At this point you guys are just seeing who will die first =p

Well I know it may sound silly but I agree. I always found absurd that parents baptise their children. Is ridiculuous.

Go atheism indeed!

 If that's what it takes :)

Preliminary thoughts (after skimming the reply): It seems to me that you, appolose, are saying, "Suppose one receives input that is absolute knowledge. Therefore, he receives absolute knowledge." This strikes me as assuming the conclusion, that is, that the input is absolute knowledge. [edit:  As you can hopefully tell, when I skimmed I missed the possibility that you are just putting forth a "let's assume for the sake of argument" type hypothetical.]

I am taking a step back and asking "Suppose one receives input. How could an objective observer (let alone the recipient) prove that that input is true, truth being a prerequisite for it being knowledge? [edit2: and, for that matter, justification, i.e. proof, also being prerequisite?]"

NOTE: This is obviously not a point-by-point response, and is not necessarily going to have much connection with my detailed answer. Nevertheless, I would appreciate it if you replied to this explaining how my simplified depiction is incorrect.

(1) Fine.  I'm not sure why you brought it up (what in that post you were responding to with that) but ... fine.

(2) Am I to understand that you are using this HYPOTHETICALLY?  As in, "assuming for the sake of argument that there exists a form of input that confers absolute and non-sensory data ..."?  Because if you are then ... you know what, nevermind.  If that's the case, I am personally going to blame you for wasting a small portion of my life, but let's not argue about that.  Instead:  what's your point?  Why are we assuming this?  Where are you going with this hypothetical revelation? 
     Or is that all?  (I ask that last only because it seems to me that you may be saying that in paragraph 5.)  Are you simply saying, "If we assume revelation is possible, then revelation is possible" in order to get around having no possibility of absolute knowedge?  (See (3b2).)
     (Empiricism:  see (5a).)

(3) 
(a)  Well, it's quite simple.  If "you are certain", that refers to your belief.  If "it is certain", that does not.  Considering the postscript I thoughtfully included and directed you to, I am surprised -- even with all that has gone before -- that you would fail to comprehend my meaning. 

(b1)  "If I am able to doubt it in my mind, apparently it’s not absolute knowledge. If I can’t confess I’m 100% certain and that it can’t be anything else, then apparently it’s not absolute knowledge."
     This is TOTALLY dodging the point.  What I mean by that is that your statement only addresses the BELIEF part of knowledge, not the TRUTH part that I am concerned with [edit: let alone justification etc.; see (3c) and (3c2)]. (NOTE 1)  And you also seem to misunderstand the concept of proof.  Doubt is not required.  I do not have any doubt at all of gravity in the perceived world, but I can still do tests to confirm it (leaving aside the question of whether the perceived world exists etc. etc.).   

(b2)  "Keep in mind the point I made a while back about whether or not one thinks any knowledge is dependent upon also knowing the source it came from at the same time."
     I do remember that, but I never conceded what I saw to be your point.  Although if we just hypothesize that the revelation exists, then obviously no source is necessary -- we just assume it.  But for it to actually exist, it would have to have a source with absolute credibility, which to the skeptical viewpoint (it seems to me) would not exist.  (Except if by another revelation, which would need another source, etc. etc.)

( c )  No, what I'm saying is that ineffable truth doesn't count.  If you have a belief that you cannot prove, then to take it as truth is a crap shoot.  Maybe it is true and maybe it isn't.  You're 100% sure it's true, but that's only belief UNLESS you can prove it.  And if proof is impossible ... then too bad. 
     [edit:  (c2) I don't have to prove that revelation (of absolute truth in addition to belief) does not exist.  All I have to show is that we cannot confirm the truth independently of the input that is claimed to be revelation, and we also cannot confirm that the alleged revelation actually is giving us absolute truth, i.e. that it is revelation, without first assuming that it (or some other input) is revelation.  (In other words, IMO you're ignoring the problem of "authenticating" the input as revelation.  What if it's NOT revelation but claims to be?  Input cannot self-authenticate, either, as I recall some of your earlier posts may have been claiming, any more than empiricism can.)  [edit3:  Therefore, whether the belief bestowed by the alleged revelation is true or not, there is no justification for believing it is true and therefore it is not knowledge.]  It MAY be truth, but so might empiricism-based beliefs be true.]  [edit2:  So revelation (of true beliefs) could perhaps possibly exist, but only in a totally useless way.] 
     [edit:  (c3) Also, I hope your first statement ("Basically...") is not implying that I think truth does not exist or inherently cannot exist in our minds.  That would be grossly incorrect; note the "without proof that can be articulated" modifier.  The issue is which truths can be known.  I am asserting that one must be able to prove a belief in order to know it.  If you say that we cannot prove any beliefs, well then a consequence of that would be that we don't truly know anything.  But that's not something I'm declaring by fiat or by virtue of our minds not being constitutionally able to have truth or something weird like that.  In fact I do say there are things we can know, as in (5b), but you didn't understand that at the time.]

(d)  Okay.  What I was saying was that the way I see it, revelation can only be shown to give subjective truth [edit:  if even that], which we agree is meaningless.  This is the connection to the discussion. 

(4)  Let's recap: 
Me:  "[Interpretation =] "the sense data means X".  Such a statement can be made with varying levels of certainty.  Obviously if the interpretation and sense data are both absolute knowledge then the level of certainty is 100%, which is my point." 
You:  "Varying levels of certainty?"  [And anyway, what's the relevance?] 
Me:  ""Varying" could mean between 0% and 100% only and be just as valid. [... I thought you said] that "interpretation" implied uncertainty and I don't know how else I could have taken it.  So I responded that no, interpretation did not necessarily imply uncertainty."
     So, "valid" in this case means that different interpretations could have only either 0% or 100% certainty and have "varying" certainty.  (Which is to say, I used the word correctly and my statement is not nonsense.)  Do you disagree?
     Second:  did you in fact mean to say that "interpretation" (as I used it) implies uncertainty and if so, do you still hold this position? 
     And lastly, do you agree that revelation-based interpretation of sense data could have 100% certainty?  (See previous posts for more detail.)  If not, why?  [edit:  by "100% certainty" I mean in this case that the interpretation is inevitably true, assuming your revelation.]

(5) 
(a)  Well, I was putting revelation in the same class of input as raw sense data, but if (for the sake of argument) you separate the two and say empiricism can only rely on sense data, then I would agree with what you said. 
     We can argue about who is right in whether or not that's "empiricism" if you really, really want to.  (But you have to have both "really"s.)

(b)  What I mean is that the Pythagorean Theorem is true whether or not Pythagoras existed, or I really read about it in a textbook, or anything.  [edit:  And even if Pythagoras didn't discover it, which Wikpedia seems to think is likely.  Who knew?]  a^2+b^2=c^2.  It's still true even if I'm in the Matrix.  It would be true even I believed it wasn't.  So I got that truth from input, even if the input is not a true representation of the world.  Do you get it now? 

(NOTE 1)  I suppose this part may be irrelevant if revelation of absolute knowledge is and shall remain only hypothetical, in the "let's assume for the sake of argument" sense.

(NOTE 2)  You say that having to prove revelation begs the question.  This is only true when assuming revelation for argument's sake.  For positing revelation as a form of input that could actually take place, however, the opposite is true:  although a revelation needs no proof by definition (right?), it must be proven that a given input is in fact revelation in order to accept it as such [edit: that is, for it to qualify, whether it is "accepted" (believed) or not].  Isn't that so?  If not, why not?  If so, doesn't this run up against the same problem as empiricism, if not worse?

Brief addendum: I was glancing through our early history in this thread and spotted two things:

1. You said "you're right when you say non-sensory input isn't more likely to be true than sensory input". Either "revelation" is sensory input or it is not. In either case it is no more likely to be true than sensory input by your admission, no?

2. We talked about the fact that your suggestion of "an alternative" was hypothetical. (I gather in the "could perhaps exist" sense -- please correct if I am wrong.) But "revelation" as you now describe it (conferring absolute knowledge) is not such an alternative IMO (see the mega-post).

“I am asserting that one must be able to prove a belief in order to know it.  If you say that we cannot prove any beliefs, well then a consequence of that would be that we don't truly know anything.”

“And you also seem to misunderstand the concept of proof.  Doubt is not required.  I do not have any doubt at all of gravity in the perceived world, but I can still do tests to confirm it (leaving aside the question of whether the perceived world exists etc. etc.).”

“If you have a belief that you cannot prove, then to take it as truth is a crap shoot.  Maybe it is true and maybe it isn't.  You're 100% sure it's true, but that's only belief UNLESS you can prove it.  And if proof is impossible ... then too bad.”

“I don't have to prove that revelation (of absolute truth in addition to belief) does not exist.  All I have to show is that we cannot confirm the truth independently of the input that is claimed to be revelation, and we also cannot confirm that the alleged revelation actually is giving us absolute truth, i.e. that it is revelation, without first assuming that it (or some other input) is revelation.  (In other words, IMO you're ignoring the problem of "authenticating" the input as revelation.  What if it's NOT revelation but claims to be?  Input cannot self-authenticate, either, as I recall some of your earlier posts may have been claiming, any more than empiricism can.)  [edit3:  Therefore, whether the belief bestowed by the alleged revelation is true or not, there is no justification for believing it is true and therefore it is not knowledge.]  It MAY be truth, but so might empiricism-based beliefs be true.]  [edit2:  So revelation (of true beliefs) could perhaps possibly exist, but only in a totally useless way.]”

    From such preceding quotes I gather your contention is that absolute knowledge (truth) must be proven for it to be truly (lol) absolute knowledge (truth). Or rather, for your sake, if a mind holds a belief it cannot prove it cannot move said belief to “absolute knowledge” status (truth).

    I’d respond to that but, first, taking one step at a time, you seem to say that such a problem wouldn’t apply if I am, in fact, posing revelation as an answer to the problem of epistemology hypothetically. I really don’t know how potential problems go away if I clarify the answer’s hypothetical status.

    E.g. I might say “If we had my toolbox we could fix the machine”. Then you say “But your tool box doesn’t have the tool you need.” How does pointing out I suggested the solution only hypothetically make the problem go away, as it still wouldn’t work if I actually had the toolbox?

    Likewise if you’re absolutely certain (lol) that a belief must be proven to be considered absolute knowledge (truth), how does that clear the problems you see in my suggestion of “what if” absolute knowledge (truth) were given to you?

(Preliminary Thoughts)

“It seems to me that you, appolose, are saying, "Suppose one receives input that is absolute knowledge. Therefore, he receives absolute knowledge." This strikes me as assuming the conclusion, that is, that the input is absolute knowledge.”

    Suppose one receives input that is a penny. Therefore he receives a penny. That seems to be pretty coherent/logical to me. Now this is the same composition of subject and predicate as with absolute knowledge. If I misunderstood what you meant in those premises I think I would have to surrender my attempt to understand you completely.

(2)

What's your point?  Why are we assuming this?  Where are you going with this hypothetical revelation?

…

Are you simply saying, "If we assume revelation is possible, then revelation is possible" in order to get around having no possibility of absolute knowedge?

    Almost. Inserting “assume” kinda sounds like it’s moving past mere hypothetical suggestion and, well… assuming it. It should just be “If revelation occurs (sure “is possible” *hope that doesn’t carry some biased implication*) then you would have revelation. (And again what I mean by revelation is given absolute knowledge, or rather given truth, etc.)

(3.b1)

And you also seem to misunderstand the concept of proof.  Doubt is not required.  I do not have any doubt at all of gravity in the perceived world, but I can still do tests to confirm it (leaving aside the question of whether the perceived world exists etc. etc.).   

…Wait are you saying you have no doubt that gravity exists apart from confirming it through tests (aka proving)?? (Along with the apparently unnecessary option of confirming it just for the heck of it, as you apparently have no doubt already.)

(3.b2)

“…if we just hypothesize that the revelation exists, then obviously no source is necessary -- we just assume it.  But for it to actually exist, it would have to have a source with absolute credibility, which to the skeptical viewpoint (it seems to me) would not exist.  (Except if by another revelation, which would need another source, etc. etc.)”

Sorry, I can’t understand this.

(3.d)

    Since we agree that subjective truth is meaningless, if revelation “were possible” (in your words) than it would have to be giving objective truth. And that’s what I’m proposing in saying it would give “absolute knowledge”.

    I think perhaps you’re argument as to why revelation can’t do this is related to the main issue at the top. And it should come out again as I’m trying to take it step by step (inshallah) (haha, inside joke). So let’s just leave it till it comes up there.

(4.)

   So, "valid" in this case means that different interpretations could have only either 0% or 100% certainty and have "varying" certainty.  (Which is to say, I used the word correctly and my statement is not nonsense.)  Do you disagree?

A.

   Sorry, the way you’re trying to define something doesn’t even make sense to me – I mean the sentence itself I suppose (as a definition). The way you’re using “interpretations” still doesn’t make sense with the meaning I have of it. And I can’t think of a relationship between something that is 0% certain and “valid”.

    If this turns out not be a mere definition and rather some philosophy (belief) of yours I didn’t see its construction anywhere and so it seems like it’s coming out of the blue without rhyme or reason.

B.

    I’ve only used interpretation in relation to sense data. Interpretation means a belief about a particular moment/blob of sense data that seems to be consistent (fit) with the particular moment/blob of sense data. Like we see a bunch of colors that would fit with the belief that the sense data represents a barn. That’s an interpretation.

    The term also indicates what I’ve been saying that there are many beliefs that would fit any particular moment/blob of sense data. Calling it an interpretation already implies that there are more of them available.

    This is why when you apply “interpretations” to “absolute knowledge” it has no meaning to me.

C.

And lastly, do you agree that revelation-based interpretation of sense data could have 100% certainty? … If not, why? 

    I find that ambiguous. I’ve been positing that revelation (which already carries 100% certainty in the meaning I am proposing within this answer to epistemology) would be telling you which interpretation of sense data was correct at any particular moment/blob of sense data.

    I really can’t explain the other meaning you might have in this as it truly comes off as meaningless to me.

(5.)

A.

What? I am putting revelation in the same class as raw sense data. That is, I don’t separate the two in the status of absolute knowledge. After what you said there…  I just can’t keep figuring out what is happening. But one thing I wish was clear – empiricism is a word. It’s a word that been used to refer to the doctrine that we can gain absolute knowledge [of the world at least in this argument] through the sole use of raw sense data. That’s just what it has meant (in part). Why confuse it by making it mean something else right now?

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/empiricism

B.

    Yes, math and other such analytical, meaning-based propositions in the realm of the mind are not dependent upon sense data and/or gaining knowledge of what sense data represents.

    Math and said analytics are true by mere confession of their meaning in the mind. It’s not related to what is true of, or rather what exists in, what we commonly call reality or the world. (e.g. A bachelor means an unmarried man by confession of my mind, but does a bachelor even exist (back to the question of epistemology)? 2+2 is 4 but are there two and two objects in reality (back to the question of epistemology)?

00000000000000000000

   Forgive me but I feel I must make an attempt to explain why your communication seems so confusing to me. These are not necessarily the best examples but more the most recent ones:

Inadequate Clarification

   Regarding point 3. I clearly tell you that I don’t understand what you mean in the distinction of “It is certain” and “How the recipient is certain”. You respond with “Well, it's quite simple.  If "you are certain", that refers to your belief.  If "it is certain", that does not.”

    This basically reiterated that you feel there is a distinction of meaning in those terms you’re using. I asked for clarification on that though. (The small insert “that refers to your belief” hardly brings clarification as, besides being obviously necessary to that term, this whole mess is related to the meaning of belief. More importantly you leave “is it certain” with no clarification other than saying it’s not what the other thing you said was. That was already obvious when you made the distinction between the terms.)

    Also, you mention the postscript you included originally but I had that in mind already when I was asking for further clarification for the distinction you are making as I didn’t understand what meaning either. I just didn’t post it along with the other things you said.

    Regarding point 4 (slightly past example). I informed you that I didn’t understand what relationship “varying levels of certainty” had with anything of what you were saying and/or the subject as a whole. You responded by defining your use of the word varying, which I already knew and which did not address what relationship the term “varying levels of certainty” had with anything (and as I specifically inquired, was it something to do with a method of truth (or whatever you mean by certainty) that you’re proposing of which I’ve never clearly heard before?).

   After defining the word varying you add the curious proposition “and be just as valid”. As this does not perform any clarity to the specifics I requested it only further confuses me because now you’re introducing another term that would strongly relate to epistemology – and we’ve clearly has issues with the use of those kinds of terms previously. So you bring this one in with no clarification following. (I would understand ‘valid’ as I always would but throughout this subject you seem to be implying things that deny my concept of it, or at least the meaning is already something involved at the heart of our disagreement or confusion.)

    In the next bit of your response that followed on my confusion over a particular sentence you quote me wondering what you meant by an “interpretation of absolute knowledge” and where I mentioning that if you predicate “absolute knowledge” with “a mere interpretation” it already goes against what I’ve been meaning by absolute knowledge the entire time. You respond by saying “I took this to mean that "interpretation" implied uncertainty and I don't know how else I could have taken it.  So I responded that no, interpretation did not necessarily imply uncertainty.”

    You didn’t clarify what you meant by the particular sentence I didn’t understand. You do, however, quote what the “problem sentence” was apparently in response to. But what you say following that… I can’t even begin to articulate the difficulty in finding the meaning or relationship it has to what you quoted and to the problem sentence.

Possible Sophistry

    Regarding point 3. Here amidst the whole context of discussing how one comes to absolute knowledge (which is obviously a subject involving the meaning of “certainty”) and you make the distinction… “you are certain” vs. “it is certain”.

    You do realize that when we say “it is certain”… it refers to us being certain of it, right? Or are you truly… truly saying that “certainty” is some sort of attribute to an object or belief? The glass of water is cold, clear, and… certain? Or rather, what’s the difference between a belief I am certain about and a certain (obvious not meant in the sense of ‘particular’ here) belief I may have? What could you possibly mean by this distinction? And I don’t mean to say that you can’t mean something by it but, rather, how was I supposed to understand it without any clarification on your possibly stipulative use of it?

    Even if you’re able to explain it to me now (or even if you feel the postscript made it clearer, which it didn’t for me) I think it’s just a terribly ambiguous and confusing use of terms in the first place.

Consistency and Clarity of Terminology

    Your use of these epistemic terms has often confused me. The way you use them at times seems to indicate you understand them as I’m using them, but then later you don’t and make something strange out of them [perhaps sophistic as I wonder at times]. A recent example being “interpretation of absolute knowledge”. At certain points you seem to understand my use of the term “interpretations”, like when you said “I don't think you understand what I mean by interpretation.  It's simply ‘the sense data means X’.” But then at another point you brought up “interpretations of absolute knowledge” in which those words in such a relationship just don’t have any relationship in meaning to me.

     Another example:

“What I mean by that is that your statement only addresses the BELIEF half of knowledge, not the TRUTH half that I am concerned with.”

    I don’t think I’ve heard this from you before, or at least in such a clear manner (?), and I really don’t know what you could mean in the distinction. Certainly because we are having so much difficulty with these specific terms it would at least be befitting to over-clarify when using a new expression or saying something in a new way.

    Another example of specific changing terminology: Regarding point 3.C2 you used a number of different terms to convey the same process, beginning in point C with “prove” which then became confirm, authenticate, and justification. It’s just an example of the specific way of saying something keeps changing which makes things tedious, with so many other along side it.

    Further, it seems when you address a reoccurring problem you see in my response you respond to it at every point it occurs. It would seem more effective to group them together under one heading and respond to it. But regardless of that, what makes it more confusing is that every time you address the reoccurring problem you seem to use different terminology or different expressions every time. Or rather you make the terms somewhat stipulative without giving a clear reference or further clarification of what you mean. So I’m left trying to figure out what you mean at every point and, along with that, attempt to realize your fundamental contention.

   It just seems we should know our terminology by now but your different expressions continue to add and add.

Following the Progress of an Issue

    Regarding point 1, you asked me what I was saying yes to. So I responded by directly quoting your concern “I'm trying to figure out whether to you knowledge = truth”. Following that I clearly said that this was the quote that I was answering with a “yes” to (with clarification). You then respond with asking me why I brought it up.

    You brought a concern/question up. I responded/answered it. I don’t see the sense in asking me “why I brought it up”.

Context-less Introduction

   Despite my mistake in not being clearer the first time on point 1 I think I’ve seen this sort of context-less introduction several times in your responses. I have one specifically in mind that took me a while to figure out but I think it’s too far back and I’m not up for that much searching.

   I think we should avoid starting anything out without clear reference, quote, or summary.

Confusing Philosophy on Knowledge

    They’re many more quotes like these. Truly I just don’t know how to form an understanding of your position on knowledge/belief/truth/certainty while considering these things you’ve said about them. I’m just hoping you can see how confusing it might be to put together.

“This is TOTALLY dodging the point.  What I mean by that is that your statement only addresses the BELIEF half of knowledge, not the TRUTH half that I am concerned with.”

“I am taking a step back and asking 'Suppose one receives input. How could an objective observer (let alone the recipient) prove that that input is true, truth being a prerequisite for it being knowledge?’ ”

I don't think you understand what I mean by interpretation.  It's simply "the sense data means X".  Such a statement can be made with varying levels of certainty. 

“But anyway, Descartes asked how we could know absolutely for sure that we weren't dreaming all of our existence (or in the Matrix or whatever), and I don't have an answer ... so obviously if the world we sense isn't absolute beyond question, then observation-based science (or any sense-based belief set) is not absolute either.”

“And you also seem to misunderstand the concept of proof.  Doubt is not required.  I do not have any doubt at all of gravity in the perceived world, but I can still do tests to confirm it (leaving aside the question of whether the perceived world exists etc. etc.).”

lol... Wall of text pawn 0_o

@ Preamble: 
@ Paragraph 1:  Yes.  If you look at the Wikipedia article for epistemology, you see not only "belief" and "truth" tied into "knowledge", but "justification" as well.  So unless input can justify ITSELF, then revelation cannot give absolute knowledge by its own authority.  (Leaving aside the Gettier problem.)  I say that input cannot justify itself by its own authority.  (When I say "by its own authority" I mean that it is NOT like the input of the Pythagorean Theorem, which justifies itself because the math works out, or rather, is justified by the math working out instead of being justified by itself.)

@ Paragraphs 2 and 3:  No.  The (colloquial) sense of "hypothetically" in which the problem would go away is if you then said, "But if the tool was in the toolbox, and we had the toolbox, then we could fix it."  
     [edit:  Anyway, IMO your example could have been better.  In your example, the first statement is already hypothetical as in "assuming for the sake of argument (even though it is false)", whereas a problem I have with your revelation is that I thought it was presented as hypothetical as in "this could, perhaps, actually exist".  (i.e. "If we have the toolbox then we can fix it." / "But we don't.")  Was I wrong?] 

@ Paragraph 4:  My problem goes away if you say, "fine it can't exist, BUT IF IT DID then (whatever)".  [edit:  I think I'd better expand on that.  It seems to me that you're suggesting revelation as a method whereby one is given absolute knowledge that lacks justification (proof).  I think that this violates the definition of knowledge, but if there was some point that could be made by assuming that that wasn't the case for the sake of argument, then that might be worth pursuing.]

@ Preliminary Thoughts: 
It's perfectly coherent and logical as a tautology that is not proved or justified by anything but itself.  That is fine for defining something:  "I got input.  I shall call it "a penny".  I got a penny."  But if you say "pennies are made of copper" or "pennies are made of zinc" or "absolute knowledge is true justified belief" then you have to back it up with more than the tautology itself. 

I'm not at all sure I understood what you meant by "Now this is the same composition of subject and predicate as with absolute knowledge."

(2) 
I suppose I'm just throwing "assume" in there to emphasize the assumption inherent in "if".  I regret any confusion that may have caused, but I don't think it should have.  "Assuming revelation occurs, then revelation occurs".  I can get on board with that. 

(3b1)
Recap: 
I said:  "How do you propose to differentiate absolute belief from absolute truth in your own mind?"  (I was trying to imply that you can't except by testing and proving (or disproving, the latter of which would destroy the wrong absolute belief).  Inconclusive proof would not harm the belief, only show that proof yet eluded the believer.)
You said:  "If I am able to doubt it in my mind, apparently it’s not absolute knowledge. If I can’t confess I’m 100% certain and that it can’t be anything else, then apparently it’s not absolute knowledge."  (I thought this implied that we cannot test something that we absolutely believe.  If not, I don't know what your point was.)
I said:  We don't need to doubt in order to test.  (Using gravity as an example.)
Does that clear things up any? 

(3b2)
Here I used "hypothesize" in the "let's assume for the sake of argument" (colloquial) sense. 
     As for "But for it to actually exist, it would have to have a source with absolute credibility, which to the skeptical viewpoint (it seems to me) would not exist.":
     It seems to me that this analysis actually AGREES with an earlier post of yours:  "[Revelation] holds no process or application, only the reception of knowledge from that which imputes knowledge. And what I mean by that is, one is at the mercy of that which holds knowledge (although it may be called the act of presupposition from a certain perspective)."
     Please explain how my claim about revelation differs from your claim about it, aside from that mine doubts the existence of the knowledge-imputing agency. 

(3d)
Clarification:  I meant to say that it is meaningless objectviely.  The distinction shouldn't matter for this part of our discussion. 
     Are you saying that what you mean by "asbolute knowledge" is literally and ONLY "objective truth"?  Not epistemological knowledge? 
     If that is the case then I might have to concede that I can't disprove that revelation could be possible. 

(4a)  What I meant by "valid" was simply and only that "I used the word ["varying"] correctly and my statement is not nonsense".  Not that a 0% certain interpretation was "valid".  I said this because IIRC you were making noise about my use of "varying".  

(4b)  "Calling it an interpretation already implies that there are more of them available."  More interpretations, you mean?  Are you saying that revelation could not provide a one true interpretation of a given pattern of sense data, even future replications of said pattern?  (Given that said replications were completely identical.  Or do you deny that such a thing could happen?) 

(4c)
Related to (4b):  I was suggesting that (presuming revelation) revelation could provide an interpretation of sense data that would ALSO apply to certain sense data that occurred in the future -- i.e. that a particular revelation of an interpretation of sense data didn't necessarily only to interpreting one particular moment of sense data.  And you wouldn't need an additional revelation that said "use this interpretation now". 

(5a)
Well, then!  I am classing both as absolute belief.  Also, I have been consistently saying that revelation could be considered "sensed".  (I think you put it differently a while ago by saying that sense data was a form of revelation.  Either way they're similar.)

(5b)
All I was saying was that that was an exception from not being able to get absolute knowledge from input.  The exception is possible because of the nature of mathematics, as you say.  I LEARNED it by input, but it is not dependent on input. 

@ Inadequate Clarification: 
“Well, it's quite simple.  If "you are certain", that refers to your belief.  If "it is certain", that does not.”
     Look.  I made a mistake in involving the word "certain".  I compounded this mistake by using it in different ways.  On the other hand, a discerning reader might be able to glean the ways I was using it from context. 
     If A PERSON is certain, then that can only (reasonably) be a reference to their belief.  I should have said "he believes" instead of "he is certain" in this case.  
     If "IT" is certain, then that is NOT a reference to a person's (or persons') belief.  And if it doesn't mean belief, then what can it mean but truth?  I should have said "it is true" instead of "it is certain".  [edit: to answer the supposedly rhetorical question, I suppose it could also refer to justification.  What a mess.]
     When I said "level of certainty", that meant "likelihood of truth". 
     My postscript said, "I apologize for using the word "certainty" irregularly -- sometimes to mean belief (i.e. "you are certain") and sometimes epistemological truth."  I really, really don't know how to make it any more fucking clear than that.  In fact, everything I just wrote is basically a restatement of that postscript.  

"varying"
I thought you were complaining that there was either absolute certainty likelihood of truth or total uncertainty lack of likelihood of truth (in the face of infinite alternatives) [edit: and no middle ground, so that your complaint was about the word "varying" being used when there were only two absolute and polar opposite possibilities].  So I defended my use of the word by saying that eliminating all possibilities between 0% and 100% did not invalidate my use of the word "varying", nor the point I was making.  
     I thought you didn't understand what I meant.  That would have explained how you didn't understand how what I meant was relevant to the discussion. 
     Actually, wait.  I just looked back. 
"I informed you that I didn’t understand what relationship “varying levels of certainty” had with anything of what you were saying and/or the subject as a whole."
     Actually, no, you said, "Besides not knowing what you meant by that, I either don’t know what you mean by the last sentence or don’t see the relevancy in it with anything I’ve said."  You said you didn't know what I meant.  How was I supposed to take that other than you not knowing what I meant?  You said you either didn't understand the meaning of or the relevancy of the following sentence -- and I told you.  

@ Possible Sophistry: 
I believe I answered this in "Inadequate Clarification".  I believe, however, that I ALSO answered it in that postscript, so your mileage may vary.  In any case, I concede that it's my fault for introducing that particular confusion to our discussion but blame you for keeping it alive.  If you're fishing for an apology, I redirect you to that postscript. 

@ Consistency and Clarity of Terminology: 
1.  "interpretations of sense data" and "interpretations of absolute knowledge" seem perfectly compatible to me, bearing in mind that for argument's sake I am supposing that sense data is absolute knowledge in order to discuss revelatory interpretations of such. 

(NOTE 1)

2.  You don't ... know what I could mean in the distinction?  What, exactly, is unclear?  I find it hard to believe you truly don't understand that I am differentiating between truth and belief.  Do you not understand why I might wish to examine separately whether an alleged revelation gives belief, truth, or justification for believing it to be truth?  
     To be honest I think I actually misspoke.  The JUSTIFICATION angle is even more critical than the truth angle:  an alleged revelation MIGHT be true, whereas I think it CAN'T be justified [edit:  by itself]. 

3.  Well, I'm sorry, but using multiple similar terms to make sure the basic idea gets across without someone getting hung up on a specific misinterpretation is a habit I find hard to break, and frankly I'm not convinced I should.  I admit this occasionally causes a problem like "certain", but it dispels such problems as well. 

4.  (Repetition)  I had been doing point-by-point in order, but since I'm doing a pretty comprehensive numbering system already I'll try to compile similar issues for unified discussion as you say.  

@ Following the Progress of an Issue
But that was in a previous post.  The quoted parts were all from the other post, so when you just started with "Yes" I was confused what you were addressing from the post you were quoting.  I appreciate that you answered, but next time when replying to multiple posts please mark more clearly. 
     It should be noted that I was misusing the word "knowledge" in that post.  You should have pointed that out and demanded clarification, unless you missed that fact. 

@ Context-less Introduction
Was I replying to multiple posts?  Also, "several times" but it took you forever to find an example? 

@ Confusing Philosophy on Knowledge
Not really, considering the various contexts.  I mean, this discussion is pretty byzantine, but I don't think that my position is what's complicating things.  Do you think spending our time on reconciling those quotes would actually help? 

(NOTE 1):  "Belief half"  OH FUCK.  Are you working off of an old version of the post?  Does the edit change anything for you?  I can't remember what if anything else I edited after that! 

I want you to define knowledge now. I have to leave for work but IIRC you've made comments implying you see it as "true belief". Is justification not required in your opinion? That would certainly explain a lot.

[Edit:  I notice that in your response to (3c) (etc.) you keep saying "absolute knowledge (truth)".  Am I to understand that you are defining "knowledge = truth"??  Or does it simply signify that we are discussing the truth portion of the alleged absolute knowledge?]