sc94597 said:
Yes, it's idealistic, I recognized it with "so ideally." There is nothing wrong though with using ideals as ultimate goals. By getting closer to said goal one benefits. 1. Sure, but must this standard be universal? For example, in our current world with multiple states very few people argue that we should have one super-state that acts as the final arbiter of all global affairs. The plurality of nation-states is recognized as something of value. Within this plurality we have the United Nations which acts as a sort of dispute resolution organization to prevent war. One also recognizes that the ability to induce violence (through nuclear weapons for example) is a huge deterrent because the costs of doing such are so relatively high. Does this mean that there is no war? Nope, but the probability of war has decreased significantly. The anarchist suggests that such mechanisms of dispute-resolution be replicated at the individual and community levels. That each person (and union of persons) is treated as an autonomous moral agent, and it is through compromise and the fear of the costs of war that people reconcile their differences. All of this can be done without an ultimate and universal arbitrator. This is why I suggest that the capacity to induce violence be at a minimum level. When there is an inequality in weapons, for example, one group can impose themselves on another. One could look at examples like feudal Japan where there wasn't necessarily an absolute authority, and those with weapons (Samurai) called the shots. Since I don't want society to revert back to feudalism, a relative equality in access to the means an legitimization of violence is necessary. 2. So there are two types of costs: 1. social reputation and 2. violence. If I act violently toward others, they are likely to act violently back. Furthermore, since there is value in social cooperation and cohesion, if I act violently to others they might choose to ostracize me in non-violent ways. So out of fear for my own life and also out of my material interests (which are bolstered by social cooperation) I am very likely to act social rather than anti-social toward others, unless I have a particular advantage over them. 3. In the same way that hierarchy is reinforcing, so is anarchy. People when living in a free society will be especially attuned to anti-social, hierarchical, and oppressive behavior and therefore wary of it. It's not in most people's interests to be ruled by others, and therefore there would be strong opposition to anybody who tried to declare authority over other people. It's possible that in local contexts, and situations, certain authoritarian relationships might come to exist, but if the greater society is anarchic then it is unlikely that it'd gain momentum. That brings me to my next point. Anarchism isn't something that happens over-night. It requires a lot of social reformation and evolution alongside the political reformation and evolution. It seems unlikely that liberal democracy would've come to exist without the enlightenment, and it's just as unlikely that we disentangle authority without a second enlightenment, which changes how common people think about their relationships with one another. I don't think there would be decent results if the state disappeared tomorrow without all of the pre-requisite social evolution, but that social evolution won't come about until people criticize the fundamental basis of authoritarian and hierarchical relationships, including those pertaining to the state. "Even if you design a system around the failings that have led to the issues within current governmental structures around the world (and it actually initially works), you will soon find that system itself being exploited for the advantage and profit of whoever can. In other words, regardless of what system you attempt to implement, the threat of violence will wind up being used to oppress people for the benefit of others." The anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon spoke of "anti-absolutism". It's basically the idea that one shouldn't hold anything to be absolutely desirable. This was the basis of his criticism of utopianism (which isn't the same thing as idealism), capitalism, property, communism (communists of his time were very dogmatic), religion, etc. Another anarchist, Max Stirner had a similar concept of "fixed-ideas" or "spooks" where he believed that we shouldn't put ideas above our individual interests, and in so much as we have an ideology it is to aid the pursuit of our interests. Again he criticized all of these things that Proudhon had. From these perspectives, anarchism isn't necessarily a system. It is more a method of criticizing hierarchies and ruler-ships. Over time, human society has become increasingly anti-absolutist, and it is through this process that the conditions of exploitation are absent. I think you're right in that any system of organization if taken to be a fixed good will end with exploitation as people wish to move away from it, but in the absence of rulers people will have the freedom to change organizations to accommodate for rising exploitation. The necessary pre-requisite is that a sizable portion of the population rejects spooks/fixed ideas/absolute ideas. By constantly disrupting the means of exploitation (whatever they might be) we keep exploitation at a minimal and localized (in time and space) level. As Stirner said, “Not against love, but against sacred love, not against thought, but against sacred thought, not against socialists, but against sacred socialists, etc.” I have to say by the way, this conversation has been pretty fruitful! |
Agreed, it's always nice to have a pleasant back and forth on the internet about complex issues. Doesn't happen enough, sadly.
Yes, it's idealistic, I recognized it with "so ideally." There is nothing wrong though with using ideals as ultimate goals. By getting closer to said goal one benefits.
I was trying to say that it was more than just idealistic with the phrase "in generous terms, a very idealistic concept." It seems so far-fetched that pursuing it, even if it's done as piecemeal goals, worries me. I agree that pursuing an ideal, even if farfetched, can be worthwhile, but issues can arise when the belief rests on a number of assumptions working out that may themselves be flawed.
For example, let's say that as part of this pursuing this goal, we somehow convinced a state's government to give up its monopoly on legitimized violence to another group (and we'll further assume that this group isn't inherently beholden to the interests of elites, like, say, private police). Now many of the issues I brought up previously have transformed from hypothetical questions to real world problems, and they are problems that need to be addressed now. Entirely new oversight mechanisms have to be constructed, along with rules and procedures, and maps of jurisdiction, not to mention the inevitable questions of whose definition of "legitimized violence" prevails in different locations. If the actions of some law enforcement officials are questionable now, just wait until cases of confusion over which independent force (the state or this new organization) holds authority in different cases.
That's admittedly an extreme example, but I think it illustrates how pursuing an ideal can be dangerous itself. If the policies we construct to replace a broken system are founded on notions which are far enough removed from reality, they will inevitably run into issues unaccounted for.
Sure, but must this standard be universal? For example, in our current world with multiple states very few people argue that we should have one super-state that acts as the final arbiter of all global affairs. The plurality of nation-states is recognized as something of value.
The standard does not need to be universal across the globe, but I would argue that it needs to be the same, or very close to the same, across a single nation. If we have multiple, competing definitions for what is and is not legitimized violence functioning in the same territory, any semblance of a functioning law will quickly dissipate, replaced by confusion as to what is and is not legal violence.
One also recognizes that the ability to induce violence (through nuclear weapons for example) is a huge deterrent because the costs of doing such are so relatively high. Does this mean that there is no war? Nope, but the probability of war has decreased significantly.The anarchist suggests that such mechanisms of dispute-resolution be replicated at the individual and community levels. That each person (and union of persons) is treated as an autonomous moral agent, and it is through compromise and the fear of the costs of war that people reconcile their differences. All of this can be done without an ultimate and universal arbitrator. This is why I suggest that the capacity to induce violence be at a minimum level.
Furthermore, since there is value in social cooperation and cohesion, if I act violently to others they might choose to ostracize me in non-violent ways. So out of fear for my own life and also out of my material interests (which are bolstered by social cooperation) I am very likely to act social rather than anti-social toward others, unless I have a particular advantage over them.
You can, of course, always take more of an anarchist approach (or what I've come to call the "Senator Armstrong Theory of War" since 2013), where fear of retaliation largely determines right and wrong, but the issue is that, once again, we run a serious risk of the more powerful simply combining forces (or perhaps not even bothering to combine forces if they feel they are capable enough) to oppress the less powerful with no risk of retaliation. I find the reference to global scale politics to be rather intriguing, actually, because I'm reminded of Russia's takeover of Crimea. Regardless of whether you believe the decision to invade Crimea was justified, it's notable because it speaks to the relative lack of consequences in a situation where surrounding bodies believe that an attempt to retaliate in an appropriate manner could hurt them as well. The sanctions that did ultimately result perhaps speak more to the social consequences you mentioned in the second point, and I'll address that a little later. The bottom line, however, is that one powerful body was able to violently impose its will on another with minimal retaliation from others.
And this itself brings up another important issue, the problem of information. Somewhat obviously, countries who did impose sanctions on Russia were only able to do so because they knew about the event. However, on an individual level, if you take away the state's monopolization on the legitimization of violence, then you are also taking away any reason for the state to investigate a violent crime. After all, if what is and what isn't legitimized violence can differ from person to person, there is no reason to investigate what is no longer a crime. In other words, it's far easier to commit murder and get away with it, leaving other people with no way to know who committed said violent crime, and thus no way to punish the offender. Perhaps this could be resolved to some degree with private agencies, but again this just disenfranchises the poor even more because they will lack the resources to hire said agencies.
This all applies to social ostracization as well, and perhaps even more so. Not only does the information problem make it difficult to determine who to punish socially, but it can also make escaping the consequences of your action far more easily. Arguably the biggest social deterrent from committing a crime is the label of criminal; it permanently brands you as a violator of the law and makes it much more difficult to find employment. However, without a state monopoly on violence, there is no brand of criminal which will follow an offender for the rest of their life. A person can move to a new location and start entirely fresh, with no history of "criminal" behind them. While moving is certainly inconvenient, I wouldn't be particularly comfortable living in a state where the punishment for murder is that some people treat you as a social outcast and which can likely be erased entirely by moving to a new location.
Again, this could be perhaps mediated somewhat by private services; perhaps some sort of database by reporters across the country who look into compiling lists of suspected violent offenders. However, that in and of itself might worry me even more. Not only will the sources for who is and isn't a violent offender likely to be more questionable, but there's less hard evidence determining who is and is not on the registry, likely leading to more wrongly accused people. And, of course, there's the always present issue of favoring the richer.
In the same way that hierarchy is reinforcing, so is anarchy. People when living in a free society will be especially attuned to anti-social, hierarchical, and oppressive behavior and therefore wary of it. It's not in most people's interests to be ruled by others, and therefore there would be strong opposition to anybody who tried to declare authority over other people.
But that is exactly the concern we have to take into account when considering pursuing a new ideal. No major country on Earth is used to anarchy, and so a transition to any system that resembles anarchy would be riddled with issues where people attempt to take advantage of opportunities to reinforce some sort of hierarchy that favors them, and the cycle just repeats itself. This admittedly gets a bit more entangled with the issue of transition time, which leads me to...
Anarchism isn't something that happens over-night. It requires a lot of social reformation and evolution alongside the political reformation and evolution. It seems unlikely that liberal democracy would've come to exist without the enlightenment, and it's just as unlikely that we disentangle authority without a second enlightenment, which changes how common people think about their relationships with one another.
I think we're at risk of deviating from the original debate over state monopolized violence into one over systems of government entirely, but yes, you're right, and I'm not trying to advocate that anarchy (or just about any major change) happens overnight. What I am saying, however, is that the transition period itself is inevitably going to be problematic. I believe you noted this during your initial response to my first post, but the transition from a monarchal system of government to democratic was marked by people using the resources they had available to them to assert authority, usually via financial influence, in the gaps that were left by the disappearance of a monarch. This doesn't have to be done via creating laws that people have to follow, it can be done by altering the living dynamic so that people can choose to disobey, but they likely won't survive if they do (or they'll be incredibly miserable, at the very least). For instance, children working at British factories during the Industrial Revolution; as a parent, you can certainly opt to not send your child to work at a factory, but your family will probably starve if you don't.
I fear I've been rambling for a bit, but here's where this all hopefully ties in to my larger point. Those atrocities were ultimately reined in by laws; the general population's influence eventually won over legislators to create legal protection for them. In other words, the room for exerting exploitive authority was removed altogether by the state. If you undo the control that the state holds, be it over time or all at once, there is nothing to suggest that power hungry individuals will not step in to fill the newly created void of authority. And if individuals continue to step in and simply use the lack of state authority to create their own hierarchies, the population never becomes used to a rule-less society, and the same harms that I mentioned previously apply, including the issues with powerful individuals allying and attempting to impose their authority through violence.
