| Final-Fan said: (Firstly, is there anything you don't understand of my statement of your position and its consequence; or, if you believe that you understand my statement of your position and its consequence but that I am mistaken about one or both (or have left out crucial parts), then how so? Secondly, if the first is OK, is there anything you don't understand of my position and its consequence?) |
1. “Your position is that in order to "justify" any belief as knowledge one would have to have knowledge with which to justify that belief.”
Not quite. The way you’re posing my position sounds like I’m still acknowledging justification represents some real/applicable concept in epistemology and that I’m saying it just happens to be impossible to achieve.
What I’m trying to communicate is that justification in epistemology amounts to “establishing” that which it already essentially is. This is contrary to establishing that which it was not – and notice this is the only sense in which “establishing” holds any meaning in the first place. That is to say, if something is already what it is, then setting out to establishing it as such is ‘meaningless’.
As with the example of rationalism: The premises already literally contain the information we have in the logical conclusion. Such a logical argument is only a mere demonstration of the implicative relationship set between the propositions we deem “premises” and the proposition we deem the “conclusion”.
It is totally against the epistemological hope vested in “justification” to start where you want to end. Yet that’s what justification essentially would mean for epistemology. Thus this is why I say justification is meaningless for epistemology.
In epistemology we have that concept of belief (a position without an set truth value – something dubitable) and the concept of knowledge (a position with a set truth value – that which is indubitable), but “justification” could only have meant starting with knowledge to get back to knowledge (essentially including the same knowledge – as in the example of rationalism) – Thus the elusive concept of “justification” in epistemology clearly does not have anything to do with starting with belief and process it’s way to knowledge - Of which was the epistemological hope vested in “justification”. Justification is not an applicable concept in the epistemological manner of moving belief to the status of knowledge. It is in that sense, meaningless.
With the concept of knowledge, there are no distinct parts to gather together in which you could then call an act of ‘establishing’. This is what I meant previously when I said that knowledge is something fundamental.
Not to be annoying but just to take the opportunity on the current clarity and relate this to the ‘hypothetical’ answer of revelation: As there is not a [logically necessary] process in our possession by which to morph that which is dubitable to that which is indubitable, revelation (having that which is indubitable given to you from that which has it) would of course be an answer without a [logically necessary] problem, as simplistic as it may come off after so much ramble.
I feel I’ve written more clearly here than I have before. I would beseech you to carefully examine what I’m setting forth in specific consideration to the definitions (the meanings) compared to the way you’ve been using the words throughout in your position, as I feel the confusion comes in being somewhat vague and general with these meanings.
Not as an indictment but right when I felt we were nearing some clarity before I noticed you introduced the term “absolute belief” again and I personally think that’s a direct result of having to plant a troubled ambiguity elsewhere as the use of our terms were becoming more isolated.
2. “However, it is my position that in certain cases preexisting knowedge is NOT necessary for justification. (I've attempted to explain the reasoning for that position, but let's get to that later.)”
I understand you’re using this formulation of words to represent your position, so in that sense I understand. But making sense of them together in my mind in consideration of their meaning – we call it your ‘‘reasoning’’ (and your application of it to an example) – I don’t understand.
I put the word reasoning in quotations to make the point that this ‘‘argument’’ is one of an analytical nature (meaning of words, the whole ‘‘realm of the mind’’ thing) wherein we are actually trying to explain clearly the relationship and implications between meanings of certain words. It’s not an argument in the sense that we’re battling over a particular view of something in reality and dealing with non-analytical conclusions. Hence why our accusations on this main issue are coming in the form of confusion, ambiguity, and meaninglessness, as opposed to something like “no that’s just not true, look it up in book X”.
The only thing I’ve been inclined to suppose so far on the ‘reasoning’ and principle you posed here is that it’s sophistry - a maneuver of words guided by vagueness or ambiguity. So in that sense I’m still waiting to understand what you mean fully.
I don’t mean to tell you my “inclination” for any other purpose than further clarifying my problem with your position and hoping to inspire a meticulous bout of clarity. (I think around 90% of philosophy is living because of sophistry, so my explanation of inclining to believe your position is ‘sophistry’ isn’t suppose to come off as some insulting, grave accusation.)
Okami
To lavish praise upon this title, the assumption of a common plateau between player and game must be made. I won't open my unworthy mouth.
