‘Siren economy’: Why tactical wins fail to bring Israel strategic safety
Analyst refers to ‘security achievement gap’ of tactical assassinations that fail to bring Israel security.
Israelis lie on a road to take cover during a siren following a barrage of missiles from Iran, amid the United States-Israeli conflict with Iran, in central Israel, on March 9
At exactly 12pm (10:00 GMT), the piercing wail of air raid sirens shatters the midday hum of Tel Aviv.
Across the city, tech workers abandon their desks and rush into reinforced concrete stairwells, scrolling anxiously through phones as the dull thuds of aerial interceptions echo overhead. This midday disruption is not a random anomaly; it is a meticulously scheduled routine in a suffocating new reality for millions of Israelis.
While the United States and Israel promote their war on Iran, which assassinated Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as a “strategic victory,” the operational reality on the ground reveals a crippling war of attrition.
Ehab Jabareen, a researcher specialising in Israeli affairs, describes this disconnect as the “security achievement gap”.
“Israel can achieve massive intelligence breakthroughs, like assassinating a figure the size of the Iranian supreme leader, but it is simultaneously unable to translate this achievement into a daily sense of security,” Jabareen said.
He noted that the old Israeli security doctrine – which assumed the adversary’s body would collapse if the head was severed – has failed. Instead, assassinations merely trigger new rounds of retaliation, offering a “psychological victory without any strategic stability”.
The data of attrition, from shock to ‘programmed paralysis’
The scale of this attrition is captured in data from Tzofar, a voluntary alert tracking system that draws real-time information from the Israeli military’s Home Front Command servers. An analysis of Tzofar’s data between February 28 and March 8 documents thousands of security incidents, detailing a profound military shift.
- The initial shock: On February 28, as United States and Israeli jets struck Tehran, Israel faced an unprecedented retaliatory barrage. Tzofar data indicates an overwhelming initial spike, with alerts peaking dramatically on the first day to overwhelm layered air defences.
- The attrition phase: By early March, the strategy shifted. Daily alerts stabilised into a steady rhythm of attrition that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims it is prepared to sustain for at least six months.
A critical tactical turning point occurred on March 3. Tzofar’s breakdown by threat type shows that infiltrations by “hostile aircraft” – primarily “suicide” drones – surpassed traditional rocket alerts for the first time. This coincided with Lebanon’s Hezbollah entering the fray to target northern Israel.
Unlike ballistic missiles with predictable trajectories, these slow, highly manoeuvrable drones can hover over populated areas, forcing hundreds of thousands of Israelis into shelters as a single drone triggers alarms across vast geographic areas.
Jabareen argues that the Iron Dome was historically more than just a defence array; it was a central pillar in the psychological contract between the state and society, creating an invisible shield that allowed Israelis to live and work normally despite regional wars.
Cheap, low-flying drones have radically altered this equation. “They do not need high precision or massive destructive power; their main job is to disrupt the economic rhythm of life,” Jabareen explained.
Targeting the economic heart
While border towns naturally record high total alerts, a closer look at the data reveals a targeted campaign against Israel’s economic centre.
Cities deep within the central Gush Dan and Shfela regions – such as Petah Tikva, Givat Shmuel, Kiryat Ono and East Ramat Gan – recorded nearly identical figures of about 70 to 75 alerts each in the system’s tracking. This symmetry indicates coordinated, dense barrages aimed directly at the greater Tel Aviv area, effectively undermining the country’s financial and demographic heart.
The timing of these strikes exposes a strategy focused on psychological and economic disruption. The Tzofar data reveals that attacks are not random; they peak sharply at exactly 12pm local time, with other waves at 7am, 2pm and 3pm. By targeting morning commutes and peak afternoon business hours, while leaving the early morning hours relatively quiet, the strikes are engineered to maximise economic paralysis.
This dynamic is giving rise to what is being debated in Israel as a “siren economy” – an environment where markets and businesses are forced to operate in fragmented bursts between air raid alerts. For a country that proudly brands itself as the “Startup Nation”, the inability to maintain a fast-paced, stable work environment poses an unprecedented dilemma.
