seems. I really do hope that requires no further explanation than that. (Dare we complicate it with certain irrelevant distinctions I have in mind.)

    Thus we certainly already accept this “imputation” of justified belief (that is, the imputation of knowledge).

 

Overview Note

I have not launched into anything else here yet about revelation as an answer to epistemology or the idea of accepting the conclusion that we can’t know anything or anything else. I only want to take this step by step. Do we merely agree on the previous points?

Other

 

5. (a1) The confusion was over the term as a whole but you could emphasize the word “input”, yes. I didn’t know what you were referring to exactly in regards to sense data and revelation.

    It seemed vague in a way that made me wonder if you were implying that revelation and empiricism essentially function the same way as “input”. This would be incorrect to me, of course, and indicate possible confusion in the difference between sense data and empiricism.

   Using your terms, yes, sense data and revelation could be categorized as “input” of knowledge. It is empiricism that represents a specific doctrine concerning sense data that I find problematic. (Gaining propositional knowledge about reality, as explained more fully in the ‘essay’ above)

 

Rather, the question is whether the input is revelation by that definition.  If I have misapprehended your definition, by all means tell me.  If you want me to say "revelation" whenever I mean "input alleged to be revelation" (and tell me so), I will try, although I would take no responsibility for any resultant confusion.  Or is "input alleged to be revelation" also nonsense according to your scheme?  That question may sound sarcastic but it's not -- I'm just honestly not sure and think it's an important question. 

 

(a2) Sorry, not sure what all that means.

 

c.  Go ahead and repeat but do me a favor and introduce it every time with a clear indication/heading of one general point (or use the word “again”) and also state whether or not it directly relates to the confirmation or denial of the specific point at hand.

    Otherwise, with all the confusion with our communication, I just personally find it difficult to tell if you’re actually making a new point. As well, within them, for the same reason stated previously, there is also the difficulty of detecting any further elements to your contention. So it seems more difficult than necessary for me to grasp it all, unite it all, and systematically address them concisely.

    I certainly don’t know want to respond to 85 points all restating the same unrelated thing or making slight additions to it within each occurance.

 

d. You’re disagreeing that it was clear because there’s a redundant phrase (repetition) at the end? (Of which I was merely using to make a clear connection with your use of the term previously and I really don’t find to be bad English.) Maybe I don’t know what you mean by ‘you disagree’.

 

7. There is some ambiguity in the term “experience” and I understand that is why you are categorizing revelation under it. Again, you may mean whatever you want with words but “experience” in empiricism was in reference, by such philosophers, to what we call our senses. (Some have argued there are as many as 9 senses btw and I’ve even heard a particular speaker claim there are 16.) (I would imagine “pleasure”, in a specific sense of the word, certainly could be categorized as a sense [omitting further clarification].) There may have been a broader meaning (that really doesn’t essentially move away from basic senses) but it’s been clearly in distinction to [propositional] revelation.

    In fact I think I could find some quotes wherein philosophers explicitly mention the distinction of empiricism to revelation (often in the form of ‘religious dogma’).

    One particular empiricist I’ve read that has made it very clear what he means by sense data and experience: Bertrand Russell. It was definitely not propositional revelation.

    Without looking at the way philosophers used the word, I think within this wikipedia article it can be understood. They do at least make the distinction between empiricism and revelation when used in the “scientific “sense.

"Mere Definition"
I agree.

"Hypothetical Contradictions"
I agree. 

"The Problem of Justification"
To the extent that you are saying justification* requires preexisting knowledge in order for it to be possible to justify a belief and make it knowledge (as well), I agree. 

If there was another vital point in here, please point it out.  The way I read it, your points were all in illustration of the above, and so if I replied to their specifics I would be distracting from the topic. 

* Of beliefs about reality outside of one's own mind -- see "JB(K)aI"

"Establishing "Probable Belief""
I agree, although this is merely a restatement of point(s) above. 

"Justified Belief (Knowledge) as "Input""
I agree with you as far as you saying (I think) that the belief that you are experiencing sense data is inextricably linked to the "true" experiencing of sense data.  In other words, when you think you're in pain, you ARE in pain.  Your belief IS justification in this case.  (Right?)  So justification still occurs -- this is an example of a self-justifying belief. 
     [edit2:  Deleted paragraph because, although it was thought-provoking, I feared it might potentially lead to misunderstanding.] 
     (NOTE:  This paragraph anticipates where I think you're going with this.  If you want to leave it for later, that is an option.)  But it is a different situation if an input makes a claim about reality outside of one's own mind (e.g. "A cat is hurting me").  Isn't that what revelation does?  When I think a cat is causing me pain, that doesn't necessarily make it true (Matrix etc.), although it is true that I am in pain. 

     Also, I see you're using "imputation" again.  I was never 100% sure what it meant and if you told me I don't remember anymore.  Please define it now, as the dictionaries I consulted did not offer up a solution that seemed to make sense to me.  (accuse, credit, give, (theological def.)).  In what way exactly does "imputation" differ from "input"? 

5. 
(a1) I don't see where you showed that revelation is not sense data. If you don't make that assertion, then I guess we might not actually disagree except on the use of the word itself?  [edit2: "empiricism", I believe (been a while since I wrote this).  In any case I'm suggesting that your sentiment might be along the lines of "I agree with what you mean, I just don't think you should use that word that way." If that is the case, see (7) (third paragraph).]

[edit2:  I don't know why I didn't notice this before, or if I did what possessed me to not address it, but: 
["You also know I’ve suffered some confusion on your use of empiricism, input, and your categorization of revelation under these."
["made me wonder if you were implying that revelation and empiricism essentially function the same way as “input”."
[It seems to me that the first quoted sentence, by "these", implies that revelation has been categorized by me "under" empiricism.  The second one said explicitly that you seriously thought I might consider empiricism a form of input.  Just to be absolutely clear:  I do not consider revelation a type of empiricism.  I do not consider empiricism a type of input.  Revelation, if it exists, is input, and empiricism is a doctrine of using input* to form beliefs about the world.  Revelation, if it exists, is (I allege), due to its status as input, 'fair game' for use in empiricism.

[* See (7), second paragraph.] 

(a2) I can understand that I explained myself in a complex way.  Let me restate the vital part:  I said "input" instead of "revelation" because you defined "revelation" to be input of knowledge and we are therefore fighting over whether input can be revelation, not whether revelation is input of knowledge.  So "input regarding the world" that somehow justified itself as true belief would be revelation.  (Or not justified, if you manage to throw out that requirement.)  "Regarding the world" was only meant to distinguish from e.g. input of mathematical knowledge.  Is that better? 

(c.) 85, lol.  I'll keep that in mind.

(d) You said you were being "concise".  So when I saw that there was repetition, I thought that you misunderstood something (perhaps the intended meaning of "hypothetical") because I didn't think that you could repeat yourself in a sentence and be concise.  You said "suggest it's possible even hypothetically" and, since "suggest it's possible" is in this case synonymous with [edit: or at least entirely within] "hypothesize", that's like saying "this is red even though it's red" [edit: or "this is a Toyota Camry even though it's a car"].  Do you see how I thought this was a strange thing to say?
     I apologize for not spelling out the connection between the fact that I "disagreed" and my criticism of the phrase that proved to be a redundancy. 

7. 
Quotes, if reasonably brief, might be helpful (especially from Bertrand Russell, given his apparent influence on you), although once we nail down exactly what "propositional revelation" consists of* perhaps I'll agree.  I don't, however, see the direct connection between "religious dogma" and your revelation, unless you're saying that the latter is dependent on the former ... which I presume you don't? 
     Anyway, as for experiences and our senses:  I just don't see the value in stipulating a form of conscious input-reception that isn't defined as a "sense".  Why not?  What else would it be?  (revelation, lol?)
     I think we're down to quarreling over whose use of the terminology is more appropriate, so this sentence is just a note that (if I'm right) we ought to be careful to not let this point get more attention than it deserves.  On a related note, the scientific use of "empiricism" is FAR more restrictive than the philosophical one, so saying that the former excludes revelation is neither surprising nor compelling. 

* By the way, I appreciate the attempt to refine what you mean by "revelation" but adding "propositional" honestly means nothing to me as I don't have the same background.  Hopefully you're getting to that.