donathos said:
I'll try to make this reply slightly less long-winded, because eventually I'm not going to be able to get around the fact that all of my arguments will rely on judgements of sensory data. (And of course, my contention is that yours do as well.)
Let me construct a brief example I'd find parallel: suppose I were to state: "Language cannot communicate ideas." To that, a person might say "Of course it can." "Prove it," I'd say. They then work up an extraordinarily detailed proof, involving all sorts of evidence, etc. I take one look and say, "But you've used language to try to communicate your idea, which I reject. Therefore, your 'proof' is either invalid or circular." To that, they respond, "But your initial claim--that 'language cannot communicate ideas'--itself rested upon an implicit assumption that language can, in fact, communicate ideas." And that's where I think we are. I believe that what you're saying is tantamount to this: "Based on all of the experiences I've had in my life--everything I've sensed and the judgements I've made based on those sensations--I conclude that such judgements are arbitrary and unreliable." I feel as though, were I to ask you for any "evidence" to back up your assertions, the only possible evidence you could produce would rely on the very things you claim to disprove, i.e. an implicit assumption that we see, touch, hear, etc., and can make valid judgements on that basis. Otherwise, if we were to give a temporary "agreement" to your stance, then your own argument would be completely arbitrary (as there'd be no good reason to believe what you have to say, or anything else), and would collapse in on itself in paradox. In other words, as soon as we conclude that all judgement is arbitrary, we're robbed of anything that would give meaning to such a claim.
Consistent with what? I think you mean internally consistent, as within the syllogism you later supply. But the only consistency that really matters vis-a-vis philosophy is consistency with reality. I believe that if you truly take something other than sensory data as axiomatic... let's say you conclude, arbitraily (via coin flip?), that arsenic is a healthy drink, and you drink it... well, your conclusion was not consistent, ultimately, with reality. That's why you've made the choice to "assume" empricism, and so have I, and so have so many others... and why only Two-Face lives his life according to the cast of a coin. Because the latter method simply doesn't work very well.
This is an example of deductive logic. Deductive logic works when the premises are, themselves, true. But deductive logic is not logic entire; there is also inductive logic, which is the method by which we arrive at statements such as "all cows eat meat." Appropriate for our discussion, inductive logic rests squarely on... the judgements we make based on our sensory data (e.g. have you ever known a cow to not eat meat?). So, I think it's safe to assume that you feel comfortable in rejecting inductive logic as a discipline altogether. However, deductive logic--the internal consistency that you believe stands for all consistency--is completely meaningless without inductive logic. If we can never know the truth of the premises (which I think is another way of formulating your argument), then what do our conclusions possibly matter?
Our beliefs must be reconciled to the reality around us because we wish to live, and avoid arsenic. Or, if you have another goal--say death--then consistency (in my sense, not yours) is still important in order to find arsenic and carry it out. Though I'll admit; death is easier to come by through an arbitrary belief system than is life.
But it's my contention that no such theist actually exists. (You: "based on, what? Empiricism, right?" Me: "Of course--there is no other way.") While ultimately (if I'm correct in my atheism), a theist will eventually reach a point where he finds that his theistic views are inconsistent with the evidence of his senses, and will have to reject one of them, I don't believe that it is a rejection of empiricism that ever leads a theist to his theism. Instead, I believe that a theist initially believes in god because he believes that it is somehow consistent according to his experiences. But, like I said long ago in this discussion, empiricism doesn't mean that people don't make mistakes in their judgements... and, as an atheist, I believe that theism is just such a mistake. As an example for all of this, I believe that the seasons were witnessed before Persephone was "created"; not the other-way around. Well... I dunno if I managed to be less long-winded or not, but I'll have to leave the field for now, at least temporarily; this is a wonderful discussion that has done incredible damage to the work and chores I've needed to do over the last few days. :) |
Yeah, let's stop for a bit, shall we? I'll say one or two things in response to summarize my position, and we can leave it at that.
"Based on all of the experiences I've had in my life--everything I've sensed and the judgements I've made based on those sensations--I conclude that such judgements are arbitrary and unreliable." It is my contention that my conclusion on the accuracy of judgements does not stem from my sense data judgements. So, that's my position on this, and that one is yours :)
"I think you mean internally consistent, as within the syllogism you later supply. But the only consistency that really matters vis-a-vis philosophy is consistency with reality. I believe that if you truly take something other than sensory data as axiomatic... let's say you conclude, arbitraily (via coin flip?), that arsenic is a healthy drink, and you drink it... well, your conclusion was not consistent, ultimately, with reality". Here, it is my position that the conclusion that the arsenic I drank wasn't actually healthy is another method of truth that I haven't assumed yet, as opposed to reality (how do I know it's killing me?), and thus is not inconsistent with the coin flip. So, there's that.
Inductive logic is another way of saying empiricism. It's not logic. And the constitency to which we both have been referring to is logic consistency, not empirical consistency (I posit).
"Our beliefs must be reconciled to the reality around us because we wish to live, and avoid arsenic". You seem to be implying that that it is an immutable concept that arsenic will kill us, and that we live. But it is my contention that those concepts, too, are ones derived from empiricism, and as such, being that empiricism is simply another method of truth, need only be reconciled to it if you've already assumed empiricism... I posit.
For your last parts, I think it fair to say I simply disagree, as the points covered can be found partially throughout the rest.
Anyways, thank you for the civil and highly intellectual (and I mean that) debate!
Okami
To lavish praise upon this title, the assumption of a common plateau between player and game must be made. I won't open my unworthy mouth.







