theprof00 said:
IV. The Japanese Search for Soviet Mediation Document 29: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1204 – July 12, 1945, Top Secret Ultra Since September 1940, under the covername "Magic," U.S. military intelligence had been routinely decrypting the intercepted cable traffic of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The National Security Agency kept the 'Magic" diplomatic and military summaries classified for many years and did not release the series for 1942 through August 1945 in its entirety until the early 1990s. This summary includes a report on a cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow concerning the emperor's decision to seek Soviet help in ending the war. Not knowing that the Soviets had already made a commitment to its Allies to declare war on Japan, Tokyo fruitlessly pursued this option for several weeks. The "Magic" intercepts from mid-July have figured in Gar Alperovitz's argument that Truman and his advisers recognized that the emperor was ready to capitulate if the Allies showed more flexibility on the demand for unconditional surrender. This point is central to Alperovitz's thesis that top U.S. officials recognized a "two-step logic" that moderating unconditional surrender and a Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Japan's surrender without the use of the bomb.[22] Document 32: Cable to Secretary of State from Acting Secretary Joseph Grew, July 16, 1945, Top Secret The draft of the proclamation to Japan that reached Truman contained language that modified unconditional surrender by promising to retain the emperor. When former Secretary of State Cordell Hull learned about that development he outlined his objections to Secretary of State Byrnes. The latter was already inclined to reject that part of the draft but Hull’s arguments may have reinforced his decision. Document 33: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1210 – July 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister rejected unconditional surrender and that the emperor was not “asking the Russian’s mediation in anything like unconditional surrender.” Incidentally, this “Magic’ Diplomatic Summary” indicates the broad scope and capabilities of the program; for example, it includes translations of intercepted French messages (see pages 8-9). [Page 14 missing from original]
Just read the documents, every single time, the ONE argument that prevented negotiation was removal of the emperor. |
Yes. Wrong. Again, Sato was talking to russia mostly to PREVENT russia from invading while they stalled out the US and actually didn't want to surrender. They weren't goint to sell Sato anything. Though again... those cables show the exact opposite of what you think they do regardless.
If you read those cables. You'll see SATO says to Togo that russia would require unconditional surrender EXCEPT for removal of the emperor.
While Togo says they would accept NO unconditional surrender even if it protected the emperor.
The specific Magic cables your talking about in fact talk about what they'd do once the war was over