Because the state gets its money from all of its citizens, that means that anything it is providing for free is actually paid for by everyone. If you believe that the state is wrongly taking your property (in this case, your money) from you, then your rights are being violated.

No, it's all about human interaction being on a voluntary basis. There isn't just one ethical system based on negative rights, since anyone can start from that basis and build off of it in a different direction. Locke was a proponent of such a system, but he also believed in a god and thought that man's duty was to live his life to God's delight. This is why merely rolling over and dying isn't sufficient in the Lockean view, and why he was opposed to suicide. The inalienable right to life in Locke's view meant just that: you literally can't get out until God releases you. I'd disagree, since I think a person wholly owns himself and isn't beholden to a god who may or may not exist, and if he wants to end his life he should be able to. I don't think suicide is always an ethical choice, though. It's a remarkably shitty thing to do if it means absconding from your responsibilities to your kids, for example.

Can you show that Locke stood for negative rights alone?  I believe Locke also argued for the concept of a social contract, which restricted some liberties, so that a person can enjoy the greatest good.

And if you look at the preamble to the U.S Constitution, you end up find cause for a case of positive rights:

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Promote the general welfare lends right into a case of positive rights.  And then, with these positive rights will come duties.  The issue with a negative rights alone argument, or the right to not be bothered, is that an individuals have the right to not exercise their rights.  One can refuse to exercise certain rights.

And on the notes of rights-based ethics systems, Locke came up.  Which would lead to a Libertarian argument against what Locke also advocated, which was a social contract.  Under the concept of a social contract, taxes are appropriate to charge people who live in a nation.  It would be in like with Oliver Wendell Holmes's quote: ""Taxes are what we pay for civilized society".  

Who said "alone"? I don't know why you keep insisting that negative rights have to be the totality of a system based on negative rights.

"The general welfare" =/= the welfare system that we know. James Madison said:

"If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare, the Government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to particular exceptions. It is to be remarked that the phrase out of which this doctrine is elaborated, is copied from the old articles of Confederation, where it was always understood as nothing more than a general caption to the specified powers, and it is a fact that it was preferred in the new instrument for that very reason as less liable than any other to misconstruction."

The discussion focused on negative rights as an out to saying that rights need not conflict.  In response to that, this came up:

And you said this:

I think basically all ethical systems (save hedonism, perhaps) provide a basis for duty, though what that "duty" is might differ. If one believes in negative rights, then at the very least one has the duties of being self sufficient and not a burden on others and of respecting the rights of others.

The discussion ended up being focused on a subset of a rights-based ethics system, to one being a negative-rights based ethics system.  This was done to try to avoid the original issue raised about rights conflicting, typically said because the rights were positive.

In regards to "promote the general welfare" that speaks to the government doing actions to improve to collectively improve the quality of life.  It is in the preamble of the U.S Constitution to state the goals of the Constitution itself.  And that is a proactive response by government to deal with issues that may arise, and be able to prevent.  It is positive in nature and is going to lead to possible conflicts you discussed.  That part is a basis to say the government CAN do programs to educated children, and help the poor, but it doesn't mean that the verse says the government is REQUIRED to do it.  It just brings it up as a fairly reasonable argument for having the Constitution, because why would people come together under a Constitution, if it made the general state of being worse?

Yeah, I recall how the conversation went. Let me ask again: why do you think that an ethics system based on rights, positive or negative, is only about rights? Locke did not promote the idea of positive rights, but his philosophy did not begin and end with the idea of negative rights.

The preamble merely lays out the case for the government and emphasizes that the powers of the government are derived from the consent of the governed. It does not grant any powers, and those two little words certainly do not trump the rest of the Constitution or destroy the notion of enumerated powers - although they have been seized upon to do just that, as Madison predicted. But if you want to argue with the guy who wrote the Constitution, that is your prerogative.

You want to show that the Founding Fathers considered that negative rights are the only rights people had?  Apparently in the Declaration of Independence, life and the pursuit of happiness were named with liberty as inalienable rights.  Life and the pursuit of happiness, combined with what is in the constitution leads to an expectation of society, and governance to enable these pursuits.  The preamble speaking of a forming a more perfect union also speaks to it.  It isn't just a matter of everyone doing what they please.

In regards to a rights-based ethic systems, it is all about rights.  It judges ethicalness of decisions based on how much the actions uphold rights.  AS I SAID BEFORE, this does not mean a society or individuals only would believe and argue that a rights-based ethics system is the ONLY system used by an individual or society.  And it would be fairly certain, Locke likely would end up saying society has other things involved.

As far as relevance today, in American society, rights are THE basis by which everything is argued for the basis of moral conduct.  The abortion issue is framed in right to life or right to choice.  Cruelty to animals is framed in a context of animal rights (http://www.peta.org/about/default.aspx).  Want to argue for environmental standards and recycling, argue the earth has rights.  The entire basis of doing things in American society is my rights vs your rights.  And you see this with the issue originally discussed in the original post, regarding contraception.

Can people argue beyond just rights?  Yes, they can.  But do they.  Show where it is done differently on common ground.  Ethical issues are settled in courts, based on rights.  

It's worth nothing that the Declaration of Independence is not a governing document, but life in that context a negative right. It means that you shall not be deprived of your life. If it were a positive right, society would be obligated to keep you alive no matter the cost. This is pretty obviously not what the founding fathers advocated or practiced. Pursuit of happiness is also a negative right. You are to be left to your own devices to pursue your own happiness, so long as you do not infringe on the rights of others.

I'm not arguing that people don't claim everything under the sun as rights, and of course if you are arguing that you have a right to everything under the sun, then people's "rights" will come into conflict. But as positive rights are almost always an infringement on negative rights, which are the most basic rights (and I'd argue the only real rights), they ought to be discarded altogether. If we're not willing to do that, then they must always be secondary to negative rights.

Legal matters, not ethical ones, are the jursidiction of the courts. Sometimes the legally correct decision is also the ethically correct one, but very often it is not. So I'm not really sure where you get that.

Several things:

* The Declaration of Independence and the preamble, show intentions, or purposes in mind of the Founding Fathers, and why to even have a Constitution, rules of law, a society with law enforcement, and norms they would likely agree would fit in upholding a view of a social contract, if they were with Locke.

* The discussion here is about ethics, right and wrong, etc... NOT governance.  If governance issues help clarify this, that is fine, but whether or not something involves with governance, is an entirely different issue.

* The lines between negative and positive rights get blurred, when people attempt to exercise them.  Like the pursuit of happiness and life, can come into conflict.  One can say that both are negative rights, but when my attempt to act to fullfill my happiness runs into an area without sufficient resources, someone is going to have to yield here and their pursuit will be restricted.  

* If rights are seen as inalienable, and not given by governments, then rights can be infringed upon by other entities besides governments.  This is made mention before the discussion goes into people merely being free, because there is no government to stop them.  

* Laws are shaped and model by values and ethics, and a reflection of these.  All laws are a reflection of some ethical state desired to be upheld to maintain states in society that individuals wish to live in.  Because of the ability of said laws, combined with taxation, law enforcement, and so on... have an ability to maintain certain states, entities in society will gather around these states and attempt to make their ideal state from an ethical standpoint, come to pass.

* PETA was made mention, because of their mission, and their stating they are an animal rights organization.  Their framework for protecting animals is framed in the context of rights for animals. And they also use other things besides legistlation.  I could got through numerous other advocacy groups, and the lions's share of them argue from a basis of rights, to plead their cases.  That is because of the dominance of rights as a focus for ethicals in Western civilization.

Well, I will close here by putting up a video below showing likely what you are trying to say in a fairly clear manner (It also shows the person arguing duty is not created without positive rights), and then a link to a discussion on rights, and arguments on the limitations and issues with rights-based ethics.

The video:

And the article:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#7

You have the Marxist argument, but also those of communitarians:

Communitarians (Taylor, Walzer, MacIntyre, Sandel) sound several of the same themes in their criticisms of contemporary liberal and libertarian theories. The communitarians object that humans are not, as such theories assume, “antecedently individuated.” Nozick's “state of nature” theorizing, for example, errs in presuming that individuals outside of a stable, state-governed social order will develop the autonomous capacities that make them deserving of rights. Nor should we attempt, as in Rawls's original position, to base an argument for rights on what individuals would choose in abstraction from their particular identities and community attachments. There is no way to establish a substantive political theory on what all rational agents want in the abstract. Rather, theorists should look at the particular social contexts in which real people live their lives, and to the meanings that specific goods carry within different cultures. This criticism continues by accusing liberal and libertarian theories of being falsely universalistic, in insisting that all societies should bend themselves to fit within a standard-sized cage of rights. Insofar as we should admit rights into our understanding of the world at all, communitarians say, we should see them as part of ongoing practices of social self-interpretation and negotiation— and so as rules that can vary significantly between cultures.

These kinds of criticisms have been discussed in detail (e.g., Gutmann 1985, Waldron 1987b, Mulhall and Swift 1992). Their validity turns on weighty issues in moral and political theory. What can be said here is that a common theme in most of these criticisms—that prominent rights doctrines are in some way excessively individualistic or “atomistic”—need not cut against any theory merely because it uses the language of rights. Ignatieff (2003, 67) errs, for example, when he charges that “rights language cannot be parsed or translated into a nonindividualistic, communitarian framework. It presumes moral individualism and is nonsensical outside that assumption.”

As we saw above, the language of rights is able to accommodate rightholders who are individuals as such, but also individuals considered as members of groups, as well as groups themselves, states, peoples, and so on. Indeed the non-individualistic potential of rights-language is more than a formal possibility. The doctrine of international human rights—the modern cousin of eighteenth century natural rights theory—ascribes several significant rights to groups. The international Convention against Genocide, for example, forbids actions intending to destroy any national, ethnic, racial or religious group; and both of the human rights Covenants ascribe to peoples the right to self-determination. Such examples show that the language of rights is not individualistic in its essence.

And there is criticisms of rights from a language usage standpoint:

7.2 Critiques of the Language of Rights

The language of rights can resist the charge that it is necessarily complicit with individualism. However, critics have accused rights talk of impeding social progress:

Our rights talk, in its absoluteness promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding personal and civic obligations…. In its insularity, it shuts out potentially important aids to the process of self-correcting learning. All of these traits promote mere assertion over reason-giving.

Glendon (1991, 14) here draws out some of the detrimental practical consequences of the popular connection between rights and conclusive reasons that we saw above. Since rights assertions suggest conclusive reasons, people can be tempted to assert rights when they want to end a discussion instead of continuing it. One plays a right as a trump card when one has run out of arguments. Similarly, the ready availability of rights language may lead parties initially at odds with each other toward confrontation instead of negotiation, as each side escalates an arms-race of rights assertions that can only be resolved by a superior authority like a court. One line of feminist theory has picked up on this line of criticism, identifying the peremptory and rigidifying discourse of rights with the confrontational masculine “voice.” (Gilligan 1993)

It is not inevitable that these unfortunate tendencies will afflict those who make use of the language of rights. As we have seen, it may be plausible to hold that each right is “absolute” only within a elaborately gerrymandered area. And it may be possible to produce deep theories to justify why one has the rights that one asserts. However, it is plausible that the actual use of rights talk does have the propensities that Glendon suggests. It seems no accident that America, “the land of rights,” is also the land of litigation.

Another deleterious consequence of rights talk that Glendon picks out is its tendency to move the moral focus toward persons as rightholders, instead of toward persons as bearers of responsibilities. This critique is developed by O'Neill (1996, 127–53; 2002, 27–34). A focus on rightholders steers moral reasoning toward the perspective of recipience, instead of toward the traditional active ethical questions of what one ought to do and how one ought to live. Rights talk also leads those who use it to neglect important virtues such as courage and beneficence, which are duties to which no rights correspond. Finally, the use of rights language encourages people to make impractical demands, since one can assert a right without attending to the desirability or even the possibility of burdening others with the corresponding obligations.

Criticisms such as O'Neill's do not target the language of rights as a whole. They aim squarely at the passive rights, and especially at claim-rights, instead of at the active privileges and powers. Nevertheless, it is again plausible that the spread of rights talk has encouraged the tendencies that these criticisms suggest. The modern discourse of rights is characteristically deployed by those who see themselves or others as potential recipients, entitled to insist on certain benefits or protections.

Describing fundamental norms in terms of rights has benefits as well as dangers. The language of rights can give clear expression to elaborate structures of freedom and authority. When embodied in particular doctrines, such as in the international human rights documents, the language of rights can express in accessible terms the standards for minimally acceptable treatment that individuals can demand from those with power over them. Rights are also associated with historical movements for greater liberty and equality, so assertions of rights in pursuit of justice can carry a resonance that other appeals lack. Whether these benefits of using rights language overbalance the dangers remains a live question in moral, political and legal theory.