Rise of atheism: 100,000 Brits seek 'de-baptism'

[Final-Fan]

appolose said:

Final-Fan said:

1. I'm trying to figure out whether to you knowledge = truth

That’s what I was saying yes (with clarification) to.

 

2.   No, every time I am either trying to find a new way to pierce your barrier of nonunderstanding of my objections or trying a new tack on which objections might best suit the discussion. 

     I understand what you’re saying but you’re missing the point I make every time you do this. It’s refusing to accept the meaning of absolute knowledge. If absolute knowledge existed in someone’s mind, there’s no sense in asking, in one way or another, “well how do they really know for sure they absolute know?”.

     If you’re providing an argument as to why absolute knowledge as a concept cannot possibly exist or be given to us, that’s different than what’s being discussed here. As I’m clearing posing this as an answer to the question of epistemology (“Hypothetically” sure – sorry if that was unclear, I just thought the language I was using and the topic strongly implied that. Further I used plenty of “ifs” and “would be’s” if you read back. Even in the quote you posted under 3. I pose it with an “if” at the beginning.) it doesn’t make sense to literally contradict my proposition every time by saying ‘what if it isn’t what you’re saying it would be’. We’re discussing whether or not it’s an answer to the question of epistemology.

    If revelation gave absolute knowledge then that would be a way of gaining absolute knowledge. In the same manner, if John wasn’t married he’d be a bachelor.

    (In regards to point 7.) I’m curious how making it clear that this is a ‘hypothetical’ answer makes any problems go away. I mean, if (I say if for your sake) I had absolute knowledge then… it still wouldn’t make sense to ask me how I knew I had absolute knowledge.

       Further, not to stray too far from that specific point, I’m also saying revelation is the only working answer presented. Other methods fail, thus either we get absolute knowledge from revelation or we get no absolute knowledge at all. Essentially true skepticism (Perhaps like what you’re already saying in denying truth – I think). But maybe something said here would distract from the main point. I’m only trying to make it clear that revelation at least would be “an” answer to epistemology (and not rationalism or empiricism).

      (Have to say: Remember, empiricism does not mean literally sense data. It’s the doctrine that states we can know truth about the world [interpretations of sense data] by sense data alone.)

 

3. (a)
Well then as I see it the problem devolves back to how it is certain*  that revelation confers absolute knowledge.

*"How IT is certain", not "How the recipient is certain". 

Sorry, don’t understand what that means.

 (b) How do you propose to differentiate absolute belief from absolute truth in your own mind?

    If I am able to doubt it in my mind, apparently it’s not absolute knowledge. If I can’t confess I’m 100% certain and that it can’t be anything else, then apparently it’s not absolute knowledge.

    Keep in mind the point I made a while back about whether or not one thinks any knowledge is dependent upon also knowing the source it came from at the same time.

 

( c ) I say revelation only confers belief, not necessarily truth. 

…

*** If you can't, then it would seem to me that you believe either (a), (b), or ( c ), since what one "knows" only in one's own mind, without proof that can be articulated, is simply a "belief" and not necessarily epistemological knowledge, IMO.  Or, I guess, you take the more direct route and jump to believing that R is AK directly.

    Basically you’re saying that “mere belief” is all that there is in our mind and that revelation could only give that mere belief (as opposed to absolute knowledge, like I’m proposing). Well, by your own standards I would think that’s something you’ll have to prove as well. (Although, as your position seems to deny such truth, it would mean you can’t do it). (Notice your statement is not an analytical one so it can’t be given any definitive status.)

(NOTE 2)    (Again as my position is being offered 'hypothetically' I'm certainly not in the position to prove that it is indeed occuring. Although "proving" things is definitely what this whole general topic is all about, and if the hypothetical method I'm posing is correct, "proof", in the colloquial sense, either totally begs the question of 'how do you know' all over again and/or is entirely dependent upon revelation still.)

 

(d) ** On truth:  Revelation could only assuredly confer absolute truth as well as belief IMO if truth only existed within oneself, whereas I have the position that it exists outside of oneself.  Thus there is only one real truth set that we try to access. 

What? This is what I’m talking about. How could I possibly understand that? It doesn’t even have any clear connection to anything else you’ve said.

   Truth means truth (ya the “one truth” if that’s really a qualification) and “where it is located” in a literal sense would have no relation to that meaning. The only thing I could catch a hint of is maybe you mean “subjectivism” in reference to “within”. But I couldn’t possibly see any relevance in mentioning that (for the purpose I still don’t know) and I’ve already dealt with why subjectivism is meaningless.

 

4. Ugh.  "Varying" could mean between 0% and 100% only and be just as valid.

  And yet I still don’t know what you’re talking about in relation to anything you’ve been presenting. And I’m too afraid to ask what you mean by valid.

I took this to mean that "interpretation" implied uncertainty and I don't know how else I could have taken it.  So I responded that no, interpretation did not necessarily imply uncertainty. 

Sorry, don’t understand what that means or it’s relationship.

 

5.
(a) Empiricism is not merely “about” interpretations of sense data. Empiricism is specifically saying that one can obtain the correct interpretation of sense data by sense data (there’s more to empiricism than that but it isn’t relevant to what we’re discussing). So when I say revelation would give you the correct interpretation(s) it’s no longer empiricism at all. Since the doctrine of empiricism is to derive such truth from sense data.

    Just in case: whether knowledge can be categorized systematically as input/output in relation to the world is not the issue. Just how we get knowledge in the first place (yes yes, absolute knowledge, something knowingly dependable).

(b) One cannot derive absolute knowledge from input, except e.g. if I look at a mathematical proof and see that it is correct, then it is still correct even though the world may not actually exist. Other than that, I think I would agree with your argument.

Sorry, don’t understand what that means.
That's the third time I've said that phrase this post, isn't it?  Please don't kill me!

(1) Fine.  I'm not sure why you brought it up (what in that post you were responding to with that) but ... fine.

(2) Am I to understand that you are using this HYPOTHETICALLY?  As in, "assuming for the sake of argument that there exists a form of input that confers absolute and non-sensory data ..."?  Because if you are then ... you know what, nevermind.  If that's the case, I am personally going to blame you for wasting a small portion of my life, but let's not argue about that.  Instead:  what's your point?  Why are we assuming this?  Where are you going with this hypothetical revelation? 
     Or is that all?  (I ask that last only because it seems to me that you may be saying that in paragraph 5.)  Are you simply saying, "If we assume revelation is possible, then revelation is possible" in order to get around having no possibility of absolute knowedge?  (See (3b2).)
     (Empiricism:  see (5a).)

(3) 
(a)  Well, it's quite simple.  If "you are certain", that refers to your belief.  If "it is certain", that does not.  Considering the postscript I thoughtfully included and directed you to, I am surprised -- even with all that has gone before -- that you would fail to comprehend my meaning. 

(b1)  "If I am able to doubt it in my mind, apparently it’s not absolute knowledge. If I can’t confess I’m 100% certain and that it can’t be anything else, then apparently it’s not absolute knowledge."
     This is TOTALLY dodging the point.  What I mean by that is that your statement only addresses the BELIEF part of knowledge, not the TRUTH part that I am concerned with [edit: let alone justification etc.; see (3c) and (3c2)]. (NOTE 1)  And you also seem to misunderstand the concept of proof.  Doubt is not required.  I do not have any doubt at all of gravity in the perceived world, but I can still do tests to confirm it (leaving aside the question of whether the perceived world exists etc. etc.).   

(b2)  "Keep in mind the point I made a while back about whether or not one thinks any knowledge is dependent upon also knowing the source it came from at the same time."
     I do remember that, but I never conceded what I saw to be your point.  Although if we just hypothesize that the revelation exists, then obviously no source is necessary -- we just assume it.  But for it to actually exist, it would have to have a source with absolute credibility, which to the skeptical viewpoint (it seems to me) would not exist.  (Except if by another revelation, which would need another source, etc. etc.)

( c )  No, what I'm saying is that ineffable truth doesn't count.  If you have a belief that you cannot prove, then to take it as truth is a crap shoot.  Maybe it is true and maybe it isn't.  You're 100% sure it's true, but that's only belief UNLESS you can prove it.  And if proof is impossible ... then too bad. 
     [edit:  (c2) I don't have to prove that revelation (of absolute truth in addition to belief) does not exist.  All I have to show is that we cannot confirm the truth independently of the input that is claimed to be revelation, and we also cannot confirm that the alleged revelation actually is giving us absolute truth, i.e. that it is revelation, without first assuming that it (or some other input) is revelation.  (In other words, IMO you're ignoring the problem of "authenticating" the input as revelation.  What if it's NOT revelation but claims to be?  Input cannot self-authenticate, either, as I recall some of your earlier posts may have been claiming, any more than empiricism can.)  [edit3:  Therefore, whether the belief bestowed by the alleged revelation is true or not, there is no justification for believing it is true and therefore it is not knowledge.]  It MAY be truth, but so might empiricism-based beliefs be true.]  [edit2:  So revelation (of true beliefs) could perhaps possibly exist, but only in a totally useless way.] 
     [edit:  (c3) Also, I hope your first statement ("Basically...") is not implying that I think truth does not exist or inherently cannot exist in our minds.  That would be grossly incorrect; note the "without proof that can be articulated" modifier.  The issue is which truths can be known.  I am asserting that one must be able to prove a belief in order to know it.  If you say that we cannot prove any beliefs, well then a consequence of that would be that we don't truly know anything.  But that's not something I'm declaring by fiat or by virtue of our minds not being constitutionally able to have truth or something weird like that.  In fact I do say there are things we can know, as in (5b), but you didn't understand that at the time.]

(d)  Okay.  What I was saying was that the way I see it, revelation can only be shown to give subjective truth [edit:  if even that], which we agree is meaningless.  This is the connection to the discussion. 

(4)  Let's recap: 
Me:  "[Interpretation =] "the sense data means X".  Such a statement can be made with varying levels of certainty.  Obviously if the interpretation and sense data are both absolute knowledge then the level of certainty is 100%, which is my point." 
You:  "Varying levels of certainty?"  [And anyway, what's the relevance?] 
Me:  ""Varying" could mean between 0% and 100% only and be just as valid. [... I thought you said] that "interpretation" implied uncertainty and I don't know how else I could have taken it.  So I responded that no, interpretation did not necessarily imply uncertainty."
     So, "valid" in this case means that different interpretations could have only either 0% or 100% certainty and have "varying" certainty.  (Which is to say, I used the word correctly and my statement is not nonsense.)  Do you disagree?
     Second:  did you in fact mean to say that "interpretation" (as I used it) implies uncertainty and if so, do you still hold this position? 
     And lastly, do you agree that revelation-based interpretation of sense data could have 100% certainty?  (See previous posts for more detail.)  If not, why?  [edit:  by "100% certainty" I mean in this case that the interpretation is inevitably true, assuming your revelation.]

(5) 
(a)  Well, I was putting revelation in the same class of input as raw sense data, but if (for the sake of argument) you separate the two and say empiricism can only rely on sense data, then I would agree with what you said. 
     We can argue about who is right in whether or not that's "empiricism" if you really, really want to.  (But you have to have both "really"s.)

(b)  What I mean is that the Pythagorean Theorem is true whether or not Pythagoras existed, or I really read about it in a textbook, or anything.  [edit:  And even if Pythagoras didn't discover it, which Wikpedia seems to think is likely.  Who knew?]  a^2+b^2=c^2.  It's still true even if I'm in the Matrix.  It would be true even I believed it wasn't.  So I got that truth from input, even if the input is not a true representation of the world.  Do you get it now? 

(NOTE 1)  I suppose this part may be irrelevant if revelation of absolute knowledge is and shall remain only hypothetical, in the "let's assume for the sake of argument" sense.

(NOTE 2)  You say that having to prove revelation begs the question.  This is only true when assuming revelation for argument's sake.  For positing revelation as a form of input that could actually take place, however, the opposite is true:  although a revelation needs no proof by definition (right?), it must be proven that a given input is in fact revelation in order to accept it as such [edit: that is, for it to qualify, whether it is "accepted" (believed) or not].  Isn't that so?  If not, why not?  If so, doesn't this run up against the same problem as empiricism, if not worse?