appolose said:
donathos said:
appolose said:
But empiricism has no more practical or tangible value than my own philosophy, in that it's practicality is measured only by itself, which would be true of any method of truth. We landed on the moon, yes, but we know that through empiricism. Yes, we have sense data. But I could roll dice and pick a statement and come up with something just as likely as true as empiricism could manage. Empericism is an assumption, with no assuredly measurable benefits, and to select is to do exactly what I've done; just picked something. My magical thinking (as it were) is all there is.
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But all of these concepts--"measurement," "true," "assumption," etc.... all of these, themselves, are constructed on sensory data and empiricism.
You say that there are no "assuredly measurable benefits" to empiricism (which, here, I mean relying on one's senses... not necessarily the formal school of thought). But I say that there are not any "assuredly measurable benefits" outside of empiricism, and cannot be, because the very notion of "assure" or "measure" or even "benefit" relies on receiving data from the world and interpreting it.
I.e. sensation.
If you agree that sensation is axiomatic (and I believe you did in another post), then perhaps you'd agree that it is beyond proof; sensation, itself, is foundational to proof--it comes before the very concept of logic. As babies, we take sensation for granted long before we ever learn what a syllogism is.
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Meaning and language are not necessarily concepts derived from our experiences (as I gave the possibility of meaning and language simply being present already (which is not impossible)). And while I do agree that sensation is itself an unavoidable axiom, it's not sensation I'm questioning, but what we make of them.
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Hmm... it's a different discussion perhaps, but I believe that language is derived from our experiences. As for saying that its being present already "is not impossible"... well... "is not impossible" doesn't give me any confidence, or lead me to wonder if it's true. By that same rationale, the Tooth Fairy is not impossible--I'm not ready to give the Tooth Fairy any credence, however, and I'm sure you don't either.
For now, I'll just go where I think the evidence points, and I think that at the moment the evidence points away from Plato's theories of knowledge and towards learning language.
As for this: it's not sensation I'm questioning... well... what the hell are we arguing then!? :) I thought you were questioning the validity of sensation.
But, if you're not, if instead you're questioning "what we make of them"... well... then what are you questioning, exactly? Maybe I just don't fully grasp your argument. (For which I apologize.)
I mean, as far as I'm concerned, "what we make of our sensations" forms the basis of, like, every other possible argument. So I don't understand a general argument over what we make of our sensations, but rather particular instances of it, like whether we believe that God exists, or butter-side-up vs. butter-side-down (and anyone who thinks down is a freak... just saying).
Sensation is our data--and I don't believe that sensation, as such, can be argued against--how we interpret that data, however... now that's the stuff of horse races.