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Forums - Nintendo Discussion - N64 & Cube are abominations

NightDragon83 said:

The N64 was not even close to an abomination.  The only reason it "lost" to the PS1 was because Nintendo made the tactical mistake (in hindsight) of not switching to CDs and instead stuck with carts, which led to an exodus of 3rd party support and frequent periods of software droughts for the system, while the PS1, thanks to Sony's aggressive marketing, received a steady stream of software including many system selling exclusives like FF7 and multiplatform games like Tomb Raider that would have been on the N64 as well if it used CDs.

The Gamecube on the other hand was, for all intents and purposes, an abomination.  Why?

JUST LOOK AT THE DAMNED THING!!!

The fact that Nintendo honestly thought THIS would be their ticket back to being the market leader shows just how out of touch with reality they were back in the late 90s and the first half of the last decade.

Even if it wasn't their best idea, it was still a good consoles. One of my favorites! It had several good games and we had really good times back when we had the GameCube. Sure, it was a failure in sales, not in games and longevity. (for me at least.)



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RolStoppable said:
The common trait of all market leading consoles is a big and varied games library, including valuable exclusives. In the fifth generation Sony did their best to attract third party developers while Nintendo's attitude towards third parties was basically: "We are boss, so you do as we say." The result was incredibly lopsided distribution of third party support which made the PS1 the more attractive purchase for the majority of gamers at the time.

I completely agree with this. Factors that turned 3rd parties off, we know them, are the cartidge-based format, high royalty fees, a poor and difficult to use API, no moneyhatting (which Nintendo was too proud to extend), horrible branding (3rd parties work on confidence, the mildest sense of misstepping is a turn off). The misstep tolerance is proportionate to the harmony/resentment level between the 3rd parties and the manufacturer. Nintendo was also bullish and difficult to partner with on SW projects. Missing important features disk-based media offered, of which 3rd parties were aware (space for FMVs and music tracks, even pop music, the possibility of distributing multi-disk games).

This is a key Red Ocean failure.

The reason why I called the Nintendo 64 and Gamecube abominations is because both consoles' lineups didn't really resemble the lineups of the previous two consoles anymore (therefore Nintendo didn't continue their tradition). For example, there were millions of fans who were looking forward to the next Super Mario Bros., so Nintendo not making such a game was a detestable action. If Sony stopped making Gran Turismo or Microsoft stopped making Halo, there would be backlash too. Backlash that will show up in a lack of hardware sales.

Super Mario Bros. was not a launch title for the Famicom. Yet, until 2005, the Famicom had no Super Mario bros. They had lots of other titles that made the NES a hit. The Famicom moved as many units in Japan as the PS did.

Compare the total sales of the NES versus the N64 in Japan.

PosPlatformNorth AmericaEuropeJapanRest of WorldGlobal
9 Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) 33.49 8.30 19.35 0.77 61.91
12 Nintendo 64 (N64) 20.11 6.35 5.54 0.93 32.93
  NES/N64 ratio 1.7 1.3 3.5 .83 1.9

 


Now compare the sales of Super Mario Bros. 3 to Super Mario 64 in Japan.

PosGamePlatformYearGenrePublisherNorth AmericaEuropeJapanRest of WorldGlobal
6 Super Mario Bros. 3 NES 1988 Platform Nintendo 9.54 3.44 3.84 0.46 17.28
7 Super Mario 64 N64 1996 Platform Nintendo 6.91 2.85 1.91 0.23 11.89
  SMB3/SM64 ratio         1.4 1.2 2.0 2.0 1.5

Data Results (Japan): So, Mario 3 outsold SM64 by a factor of 2, despite the fact that there were 3.5 times as many famicoms sold as N64s, and the fact that Mario 64 was a launch title. Id's say Mario 64 did rather well in japan. Imagine if they had the leading console.

Below is another metric. The relative strenght of SMB3 and SM64 against their platform userbase.

MetricNorth AmericaEuropeJapanRest of World
  SMB3/NES tie ratio   28.5% 41.4%  19.8%  59.7%
  SM64/N6 tie ratio   34.4%  44.9%     34.5%     24.7%   

In america, SM64 performed better than SMB3 did, by tie ratio. Now you will tell me that, had SM64 the strength of SMB3, it would have moved consoles, but it's easy to say that after the NES and Famicom were already insanely popular for multiple other reasons than Mario, and SMB 1 as well. The combination of factors helped SMB3 sell as much as it did on a solid platform. N64 didn't have that advantage.

Having said that, since SMB 1 sold this much (table below). A bundled game in NA, of course, it remains the 2nd best-selling game of all time.

PosGamePlatformYearGenrePublisherNorth AmericaEuropeJapanRest of WorldGlobal
2 Super Mario Bros. NES 1985 Platform Nintendo 29.08 3.58 6.81 0.77 40.24

Nostalgia dictates that celebrating that game in a completely new IP branded as the "New Super Mario Bros.", Nintendo is bound to turn heads. Sadly, they only realised this in hindsight, after the NSMB experiment. Some would call it blue ocean, I would call it a successful experiment. When the marketshare was obtained, some liked to call it Blue Ocean. But it wasn't a Blue Ocean strategy.

I have more, but I'll keep it for later.



Rafux said:
@happydolphin

I have to disagree, I have read all books by Jack Trout and blue/red ocean is very similar to what he wrote about decades ago in Positioning, Marketing Warfare and Bottom up marketing.

I understand. Since I gave you a quote and read through some stuff, enlighten us and provide some quotes from your end.



NightDragon83 said:

The N64 was not even close to an abomination.  The only reason it "lost" to the PS1 was because Nintendo made the tactical mistake (in hindsight) of not switching to CDs and instead stuck with carts, which led to an exodus of 3rd party support and frequent periods of software droughts for the system, while the PS1, thanks to Sony's aggressive marketing, received a steady stream of software including many system selling exclusives like FF7 and multiplatform games like Tomb Raider that would have been on the N64 as well if it used CDs.

The Gamecube on the other hand was, for all intents and purposes, an abomination.  Why?

JUST LOOK AT THE DAMNED THING!!!

The fact that Nintendo honestly thought THIS would be their ticket back to being the market leader shows just how out of touch with reality they were back in the late 90s and the first half of the last decade.

If they were going Red Ocean, they really weren't careful with their image and catering to the congested marketspace's needs and interests.

The image of this looks more Blue Ocean than anything, catering to the younger demographics... A failed strategy maybe, but that was their direction in terms of image at least.



happydolphin said:

If they were going Red Ocean, they really weren't careful with their image and catering to the congested marketspace's needs and interests.

The image of this looks more Blue Ocean than anything, catering to the younger demographics... A failed strategy maybe, but that was their direction in terms of image at least.

Please, HappyDolphin, explain to me what "Blue Ocean" and "Red Ocean" mean. I'm so confused. -.-



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NintendoPie said:
happydolphin said:

If they were going Red Ocean, they really weren't careful with their image and catering to the congested marketspace's needs and interests.

The image of this looks more Blue Ocean than anything, catering to the younger demographics... A failed strategy maybe, but that was their direction in terms of image at least.

Please, HappyDolphin, explain to me what "Blue Ocean" and "Red Ocean" mean. I'm so confused. -.-


RolStoppable might not like you asking me to clarify, since it's his pet topic. But this is my thread, and I want everyone to be more informed. I also like the Red Ocean mentality, and so, to stay competitive with Rol in the content of my posts, I am taking the time to understand it especially in the context of video games market strategy. So I will answer you, with 2 pics.

 

And a link I haven't read, which I will in a sec.



happydolphin said:
Rafux said:
@happydolphin

I have to disagree, I have read all books by Jack Trout and blue/red ocean is very similar to what he wrote about decades ago in Positioning, Marketing Warfare and Bottom up marketing.

I understand. Since I gave you a quote and read through some stuff, enlighten us and provide some quotes from your end.


Who cares man its really not important and writing in english is tiresome (I'm lazy).



Rafux said:
happydolphin said:
Rafux said:
@happydolphin

I have to disagree, I have read all books by Jack Trout and blue/red ocean is very similar to what he wrote about decades ago in Positioning, Marketing Warfare and Bottom up marketing.

I understand. Since I gave you a quote and read through some stuff, enlighten us and provide some quotes from your end.


Who cares man its really not important and writing in english is tiresome (I'm lazy).

Do me a favor, participate or step out. There is no point in you throwing out claims without backing them, that's ridiculous, with all due respect.



happydolphin said:

Since the Playstation, a new entry in the market, managed to boot Nintendo off the throne within the Red Market, using Red Market strategy, why did it work? Why did Red Ocean strategy work for Sony, and what did Nintendo do wrong for its Red Ocean strategy to fail? (since they obviously went Red Ocean)

 

At the time it wasn't a Red-Ocean strategy ...

In the early/mid 1990s videogames were considered (mostly) a toy for children and younger teens. At the time aiming for older teens and young adults was very disruptive in the market. Beyond this, it could be argued that the games on the Playstation were far more "casual" because they sacrificed gameplay and made games far easier to appeal to a broader demographic of gamers.

 

 

happydolphin said:

And ultimately, why was the N64 an abomination? Why is it not just a failed Red Ocean attempt? Why was the Cube not just a failed Blue Ocean attempt? (related post @abomination)

Rol, feel free to relegate me to your prior posts, but do post the argument related to what I need to look at.

The Gamecube couldn't possibly be a Blue Ocean attempt because it is Nintendo's best "Red-Ocean" console. In practically every way the Gamecube was a better PS2 (more processing power, easier to develop for, less expensive, etc) and Nintendo tried to compete directly against Sony on Sony's terms; and as a result it was Nintendo's worst performing system (in terms of sales)



NintendoPie said:
happydolphin said:

If they were going Red Ocean, they really weren't careful with their image and catering to the congested marketspace's needs and interests.

The image of this looks more Blue Ocean than anything, catering to the younger demographics... A failed strategy maybe, but that was their direction in terms of image at least.

Please, HappyDolphin, explain to me what "Blue Ocean" and "Red Ocean" mean. I'm so confused. -.-

I just read the Wikipedia article and will break it down for you, it's kinda hard to read I agree.

 

Book layout and highlight

The book is divided into five parts:

The first part presents:

  • key concepts of blue ocean strategy, including Value Innovation – the simultaneous pursuit of differentiation and low cost – and key analytical tools and frameworks such as the strategy canvas,
  • the four actions framework
  • the eliminate-reduce-raise-create grid.

 

The second part describes:

  • The four principles of blue ocean strategy formulation:

  1. how to create uncontested market space by:
  2. reconstructing market boundaries,
  3. focusing on the big picture,
  4. reaching beyond existing demand and
  5. getting the strategic sequence right.

These four formulation principles address how an organization can create blue oceans by

  1. looking across the six conventional boundaries of competition (Six Paths Framework),
  2. reduce their planning risk by following the four steps of visualizing strategy,
  3. create new demand by unlocking the three tiers of noncustomers and
  4. launch a commercially-viable blue ocean idea by aligning unprecedented utility of an offering with strategic pricing and target costing and by overcoming adoption hurdles.

  • The book uses many examples across industries to demonstrate how to break out of traditional competitive (structuralist) strategic thinking and to grow demand and profits for the company and the industry by using blue ocean (reconstructionist) strategic thinking.

 

The third and final part describes:

  • The two key implementation principles of blue ocean strategy including:
  1. tipping point leadership and
  2. fair process.

These implementation principles are essential for leaders to overcome the four key organizational hurdles that can prevent even the best strategies from being executed.

  • The four key hurdles comprise the
  1. cognitive,
  2. resource,
  3. motivational and
  4. political

Hurdles that prevent people involved in strategy execution from understanding the need to break from status quo, finding the resources to implement the new strategic shift, keeping your people committed to implementing the new strategy, and from overcoming the powerful vested interests that may block the change.

In the book the authors draw the attention of their readers towards the correlation of success stories across industries and the formulation of strategies that provide a solid base create unconventional success – a strategy termed as “Blue Ocean Strategy”.

Unlike the “Red Ocean Strategy”, the conventional approach to business of beating competition derived from the military organization, the “Blue Ocean Strategy” tries to align innovation with utility, price and cost positions.

 

 

The book mocks at the phenomena of conventional choice between product/service differentiation and lower cost, but rather suggests that both differentiation and lower costs are achievable simultaneously.

The authors ask readers “What is the best unit of analysis of profitable growth? Company? Industry?” – a fundamental question without which any strategy for profitable growth is not worthwhile.

The authors justify with original and practical ideas that neither the company nor the industry is the best unit of analysis of profitable growth; rather it is the strategic move that creates “Blue Ocean” and sustained high performance.

 

The book examines the experience of companies in areas as diverse as

  • watches,
  • wine,
  • cement,
  • computers,
  • automobiles,
  • textiles,
  • coffee makers,
  • airlines,
  • retailers, and even
  • the circus

to answer this fundamental question and builds upon the argument about “Value Innovation” being the cornerstone of a blue ocean strategy.

 

Value Innovation is necessarily the alignment of innovation with utility, price and cost positions. This creates uncontested market space and makes competition irrelevant. The following section discusses the concept behind the book in detail.

 

[edit]Concept

The metaphor of red and blue oceans describes the market universe.

 

Red Oceans are all the industries in existence today – the known market space. In the red oceans, industry boundaries are defined and accepted, and the competitive rules of the game are known.

Here companies try to outperform their rivals to grab a greater share of product or service demand. As the market space gets crowded, prospects for profits and growth are reduced. Products become commodities or niche, and cutthroat competition turns the ocean bloody. Hence, the term red oceans.[2]

 

Blue oceans, in contrast, denote all the industries not in existence today – the unknown market space, untainted by competition. In blue oceans, demand is created rather than fought over.

There is ample opportunity for growth that is both profitable and rapid. In blue oceans, competition is irrelevant because the rules of the game are waiting to be set. Blue ocean is an analogy to describe the wider, deeper potential of market space that is not yet explored.[2]


Cirque du Soleil – an example of creating a new market space, by blending opera and ballet with the circus format while eliminating star performer and animals

 

The cornerstone of Blue Ocean Strategy is 'Value Innovation'. A blue ocean is created when a company achieves value innovation that creates value simultaneously for both the buyer and the company. The innovation (in product, service, or delivery) must raise and create value for the market, while simultaneously reducing or eliminating features or services that are less valued by the current or future market.

The authors criticizeMichael Porter's idea that successful businesses are either low-cost providers or niche-players. Instead, they propose finding value that crosses conventional market segmentation and offering value and lower cost. Educator Charles W. L. Hill proposed this idea in 1988 and claimed that Porter's model was flawed because differentiation can be a means for firms to achieve low cost. He proposed that a combination of differentiation and low cost might be necessary for firms to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage.

 

Funky Business (Swedish book)

Many others have proposed similar strategies. For example, Swedish educators Jonas Ridderstråle and Kjell Nordström in their 1999 book Funky Businessfollow a similar line of reasoning. For example, "competing factors" in Blue Ocean Strategy are similar to the definition of "finite and infinite dimensions" inFunky Business. Just as Blue Ocean Strategy claims that a Red Ocean Strategy does not guarantee success, Funky Business explained that "Competitive Strategy is the route to nowhere". Funky Business argues that firms need to create "Sensational Strategies".

Just like Blue Ocean Strategy, a Sensational Strategy is about "playing a different game" according to Ridderstråle and Nordström. Ridderstråle and Nordström also claim that the aim of companies is to create temporary monopolies. Kim and Mauborgne explain that the aim of companies is to create blue oceans, that will eventually turn red. This is the same idea expressed in the form of an analogy. Ridderstråle and Nordström also claimed in 1999 that "in the slow-growth 1990s overcapacity is the norm in most businesses". Kim and Mauborgne claim that blue ocean strategy makes sense in a world where supply exceeds demand.