A fair bit depends on what Ukraine has available in reserve to throw into the operation, and how quickly RF organizes to counter. I would treat many of the maps as speculative, because the first few days in an offensive tend to be the most dynamic.
— Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) August 7, 2024
It also gives Ukraine leverage - something that could be "traded back" in any eventual negotiation.
— Jimmy Rushton (@JimmySecUK) August 7, 2024
Ukraine isn't interested in occupying Russian lands, but it'll be intolerable for Putin to leave any territory within of Russia's recognised borders under Ukrainian control.
Reports indicate that Ukraine has already taken hundreds of captives in the Kursk region. Here another group of several dozen is visible. pic.twitter.com/nlvN2lJ2Tm
— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) August 7, 2024
This is all because the CSTO expanded too quickly and too close to Ukraine's borders. Kyiv was provoked into this invasion. https://t.co/CWxew7FWZz
— Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) August 7, 2024
It's pretty easy to be quick to dismiss the Ukrainian offensive operation in Russia's Kursk as "just a PR stunt" and criticize it, given the dire situation at Porkovsk and Toretsk.
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) August 7, 2024
That, indeed, might be a bad idea.
At the same time, it's very hard to ignore the fact that...
-…
It's pretty easy to be quick to dismiss the Ukrainian offensive operation in Russia's Kursk as "just a PR stunt" and criticize it, given the dire situation at Porkovsk and Toretsk.
That, indeed, might be a bad idea.
At the same time, it's very hard to ignore the fact that...
- given Russia's strategic superiority in resources and manpower and given Russia's readiness to tolerate inadequate losses, putting their flags over lifeless ruins of Ukrainian towns at any cost,
- given Ukraine's own chronic problems and constraints in its ability to fight a full-scale total war in the 21st-century environment against one of the world's largest militaries,
- given how chronically slow Western defense aid is and how reluctant the West is in making decisions and dropping its "escalation management" limitations,
...Ukraine may need to focus even more on asymmetrical tactics and out-of-the-box solutions that hit Russia hard where it doesn't expect.
Just fighting through walls of endless Russian frontal attacks slowly closing in under the rain of gliding bombs for months and years is a bleak perspective.
Especially in a situation where the aggressor spends over two years enjoying perfectly safe havens in its territory to concentrate its forces, unfold its logistics, etc., for bombing campaigns and new offensive operations -- because heaven forbid Ukraine strikes back too hard.
We'll see.
And no, "just surrender then" is not an option.
