What I gather here is that: you "know what you know"; you're not open to being shown anything to the contrary, because you cannot conceive of doubting that which you claim to know; your system allows for no ways of dealing with "apparent disagreement" and you cannot make a case for your views via "external demonstration or argument."

    Indeed if I doubted what I absolutely knew it would mean I didn’t know it. As I know empiricism and rationalism are contradictory as a method of truth you can’t show me anything to the contrary. But you’re welcome to try.

    Yes, the question of epistemology isn’t about whether or an individual can deal with an apparent disagreement with someone else (aka methodologically convince someone of something he believes).

    The only case I am making is that revelation isn’t problematic as an answer to the epistemological question. I’m not attempting to convince you of any piece of information about the truth of the world. Merely that the method of revelation isn’t problematic like empiricism and rationalism as recognizable in our mind. That’s the only thing I really wished to be gained from the discussion.

While I take some solace in knowing that, the very fact you argue for your position implies that you don't yourself believe it at heart... the rest of me is discouraged.

    Recognizing that something is contradictory really isn’t an argument in the sense of a rationalistic method of truth. Of course in the sense of a “verbal battle” this is an argument. But this could be clearly categorized as an explanation on my part, not an argument to provide “proof”. What I’m saying is similar to stating that a bachelor is not a banana. Logic does not mean gaining any “first” truths. Knowing sense data doesn’t mean gaining truth of what it represents. Revelation, however, does mean knowledge that is received.

    It’s an issue of meaning in the mind. I’m not attempting to convince you of anything about the world. (That may be all that revelation is necessary for.)

I mean, just so we're clear, we don't have to be dealing in "hypotheticals"; I know that empiricism is a "working method of truth," and therefore your claims to "absolutely know" the contrary are certainly false.

Hehe. No you don’t know.

And for all I can tell, since you'll admit to no evidence to the contrary (despite the fact that both you and I have a lifetime's worth of it), that does indeed mean that we're at an impasse.

I have no “evidence” that sense data has ever handed me the correct interpretation of itself. As by its definition it doesn’t. Although, I have “experienced” a lifetime of beliefs about reality and sense data.

As this sort of answer to epistemology is certainly despised by many (that knowledge is a gift from God) there is a mantra of the bible I quite agree with concerning the world that rejects it: “They are ever learning and never coming to the knowledge of the truth”.

I was trying to respond earlier to that larger post you made of which involved clearing up things from our previous posts, but, not to make you irritated, I couldn’t understand what you meant many times, there was further misunderstanding on terms I think, and I couldn’t catch the context of what you were presenting to me at times. It just seemed too exhausting for me to commit to it. I’d give you examples of why I find certain things confusing but I think it’s not gonna help anything. I hope we can just call it a train wreck as you stated and move on.

1.  

You don't see them?  I'm not trying to infer some mystical difference between those two categories and any other way of dividing anything -- just that you necessarily either realize you're receiving input or you don't.  And since it seems to me that you understand and recognize that distinction, we are in agreement on that. 
     Where we part ways is that you don't seem to understand that "consciously received" doesn't mean you know WHERE it came from, just that it came from SOMEWHERE (outside of yourself).  So "not consciously received" means, conversely, that you are NOT aware that it came from outside yourself.  In fact, you may not even be aware that there was any change at all!  (e.g. if God made you swap interpretations of "purple" and "orange" without your knowledge, and you'd never notice unless you saw an object from before the swap.)  More on this later. 

    It seems we agree that revelation merely implies finding yourself with knowledge. One of the many things that may be revealed to you is that "you are receiving a revelation". One of the many things that may also be revealed to you is that "you are receiving a revelation from an outside source". Also one of the many things that may be revealed to you is "Bananas are yellow"...

    I think that’s pretty clear. I can express what you’re calling “conscious reception” in terms of knowledge clearly.

    In that case, I don’t see where we’re parting ways unless there was a misunderstanding as to what I meant previously.

2.  

I read what you wrote, but it didn't seem to concretely address the issue.  I think this is for reasons I'll be able to address in a response below.  For now I'll just say you seem to be saying, "but it's ABSOLUTE knowledge, so obviously it's absolute, QED" which is fairly obviously begging the question. 
     Actually, now that I look at your response more closely it's clear that your "revelation" is a complete sidestepping of the issue of establishing that something is absolute knowledge by saying that revealed knowledge is ipso facto absolute. 
     I still have response to this, but see (4). 

    Proposing the analytical statement that absolute knowledge is absolute knowledge is not begging the question. Nor is stating that a bachelor is a bachelor begging the question.

     Begging the question refers to a logical argument in which the conclusion is already stated in so many words in a premise. E.g. "God can't not exist. Therefore God exists". It should be noted also, that begging the question isn’t contradictory. It’s merely no good for providing a reason (proposition) not already shared by the listener. Begging the question is categorized as a "logical fallacy" for that alone.

      Perhaps it’s not being realized that I’m not attempting to convince you via argument about something in the world. I'm only stating a proposition in response to the question of epistemology (and everything following is an explanation of what is meant), which is in your head. The proposition, that is the method proposed, is being examined for coherency and, you could say, relevancy to the question of epistemology. I can't be begging the question as this specific proposition we're having an issue with really isn't a logical argument (rather a mere proposition by itself).

     It goes like this: If (I say if for your sake since you don’t hold this) you are given absolute knowledge of X, then this means absolute knowledge of X has been given to you [aka you’d have it]. Similar to: If you’re given a banana, then this means a banana has been given to you [aka you’d have it]. It’s not begging the question. It’s merely an analytical assessment. If you're a bachelor, then you're a bachelor.

3.

    Unfortunately this will not resolve much as you say this is not your position, but I want to note that this faces exactly the same issue as my hypothetical "the bible is always correct because it says so, and we know the bible is correct in saying that it is always correct because it is always correct, which we know because it says so".  I.e. the one is proven by assuming the other.  THIS is begging the question beyond any shadow of a doubt.  The only way it can be "resolved" is by falling back on your revelation, which means that this is not in fact different at all from your prior answer. 

    I don’t see how the idea of receiving two bits of absolute knowledge leads you to giving an argument that begs the question. “The bible is correct because it says so” is an argument. Absolute knowledge is absolute knowledge is an analytical proposition.

    If you wanted to take that proposition and put it into an argument then of course you make it beg the question, just like you could do with any proposition. But that's totally irrelevant to recognizing that a proposition is coherent and relevant to the question of epistemology, which is all this is about.

4.

Forget "another person".  You can't even PROVE it to yourself*.  You just "know" it without need for proof beyond the fact that you "know" it.  This is a fucking definition of faith. 
     And given that what you are calling "absolute knowledge" is faith-based, I dispute and deny in the most strenuous way imaginable that you are correct in calling it "absolute knowledge" instead of, say, "absolute faith" or "absolute belief" or "absolute certainty".**  Your feeling was correct -- this is indeed EXACTLY what I meant when I hypothesized, "you're saying that absolute certainty (no matter the origin of said certainty) that it is absolute knowledge makes it so".  Revelation, as you describe it, does not depend on being able to somehow determine the veracity of the source -- it just makes you ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN of what you now believe (now that it's been revealed). 

…

*Proof implies that you approach a question in order to substantiate it.  In this case there is no question, and no substantiation. 

    If you know X because you know X… this already implied you don’t need to 'prove' it to yourself. Fundamentally it seems you’re inevitably rejecting any form of knowing anything. You say you need proof, but once you have it I can ask you “how do you know it’s really proof?”. Proof would only be another piece of information… to prove…. unless, apparently, you knew it beyond any shadow of doubt. Knowledge has to begin… with at least knowledge, otherwise I can always ask you how you know whatever you’re bringing to support any piece of knowledge.

    I don’t think it’s ever useful to argue about the definition of a word. You can mean faith whatever way you see fit, I just hope what I’m explaining is clear. That being, absolute knowledge, if given to you, is not a random assumption you made by your own power to guess amongst possibilities (perhaps that’s what you mean by faith). Absolute knowledge, if given to you, is absolute knowledge and by definition “undoubtable”. Annoying isn’t it. The annoyance comes from wanting to put that scenario back into the arena of “not necessarily true”, but since it’s an analytical assertion, it is necessarily true. If I’m a bachelor, I’m a bachelor. How “profound”.

    After you mentioned the “faith” bit I didn’t understand much else of what you said.

5.

Your absolute certainty that the knowledge is correct does not MAKE it correct (except in your opinion).

    Either you’ve misunderstood me or this is sophistry. I still don’t understand your use of the term “absolute certainty” outside of what I would mean by absolutely knowledge. I’m sorry but I see that term as a way to make a distinction that doesn’t exist (sophistry) within: If I find myself with absolute knowledge, I have absolute knowledge which by definition is unquestionable.

    Without thinking about it too hard it seems your term “absolute certainly” is covertly making absolute knowledge not absolute, as if now being absolutely sure of something is actually dependent on being absolutely certain…

    Perhaps also having absolute certainly that you absolutely know something is dependent on being absolutely assured. And then perhaps being absolutely assured that you that you have absolute certainty that you absolutely know something is dependent upon having unquestionable understanding. And perhaps having unquestionable understanding that you’re absolutely assured that you have absolute certainty that you absolutely know something is dependent upon immutable confidence. Ect. This is what I mean by sophistry. It’s a difficult thing to dismantle since when I attack it, the one making such distinctions can very easily create slight variances in his meaning of each term, making it appear as though the original reason they were created were actually relevant.

    Oh and I apologize if this comes off as some accusation. I'm absolutely not saying you're intentionally do this.

  So in that sense faith-based "absolute knowledge" cannot vouch for itself in the abstract, only in your own estimation.  That is what I mean when you say you beg the question by saying (for example) "The bible says it, I believe it, that settles it".  It settles it FOR YOU -- but that's all.

  Addressing the issue of convincing other people of truth: Yes, revelation would only settle it for the one the revelation is given to. The question of epistemology isn’t about “apologetics”.

**To be sure, the word "know" is used colloquially when it is really only an extremely well-educated guess.  example "Do you know when the train is scheduled to arrive?"  "Yes, it's 8:00, right there on the sheet."  But maybe the sheet is outdated.  He doesn't actually KNOW.  /example But I consider "absolute knowledge" to imply much more than mere certainty, especially when you say other people do not have absolute knowledge that the world really exists.  I'm sure that millions and millions of people are very absolutely certain of it.

    Yes, in our colloquial English words are ambiguous and can mean one thing or another. Certainly people use the word know that way. But since I’m not talking about a “well-educated guess” I mean something else when I say knowledge. In the “field of epistemology” knowledge already means what I’m often calling here “absolute knowledge” for clarity sake (although sometimes I get tired of saying that and just say knowledge – the context should hopefully make that clear).

    Sorry, I don’t know what you’re saying after the example.

My Original Issue of Absolute Knowledge

To be honest I don't actually remember your explanation.  But anyway, Descartes asked how we could know absolutely for sure that we weren't dreaming all of our existence (or in the Matrix or whatever), and I don't have an answer ... so obviously if the world we sense isn't absolute beyond question, then observation-based science (or any sense-based belief set) is not absolute either.  But that doesn't mean it's not practical. 

That would be the problem in a matter of words yes. Thank you Descartes. But I still don’t understand what you mean by “practical” in relation to sense data. Maybe if you put it in this sentence it would help me: “Although we can’t obtain any correct interpretation of sense data by sense data, sense data can still…”?

    If something was revealed to interpret sense data realize this would no longer be empiricism, as empiricism holds that all we need (and have) is sense data to make the correct interpretation (lol of what sense data represents).

    Saying a "way" would be revealed to interpret sense data sounds pretty much "a method of truth" (for the world/sense data of course). It's not much different than saying "maybe there's a method of truth you haven't realized yet".

    (*sigh* have mercy on my weary soul and don’t make me explain the following in any more depth: ) Cool, well I have one that contains the fundamental answer (or rather gets to the root of the problem in epistemology) already 0_o anything else that worked would just add an interesting specification (e.g. bananas are the source of knowledge of which is gained when eaten (good luck knowing where that first banana is to eat though).

    If there will be quibbling over your specified use of the word "use", I'll just ask you how you discover the meaning of someone's word you've never known using only the word itself. Revelation means to give knowledge... so that means if it helped you gain the meaning of the word in any way it would have to give you, in some way, knowledge that would give the meaning of the word to you... which is just... revelation still.

I could reply to the whole thing, but hopefully this will cut to the heart of the matter:

From what you are saying I think your "absolute knowledge" is closer to "personal truth" than "absolute truth", the latter being universal.

That is, a person could hypothetically "absolutely know" something that contradicts something that someone else "absolutely knows", based on different revelations.

That would be why I had a fit when you were saying stuff like 'we know it's absolute knowledge because it's absolute knowledge, lol': because PERSONAL "absolute knowledge" (what you were talking about) doesn't imply UNIVERSAL "absolute knowledge" (what I was talking about*).

That would be why you said that when I was talking about absolute certainty you thought it was close to what you were talking about -- because what I meant by "absolute certainty" was what you meant by "absolute knowledge".

This may explain everything. But have I misinterpreted your meaning?
*And in my defense -- I mean, come on, it's absolute knowledge!

But didn't you say that absolute knowledge couldn't be gotten from sense data?  If you didn't, never mind.  But if the sense data is a form of revelation (as you suggested above), and if interpretations of that sense data can also be revealed, and if revelation confers absolute knowledge (your def'n.), then couldn't you put those two types of absolute knowledge together logically and derive more absolute knowledge from them?  Or is sense data a type of revelation that is not absolute knowledge? 

Empiricism is about taking sense data and making judgments about the world based on it.  As long as the revealed interpretations result in a consistent/persistent world and can create a working I/O system with feedback, I don't know why revelation of those interpretations would necessarily be inconsistent with empiricism.  But then again I'm pretty tired right now.

Final-Fan said: I could reply to the whole thing, but hopefully this will cut to the heart of the matter: From what you are saying I think your "absolute knowledge" is closer to "personal truth" than "absolute truth", the latter being universal. That is, a person could hypothetically "absolutely know" something that contradicts something that someone else "absolutely knows", based on different revelations. That would be why I had a fit when you were saying stuff like 'we know it's absolute knowledge because it's absolute knowledge, lol': because PERSONAL "absolute knowledge" (what you were talking about) doesn't imply UNIVERSAL "absolute knowledge" (what I was talking about*). That would be why you said that when I was talking about absolute certainty you thought it was close to what you were talking about -- because what I meant by "absolute certainty" was what you meant by "absolute knowledge". This may explain everything. But have I misinterpreted your meaning? *And in my defense -- I mean, come on, it's absolute knowledge!

    Well, perhaps in calling absolute knowledge 'personal truth' or 'personal absolute knowledge' it can clear up something, sure. I think it might clear up, specifically, that this method of revelation is not something I can appeal to you or anyone else with (to convince them of something about the world). Whereas sense data and rationalism are (actually within assumption...) thought to be something that every capable person has and is able to 'harness' in the same way. So it is thought, therefore, that if each person used it correctly (method of truth) we could arrive at the same knowledge when a question or disagreement is brought between us about something of the world. (And again, of course, that's not my position.)

    I do, however, hope there is no implication of subjectivism in those terms. When I say I absolutely know something as per my revelation I truly mean... it is true (for anything with the capability of knowing truth). As I've explained before, in saying things like "it's only true for me but not necessarily for you" it really just goes against the meaning of truth altogether. One can certainly mean something different by the use of truth there but it would not, therefore, be related to the meaning of truth I'm talking about.

    All that meaning, in response, no, I could never acknowledge the possibility that someone receives a different absolute truth about the world than I do. This is because, though that phrase is composed of meaningful english words, when I put them together they refer to nothing (e.g. John is a married bachelor). So I'm not denouncing a possibility per se, I'm denouncing a phrase that is truly meaningless to me (which is essentially the contention of logic, whether in relation to a phrase or an argument).

But didn't you say that absolute knowledge couldn't be gotten from sense data?  If you didn't, never mind. 

    Right, I was hoping to make it clear that revelation would be the thing bringing something to you for knowledge in some way and still not through the use of sense data. So if there was any confusion in the distinction I was bringing, I'll answer it straight: You can't get the correct interpretation of sense data by sense data (as per my explaination of it's definition essentially). Therefore proposing the possibility that revelation can just give you "something that will make it otherwise" comes off as meaningless really. I suppose it's like saying revelation might one day reveal that a bachelor is actually a married man.

But if the sense data is a form of revelation (as you suggested above), and if interpretations of that sense data can also be revealed, and if revelation confers absolute knowledge (your def'n.), then couldn't you put those two types of absolute knowledge together logically and derive more absolute knowledge from them?  Or is sense data a type of revelation that is not absolute knowledge? 

    Sorry for that other distinction that has been confusing (so many distinctions to make at a constant rate): Sense data would be some absolute knowledge, yes, and what that sense data represents would be further absolute knowledge. In regards to your comment, yes, in putting propositions together we can "use logic" to find conclusions if they are available. Whether conclusions can be considered 'new knowledge' is an interesting point. But the real question is, what propositions do sense data give you? And if it does give you anything expressable in proposition what can you use it with to gain further conclusions about the world? E.g. You sense a blob of colors and then you have the revelation that, say, Santa clause doesn't exist. ...Well, what can you derive from those two pieces of information? I doubt there's much to be derived in having the recognition of 'red, blue, and green' and a specific proposition about the world. Plus, as we understand in logic, a conclusion is just something that was already basically present in the premises. It's not a totally “new discovery” in that sense. In other words, you can’t build a whole world out of knowing that “I exist”, “I’m sitting in a chair” and “I sense red, green, and blue”.

Empiricism is about taking sense data and making judgments about the world based on it.  As long as the revealed interpretations result in a consistent/persistent world and can create a working I/O system with feedback, I don't know why revelation of those interpretations would necessarily be inconsistent with empiricism.  But then again I'm pretty tired right now.

    No, a particular arrangement of sense data doesn’t necessarily have the same interpretation every time it occurs. If I ‘experience’ sense data and it is then revealed to me that it represents a piano, it doesn’t mean that the next time I sense the same arrangement of sense data it will necessarily represent a piano for sure again without the aid of revelation (insert all those millions of interpretations here that convey the same sense data).

    Thus consistency, in the sense I think you mean it, really never comes into the picture because it always would take revelation to tell you what any moment of sense data represented. A ‘reliable’ I/O system can’t be developed with only specific moments of revelation concerning particular moments of sense data you experience.

(1)  No, that's not what I'm saying.  I'm proposing that the sense data is revealed, from which you can't make your own interpretation that gives absolute knowledge, AND you are given a REVEALED interpretation (and revelation, according to you, is (or can be?) absolute).  How can an absolute interpretation of absolute knowledge not possibly produce absolute knowledge?  (Or, perhaps, are you suggesting that that wouldn't be an "interpretation" if it is revelation, not our fallible minds, that produced it?)  It seems to me that we would be like a computer given a good (revealed) program and good (revealed) data, so no danger of GIGO applies.  Or can't we even do that?  If we were broken computers then we couldn't even do logic, so ...

(2)  That is indeed interesting; the alternative would be to say that all knowledge is actually held within the most fundamental knowledge.  But on the other hand that seems offhand like saying that diamonds don't exist, only carbon.  Well, maybe not quite, but it still seems like a very strange position although it's interesting to think about.  I guess it would be more like saying that the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem isn't "new" knowledge, only "newly discovered" knowledge, but I struggle to see a material difference. 

(3)  But what you are implying is an individual revelation for every single moment of sense data experienced.  I am not suggesting that.  Why can't a particular arrangement of sense data always have the same interpretation(s)?  How is that inconsistent with the method of revelation?  
     Then the I/O system could be built of revealed interpretations. 

appolose said: Final-Fan said: I could reply to the whole thing, but hopefully this will cut to the heart of the matter: From what you are saying I think your "absolute knowledge" is closer to "personal truth" than "absolute truth", the latter being universal. That is, a person could hypothetically "absolutely know" something that contradicts something that someone else "absolutely knows", based on different revelations. That would be why I had a fit when you were saying stuff like 'we know it's absolute knowledge because it's absolute knowledge, lol': because PERSONAL "absolute knowledge" (what you were talking about) doesn't imply UNIVERSAL "absolute knowledge" (what I was talking about*). That would be why you said that when I was talking about absolute certainty you thought it was close to what you were talking about -- because what I meant by "absolute certainty" was what you meant by "absolute knowledge". This may explain everything. But have I misinterpreted your meaning? *And in my defense -- I mean, come on, it's absolute knowledge!     Well, perhaps in calling absolute knowledge 'personal truth' or 'personal absolute knowledge' it can clear up something, sure. I think it might clear up, specifically, that this method of revelation is not something I can appeal to you or anyone else with (to convince them of something about the world). Whereas sense data and rationalism are (actually within assumption...) thought to be something that every capable person has and is able to 'harness' in the same way. So it is thought, therefore, that if each person used it correctly (method of truth) we could arrive at the same knowledge when a question or disagreement is brought between us about something of the world. (And again, of course, that's not my position.)     I do, however, hope there is no implication of subjectivism in those terms. When I say I absolutely know something as per my revelation I truly mean... it is true (for anything with the capability of knowing truth). As I've explained before, in saying things like "it's only true for me but not necessarily for you" it really just goes against the meaning of truth altogether. One can certainly mean something different by the use of truth there but it would not, therefore, be related to the meaning of truth I'm talking about.     All that meaning, in response, no, I could never acknowledge the possibility that someone receives a different absolute truth about the world than I do. This is because, though that phrase is composed of meaningful english words, when I put them together they refer to nothing (e.g. John is a married bachelor). So I'm not denouncing a possibility per se, I'm denouncing a phrase that is truly meaningless to me (which is essentially the contention of logic, whether in relation to a phrase or an argument).

Well, it just has to be hypothetically possible, not actually possible. 

And, well, you can't have it both ways.  Agreeing to call it "personal absolute knowledge" won't make me happy if you follow it up with "but it's also universal absolute knowledge" which defeats the point. 

So:  this, combined with all you've said, only gives me the following impression: 
A supernatural being could invade Person A's mind and cause him to believe something without any speck of doubt in the world that X is true.  (Revelation)  Person A absolutely knows it.  And, having done this, the same supernatural entity COULD NOT do the same to Person B but give him absolute certainty in not-X because it would violate the definition of truth. 

Unless you're just saying that A could never conceive of such a thing happening to B because it would violate his own absolute certainty. 

1. Right, I think that’s what I’m addressing. “I'm proposing that the sense data is revealed, from which you can't make your own interpretation that gives absolute knowledge,”. You can’t get a correct interpretation of sense data by (you imply that with ‘from which’) sense data.

How can an absolute interpretation of absolute knowledge not possibly produce absolute knowledge?

    An interpretation of absolute knowledge? Like I’ve said, if it’s absolute knowledge that’s given to you, it necessarily means there’s no question in it. If you question it or call it a mere ‘interpretation’ then it’s no longer absolute knowledge, it’s a possibility like anything else that you’re looking for a way to establish.

    That’s just the difference in absolutely knowing something and not. Even if you attempt to argue for another method besides revelation it would involve assertions about reality that you’d have to… absolutely know to even begin the method. Either that, or you ask “how do you know” consistently and thereby be a skeptic of the highest degree. The question doesn’t just randomly stop at what one assumes to be ‘evidence’, ‘proof’, ‘interpretation’. If one does stop asking, it would mean one absolutely knows something without question…but that would only exemplify what I’m saying of absolute knowledge.

    The best example is sense data really. If I question a person’s belief that he is indeed experiencing ‘sense data’ in any form all he can say is… umm I just know I am. There’s not much of a question as he seems to be unable to question something being literally shoved into his mind.

3. Why can't a particular arrangement of sense data always have the same interpretation(s)? 

    The issue is you couldn’t know if it did because of everything I’ve said about empiricism. There’s no indication from sense data that it does have the same interpretation at any time. You could only know that if revelation told you: “every time you encountered such sense data it meant such and such interpretation” - which would be about the same thing as revelation telling you every time it occurred – That is to say, it’s all still dependent on revelation telling you about sense data.

    Perhaps somehow I still haven’t made it clear why any particular arrangement of sense data at any time could represent many possible interpretations by our own admission? (Thus, how does being revealed one instance of sense data mean you know all the other instances which again carry the same long list of possible interpretations?)