Sqrl said:
The question was never if the US could appropriately respond. The entire point is not to be attacked in the first place. The very crux of the matter that those who are fine with this seem to be missing in their excitement over the gains in soft power is that effective deterrents are few and far between while bargaining chips for soft power are easy to come by in comparison. Soft power is only effective against those who will listen or be cooperative, and those aren't the sorts of groups and nations that are at all considering attacking the US, and consequently they aren't at all worried that we would ever nuke them. The policy is the antithesis of clever, it is pure shortsighted bafoonery that trades away longterm high-value for short-term low-value. How long do you think the credit of this move will last? Even if we're generous a decade would be the absolute longest we could trade on this. Meanwhile the threat of a nuclear retaliation is persistent and only causes worry for those who would consider attacking us in the first place. |
Nuclear deterrent is only meant to deter a nuclear threat. That is what this policy officially reserves it for. Other forms of deterrent have always been the main reason why people don't attack the USA, not the threat of nuclear action. The main reason for a nuclear deterrent has always been to avoid the possibility that all of a military will be wiped out by a nuclear strike before any retalliation can occur, no other form of attack has such large short term consequences and as such a nuclear deterrent isn't the most effective - the most effective is a purely military deterrent.
Also a gain in soft power isn't as temporary as you think, the currency of goodwill can run for a very very long time.
