Hi All, Latest piece out in @ForeignAffairs . Together, @JaharaMatisek and @alexcrowther1 and I explore different options for European forces to intervene in Ukraine and how they could make a big difference. Its so important this get properly discussed. https://t.co/Ubn5kxAK65
— Phillips P. OBrien (@PhillipsPOBrien) April 22, 2024
In some respects, the west is facing objective difficulty. It took Europe and the US almost two years to wake up to the fact that this would be a long war and that delivering part of their old weapon stocks would be insufficient. For two years (and more), Russia has put its economy on a war footing, while acquiring weapons from North Korea and Iran. The discrepancy in the ratios of artillery and ammunition are a reflection of this. Belatedly, the realisation of a long war has dawned on the west, and arms production is being ramped up: by next year, European governments should be able to compensate for some of the current mismatch. This is why Ukrainians perceive the coming months as their greatest window of vulnerability, perhaps greater than the first dramatic weeks after 24 February 2022.
But in other respects, European countries (and the US) have no excuses. Paradoxically, while lacking enough basic artillery and ammunition, Europe has no shortage of sophisticated air defence systems. There are approximately 100 such systems across Europe collecting dust. Important as the defence goal of deterring some future Russian aggression may be, the European continent is already at war. If European air defence systems continue lying around rather than being provided to Kyiv to save lives in Ukraine, they may end up being needed where they are currently stationed, turning the reasons against their transfer to Ukraine into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
