Final-Fan said:
appolose said:
A. But since we can interpret sense data any way, we could also interpret what we sensed about the moon to support the idea of it being cheese, correct (and I don't think we could even say what color it was, as the color we perceive may not even be from the moon (colorblindness, anyone?)? And with this ability to interpret sense data any way, so does it follow that sense data could support any world view (e.g., "All that I sense is consistent with what the real world would be" or "All I sense is consistent with what a Matrix world would be")
B Perhaps I've misunderstood your analogy. Just to be clear, by "up", you mean reality, by "fog", unprovability, and by "picking a direction", taking a method of truth, and sense data is not represented, correct (more or less, or is that reading into it too much?)? If that's the case, yes, you can pick a direction to go (assume a method of truth) and hope it leads you up (gives truth), but there's no indication which way is correct. You could go left (empiricism), you could go right (non-empiricistic theism*), or someway else (the M4tr1x), or you could just sit there (assume nothing). If I'm getting you right, you're saying with this there is no reason not to assume someway, which I agree with, but it doesn;t have to be empiricism.
*I use this term to show I don't think empiricism and theism are mutually exclusive, just in case it seems otherwise. |
A. No. Incorrect. You are speaking of denying that your senses are telling you what they are telling you -- asserting that what you are sensing as rock is REALLY cheese -- which is explicitly contradictory to the hypothesized worldview. I'm sorry, but there's no way to weasel out of this IMO. If you change it to a Matrix interpretation, that is no longer the original worldview.
B. I guess it's more or less good, except I thought that I included sense data pretty explicitly by the unreliable sense of "up" I provided.
For me, it seems like a natural and sensible "default" position to accept the input I am given, even if I know it is unreliable, if it is ALL I have to go on, which in this case it is; and that would be "empiricism" (exclusively so).
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A. You and I have both said that the senses say nothing, that it depends on what we make of them. So how could they contradict us? It's only our judgements that could contradict, and you and I have said you could amek your judgements whatever you wanted. And what is that bolded objection about? Why is that an objection?
B. If sense data is represented by an unreliable sense of up, then I don't see it in the analogy, as we don't even have that (being completely dizzy and practically blinded). And, unless you mean empiricism to be "Making judgements of of sense data" (which would make the idea that the Matrix is reality an empirical one), I still don't see why you have to chose it, as opposed to any other belief.
