Sorry for taking so long. Hopefully I can keep this up with my recent schedule.
This isn’t as precise as I want it to be, but I gotta just go with it now for time sake.
I disagree, because knowledge (AFAIK -- lol?) includes being aware of the justification, not just the fact that a belief is justifiable. "Justified belief" not "justifiable". Having worked out the justification is what makes that which is believed into that which is known, which it previously was not although the justification was still there, unrealized.
Sorry, what?
What? I thought that we agreed at least that knowledge is composed of belief, truth, and ???. I would call those distinct parts, gathered together ... although I guess you may disagree judging by the next quoted part.
It is the essential “characteristic” of knowledge, or rather, what makes a ‘belief’ knowledge of which I am talking about when I call knowledge fundamental: Certainty (indubitable). Saying knowledge is a mix of ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ is really just something that is displaced in a manner I don’t want to go into articulating (It has something to do with the difference between talking about knowledge as if it were outside of the mind and knowledge being a state one is in. There’s also another thing in my mind to articulate but I don’t want to get into it.) I agreed to the ‘combination’ previously in a sense for avoiding a possibly irrelevant or untimely clarification.
I wish I could find it but I remember you asking previously something to the effect of how I knew when a belief was true if I didn’t have justification. That reflects exactly what I mean here. The “element” we are really after in epistemology is certainty (what I keep calling indubitability). That is what we are after in calling a belief knowledge. That is what justification was attempting to ‘create’ for a belief – to make it certain (which again, justification could only ‘perform’ by already having certainty in that which implied the belief in question). I’ll throw this out in the event you may find it relevant: After a person presents his case for what he believes justifies a particular belief about reality it would not be nonsensical to ask “are you certain about the things you said to support your case?”.
In summary, knowledge, that which is certain/indubitable, is fundamental to epistemology - to having knowledge. Perhaps I could say it better as: certainty is fundamental and nothing that doesn’t already require it is [logically/necessarily] available to us to compose (or “build” up to) that state.
Either I have somehow been misunderstanding what you mean by "indubitable" or I believe we have a serious disagreement here. Doubt, or lack thereof, as well as CAPABILITY for doubt, or lack thereof, is something I would think falls under the category of "BELIEF" and is not related directly to "TRUTH". That is why I reintroduced "absolute belief" -- because it is what I would consider a synonym for indubitability, and so perhaps you see now why I am so skeptical of your assertion that indubitability guarantees (or reflects?) positive truth value. IIRC, it was to try to illustrate this disagreement that I recently reintroduced the term. (Disregarding the older mess.)
The lack of the capability for doubt is what you categorize under the word belief? Sorry, that’s what I mean by knowledge though. If I accepted your use of that word I’d just specify that I’m talking about the ‘particular’ within your ‘category’ which I would call knowledge.
Likewise, the capability for doubt is a characteristic of what I mean by the word belief.
I have no problem if you consider “absolute belief” a synonym for indubitability…
Realize that you’ll need to make a more articulate distinction by way of definition as this here only appears to find different words to refer to what I’m referring to.
First, I question whether being unable to conceive doubt of something is really a requirement of knowledge. Secondly, I question whether indubitable propositional input can be consciously received.
This relates to the previous bit I already addressed on the ‘composition’ of knowledge. I’m not sure how to join them clearly at this point. If you could count the explanations as one when you respond next it would be good.
First, well, being absolutely certain of something (what I am using as synonymous with ‘being indubitable) is what I find epistemology has been after (certainly a description from Descartes when he introduced his ‘methodological doubt’). So that’s what I’m talking about when I speak of knowledge. I don’t wish to find something possibly incorrect, something as unstable as a ‘mere belief’. If you’re not talking about what I’m talking about, ok.
Second, ok. I’d ask why but I don’t want to start another issue on the direction of this point (or rather another angle of this debate). Please keep in mind the difference between an analytical disagreement versus one about the particular nature of our reality. It would nice to know which kind of disagreement you are having when you say you disagree. (I would really hope it’s not the latter as that would force us to digress into another argument.)
I could be wrong, but that sounds like you're suggesting I included that term just because I was feeling trapped by the dwindling ambiguity in this thread. I don't know how I could be expected to take that other than as an insulting accusation, unless perhaps it's supposed to be armchair psychology.
Ok if you feel that way. Not saying it is intentional of course. My purpose in saying it was for clarifying my perception of what’s happening in your position (in hopes you might recognize it but whatever).
Just double-checking: when I wrote "in certain cases preexisting knowedge is NOT necessary for justification", you are telling me that you do not believe you understood what I meant when I put those words in that sentence? (As opposed to not seeing how it would make sense for me to believe that statement, whose meaning you understood.)
I understand the individual words, just not what they’re referring to together. Since my understanding of the meaning of justification obviously makes it literally nonsense. This isn’t an instance of me saying it’s not possible in our particular reality – because, as I’ve said before, this is an analytical issue (Wherein I say what I say about justification on the basis of definition.) So I’m just waiting for some explanation that shows something else to it or where I catch a different meaning your referring to.