| Final-Fan said: |
It may help to remind you what I was responding to: "What I’m trying to communicate is that justification in epistemology amounts to “establishing” that which it already essentially is. This is contrary to establishing that which it was not [...]"
I still don’t know what else you’re trying to say in response to my clarification of what I put forth about justification. I still don’t know how you’re attempting to make justification an applicable concept to epistemology, so that would be a problem any time you refer to justification. This bit about “being aware of justification” in relation to a belief becoming knowledge (or whatever, since I don’t really understand it) seems beyond that essential issue for me to understand you.
What I said was that having been justified is a change of essence from the perspective the person who has justified it, so a true belief is not already (before justification) essentially that which it is after justification. Obviously it was true before, and let's say we believed it to be true, but now we've established that it's true. The truth of it did not change; the belief (we're saying) did not change; a third aspect changed (from "not justified (by me)" to "justified").
Sure, but of course I see that change of essence as “becoming certain/indubitable” and so with your reference to justification: Again my lack of content and function for justification is still something I’m waiting for you to provide (something other or more than indubitability).
This is borderline gibberish to me. You seem to be saying, "Calling it 'belief and truth' is misguided for reasons I don't feel like going into AT ALL. Also, I misled you earlier when I agreed to that description," without saying explicitly whether you are rejecting truth as a separate condition. Is that anywhere near the mark?
The term “belief” has just been very ambiguous. Yes I don’t care to go into much because I think our clear issue is over justification and the function it was hoped to perform to “that which is not knowledge”.
In one sense, yes, “true belief” is certainly a description of knowledge. But in that sense if we held a “true belief” then what’s the problem, what’s the question? It doesn’t seem to make any literal sense to ask “Is the true belief really true?”. However asking “How we really know it is a ‘true belief’?” catches a hint of something else we’re after (and/or some distinction made within terminology perhaps).
Anyway, I really just don’t think it’s useful to argue about whatever you may think of that. The issue is definitely over the meaning of justification and the ‘characteristic’ it was hoped to bring to “that which is not knowledge”.
To you the term "belief" can only refer to what I might call "doubtable belief" -- good to know.
I see dubitability and indubitability both as reference to belief. It is a reference to the state of mind of us having an opinion of something. Dubitability is simply there being a possibility of us thinking, "could I be wrong?" and indubitability is (also simply) the impossibility of that. I do not think that either of those states can affect whether the opinion is actually in accord with the truth.
We’re still toying with the definition of belief and since we’re not accepting each others meaning I’ll just say it’s irrelevant. We accept the difference between dubitable and indubitable. You say that indubitability is not what (alone perhaps) makes something knowledge. I need to know what you think does make it knowledge, how justification performs that (or what “establishing” entails as I’ve seen you use recently), and (or rather) what justification means to you (in a way that isn’t the inapplicable conception I’ve exposed it to be).
Without distracting from those fundamental questions to you: In my understanding certainly/indubitability is simply the essential characteristic of knowledge. If “knowledge” can be doubted, if we can conjure up an equal possibility in our mind, then we are right back to good ol’ Descartes looking for certainty among them, looking for a method to become certain.
Again, I don’t wish to hear a comment on this, some further addition, aspect of disagreement, or thought. I just say it to put my position in perspective of yours when I ask for those former questions to be answered.
I ... look, you're saying I'm being intellectually dishonest, and you can say "now don't take this the wrong way" all day long but it doesn't change what you're suggesting. Not saying you shouldn't call people out on shit they try to pull (even unconsciously or inadvertently) but don't pretend you're not accusing them of anything. Because you are. If I say someone has misspelled a word, I'm ACCUSING them of misspelling. And I'm right. And sometimes they get indignant. But I'm still right. In this case I'm insulted, and say you're wrong.
Right, I suggested that you were engaged in sophistry. I didn’t deny that afterward either. I also didn’t claim it was intentional. If an error in thinking is not intentional, can you call it intellectual dishonesty? But anyway, if it was taken as a mere insult, then I apologize.
Regarding any purposeful ‘negativity’, I do feel, however, that any such subliminal sarcasm within the content of the contentions I’ve brought to this discussion have been fairly mild and not so irrelevantly abrasive in nature. Rather it’s been more the language and attitude of a formal, respectable debate. I think your expressions of frustration and indictments have been a tad more abrasive in my perspective.
Well ... so you are saying that if the meanings of the words are what you think they are, then I, as an at least somewhat rational person, could not mean that when I said those words?
No, I’m saying I don’t understand what you mean by those group of words together. I’ve mentioned my suspicion that it’s going to be ultimately meaningless (like many philosophies seem to be to me) or morphed into something else upon nit picking but go ahead and explain it more so I’ll have a chance to figure that out.
I of course hold that many adhere to propositions thought to be coherent and meaningful but which are not upon deeper examination. I don’t think they have to be idiots to do that.
Would it be too much to ask you to take a look at my previous posts (relevant to that point) and take a stab at what you think I did mean (or might have meant)?
I did. I still don’t know what you mean. I’d say it comes off as “gibberish” but I would wonder if I’d be accused of being insulting.
Here is where we are at:
This is the fundamental issue and my responses have been attempting to point back to it. I either don’t see how your previous responses have related to it (as I haven’t understood most of it for one) or they really don’t relate to it.
This is the only thing I see as primary at this point so I’m obviously hoping you can merely respond to this (as opposed to each previous “point” which I’ve attempted to dig back to this root.)
1. Explain to me what justification means to you (In specific regards to, and in a way which isn’t the ‘inapplicable conception’ I’ve explained it to be).
2. (If truly separate from the first question:) Explain to me what justification/establishing was supposed to do to “that which is not knowledge” to make it knowledge if not merely to make it indubitable. (I prefer the question in that language but you could say rather: What is your formula of knowledge? Obviously do not respond to all this by just saying in some way “it needs to be justified/established” as what you mean justification is what I’m at a loss for – hence my “first question”.)
Since there’s so much trouble understanding each other, please present your case in baby-steps, if you will. Much of the time you explain something to me again it looks different, like there’s an additional piece of information you’re giving me or coming from some totally different aspect (or it’s irrelevant etc. etc.). Connect the dots really slowly and explicitly, leaving no relationship unturned, if you find that doable.
Okami
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