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JWeinCom said:
WolfpackN64 said:

I believe the reasons stated to be good reasons that are yet inconclusive for the very reason that there is so much debate around it. We can at the most use abductive and introspective reasoning here (for now). So both sides are eventually limited to building claims on one side and refuting it on the other.

Knowledge is a true belief that is formed through the success of your cognitive or perceptive faculties. Both sides have their respective believes (the existive of God or not) and there have been cognitive and perceptive successes on the side of belief (which has sparked many an argument of course). Both sides however struggle to definitively show that their belief is true.

For me, the matter is pretty conclusive. I have experienced God, so I know my belief is true and therefore I know of his existence. I do fully understand that won't sway many atheists though so the debate and building and destroying of arguments continue.

I would disagree that the reasons you've provided so far are good reasons.  They at best point to a deistic god, but the premises of each are flawed.  I've yet to hear a solid reason to justify belief.  

I'd also quibble about the definition of knowledge.  Most of the time I see that definition it includes the word "justified".  I can have a belief that is true, but that may not be justified.  For example, I can say I know that your favorite color is blue, because my psychic powers told me.  Your favorite color may actually be blue, but it really wouldn't be accurate to call it knowledge, because I have no way to justify it as of now.  Justified true belief also has some issues as a definition for knowledge, but it is stronger.

A justified true belief is the Classical Notion of Knowledge. It's also a deeply troubled notion that has been pretty much discarded by mainstream epistemology in favor of Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology. Note that justification for your cognitive and perceptual sucesses are necessary in epestemic internalism, while in epestemic externalism they don't need to be internally justified, but they need to be true (which is our point of contention)