Final-Fan said:
appolose said:
1. The only way logic can be faulty is if something doesn't follow from the two premesis. So, as in the chicken/kitten argument: If your memory of the first premise suddenly changed to "Here is a chicken", then upon your conclusion you'd find that you'd be unable to deduce anything from the two premesis (Here is a chicken / Kittens are cute). If your memory changes to a different premise, then that premise gets incorporated into your conclusion (if it can be incorporated).
2. My point is that there all fanatasy worlds. Concluding that the moon is made of rock is just as much a fantasy as concluding it's cheese. The senses do not contradict worldviews, because they say nothing (a we've agreed before). |
1. Well, the example is necessarily very short, but I'm thinking of doing more lengthy thinking. With a long problem you rely on your memory to hold information about what you've taken from the premises and deduced into new premises. For instance, if you have two sets of premises that you work on separately and later combine the results to solve the problem. You are presuming that you will go back and double check to see that you haven't made any mistakes (or had any made for you). But no matter how many times you check, if your memory is untrustable there is ALWAYS the possibility of something being missing/wrong.
2. But the just because the senses don't prove anything absolutely doesn't mean they don't prove anything relatively, as in "assuming the senses are accurate then this is wrong". So any worldview that includes the position that the senses are accurate could have its validity challenged by contradictory sensory input.
If I have the idea that my perceptions are roughly accurate, and that a rock is as I percieve a rock and cheese is as I percieve cheese (and that they are very different), and that the moon is made of cheese, and I percieve that the moon is made of what I percieve to be as rock, then part of my worldview (either my definition of cheese or my view of what the moon is made of or my view of the accuracy of my senses) is wrong.
This is why we do NOT agree here. Just because senses can't ABSOLUTELY PROVE that a worldview is the true really for real truth, that doesn't mean that they can't prove that a worldview is not consistent with sensory data. (This is what I mean by senses "contradicting" a worldview: to say that something else is the case. That doesn't necessarily mean that the senses win the disagreement.) And, if part of the worldview is that sensory data will agree with the worldview, thus contradict itself. Your position (in the final sentence) is only true of a worldview that gives no credence to sensory data.
|
1. If you take your conclusion of one argument and use it as a premise in another, that doesn't change the explanation I gave. If your conclusion statement changed, then so would the memory of your premesis for it, or you'd notice it wouldn't fit.
2. Yes, of course if you assumed they worked in the first place, then you'd be able prove things. I've already said that there's no problem assuming our judgements of sense data is correct or even generally correct. My contention is there is absolutey no good reason to assume them, like any other method of truth one could have or use, and thus the empiricist is as unfounded as a theist.
