Rise of atheism: 100,000 Brits seek 'de-baptism'

[appolose]

Final-Fan said:

(I’ll use ‘proof’ instead of ‘justification’ once I present my case)

    Let me put the conclusion of this first: I just want to know if we’re at an understanding of your position: That belief must be justified to become knowledge. Once you’ve confirmed that I then wish to bring my case against the notion of justification in which you can bring up your specific disagreements point by point.

     Also, a mere side question here… as the “Gettier problem” is rather retarded to me, I must ask, do you see that basically they're posing a scenario in which the process of “justification” really didn’t justify? (Isn’t what we mean by justification already referring to the process of some infallible confirmation?) Thus the scenario doesn’t involve justification at all.
    Do you agree that what they are doing now is essentially asking for justification for their justification?

3.   Yes, I’m talking about “justified true belief”.
      I said “justified belief” because that’s how I saw you refer to this concept. Then I put “Knowledge of the truth” following to indicate that this was the way I’ve referred to it previously (as well as with ‘absolute knowledge’). Further, it’s an acceptable description as knowledge falls within the “circle” of truth. Thus knowledge is ‘of’ it yet, according to the little drawing (lol), not the essence (meaning) of truth. It’s a common way of referring to (epistemic) knowledge in ordinary terms anyway. Knowledge, knowledge of the truth, whatever. But let’s not argue semantics.
      After this you suggest a distinction between JTB and JB and I’m hoping you were only suggesting that out of confusion as to what I was saying. Otherwise the introduction of new terms/ideas and distinctions like that are going to annihilate the small grasp I had on your position. I’d hate to reinvent it in my mind any further or get caught up in arguing another distinction I find meaningless.
     The point we were at was clear. Your fundamental contention was that belief had to have justification to be knowledge.

But you're positive that "justified true belief" (as those words are used in the Wikipedia article) is what you are talking about?
…
So, do you agree that knowledge is (at least) composed of belief, truth, AND justification?

    So uniting with the question in point 4: Yes, I agree in the sense that I understand your position: that knowledge is ‘composed’ of belief, truth, and justification. I’m prepared to make nonsense out of justification so I can’t agree in that sense. If we’re at an understanding, I will attempt to bring my case.
    (The wikipedia article on the Gettier problem is great because of its clarity. Within it makes my contention against justification very exposed. Not that it intended to.)

5. Are you or are you not suggesting that input regarding the world can justify itself as true belief and, if so, how?*

    What? Do you see how I might not understand what you mean by “input regarding the world”? We’ve been speaking of specific terms: e.g. sense data and revelation. You also know I’ve suffered some confusion on your use of empiricism, input, and your categorization of revelation under these.
    Further, do you see how it’s hard to make a relevant or, rather, necessary relation from this (and the following) to my point about the hypothetical argument?

I do not think it can. I think you can get B and maybe T but not J via input that is alleged to be revelation as I believe you have described it.

    The first statement you make at point 5 either asks for clarity, explanation, or asks something tongue-in-cheek regarding what I said in the previous post (I think).
    After that we have this statement, along with the following, which brings up your problem with what I’m proposing of revelation. A. You’re bringing up your case to a point that isn’t necessary for it to be brought up. This breaks up the attempt to keep things concise and united. This statement and the following should be addressed to the main contention, although B. it’s getting ahead of my request to merely come to an agreement regarding the main contention. I portrayed your fundamental contention in what you marked as point 4 and after confirmation was prepared to make a case against it, in which you could then bring up your particular issues with it as it arises. (Further, I’ve heard you say this basic statement of disagreement of yours already in so many words.)
    Do you know what this is like? Ignore the content of this example and just note the progression of the argument on one particular point: A: If we could just get to the store we could buy milk. B: Ya but we don’t have money or a car. A: Wait, we don’t have money? B: No, and besides we don’t have a car. A: Don’t we have some money in the jar upstairs? B: No, and besides we don’t have a car so how can we get there anyway? A: Well hold on, don’t we have a gift certificate for that store? B: We did, but it’s all used up and we don’t have a car so we can’t get there. A: I know about the car, can we address it in a moment? Don’t you have a debit card? B: Yes but I forgot the pin number and you can’t get to the store without a car.
   Whether you think certain times it’s related or not, it’s better to attempt to create some unity instead of addressing all the multiple splits in our discussion with the same addition.

So I do not think that revelation could even hypothetically be true in the sense of "hypothetical" that means "this could possibly be true".

    Do you notice how confusing that sounds? Let me rephrase what I think you meant: “Since I can demonstrate that your theory of revelation is impossible without exception I clearly cannot suggest it’s possible even hypothetically.” Clarify “demonstrate that your theory of revelation is impossible” as you’d like but that’s still a more concise wording.

6. This is doing the same thing I described above in point 5. You’re bringing up your case for a point that wasn’t asking for it. The point was about analytical statements. You could have affirmed it or denied it and explained why. Instead you introduce a contention/concern (in the form of a question) with revelation again.

7. You don’t see how ambiguous that is? You don’t see that this is not what the word empiricism has meant (I wouldn’t say “millennia” but long enough to make the point)? You can certainly stipulate that meaning if you want but it’s certainly confusing.
    But to defend the vital distinction either way: revelation (or even more clearly, aka ‘propositional revelation’) is clearly not what we mean by gaining interpretations of the world through the base experience of color, touch, etc (which is precisely what empiricism has meant).