Take some personal philosophy tests! Are you intellectually coherent?

[The_vagabond7]

Alright, try the "Staying alive" quiz, it's pretty interesting. I will post my results because I want to discuss an aspect of it. Don't read until you've taken it, unless you don't care about having it spoiled.

 

You chose:
Round 1: It's the spaceship for me!
Round 2: I'll take the silicon!
Round 3: Freeze me!

However, although you have survived, you seem to have taken an unnecessary risk.

There are basically three kinds of things which could be required for the continued existence of your self. One is bodily continuity, which actually may require only parts of the body to stay in existence (e.g., the brain). Another is psychological continuity, which requires, for the continued existence of the self, the continuance of your consciousness, by which is meant your thoughts, ideas, memories, plans, beliefs and so on. And the third possibility is the continued existence of some kind of immaterial part of you, which might be called the soul. It may, of course, be the case that a combination of one or more types of these continuity is required for you to survive.

Your choices are consistent with the theory known as psychological reductionism. On this view, all that is required for the continued existence of the self is psychological continuity. Your three choices show that this is what you see as central to your sense of self, not any attachment to a particular substance, be it your body, brain or soul.

But there is a tension. In allowing your brain and body to be replaced by synthetic parts, you seemed to be accepting that psychological continuity is what matters, not bodily continuity. But if this is the case, why did you risk the space ship instead of taking the teletransporter? You ended up allowing your body to be replaced anyway, so why did you decide to risk everything on the spaceship instead of just giving up your original body there and then?

 

 

Now then, it says I've taken an unnecessary risk, but I disagree. I agree with it's analysis of what I consider my continued existence, but I disagree with it's assessment that the teleporter would have been a better choice. The teleporter I see as being 100% death. Even if my psychological state is recreated to a "T" it still ceased to exist. Every bit of me, including my brain was destroyed. Even if as information it was transfered elsewhere, my persistent memory did in fact end, it was ripped apart.

In the case of the synthetic parts, it was different. If the question had been would I let them destroy my brain, but tranfer all of the signals into a computer and put the computer inside my body, I would have gone with the other choice. Because My conciousness still would not have had a continual existence, the original information would be completely destroyed and then a copy be put in it's place. But rather it was merely synthetic parts were going to replace certain parts of my brain, which would keep my conciousness persistent. At no point was my conciousness destroyed, and thereby ended.

So I agree with their assessment that I value my persistant concious state as being my identity of self, but I disagree about there being a "tension". I think largely because of a slightly differing view of materialism. I add an important asterisks to a material view of myself, a replica of me isn't me, becuase it wasn't persistantly me. Where as other materialists would say an exact replica of me might as well be me.