(A) Yes.  (Justification is a requirement to ensure that a belief is true.)

(B) Yes, I suppose you could say that the justification wasn't "absolute", because it could be (and was) inaccurate, or not foolproof.  I'm not sure what you are asking with "justification for justification", unless it is to mean that the justification must be absolute (thus perhaps why you use "proof"?) to count as such. 

(3) (a) OK.  (Yes, that refers to everything in both paragraphs as far as I could see.  I could do a little side argument about "knowledge of the truth" if I wanted to but I don't.)
     (b) Yes, it was a suggestion out of confusion, you can safely disregard it.
     (c.) Correct, knowledge requires justification.  (As in (A).)  (IMO anyway and isn't it a rare case of consensus among philosophers?) 
     (d) OK. 

(5) (a) I see how it may be less than absolutely clear what I meant by "about the world", although total confusion seems a bit extreme unless it's just you being defensively conservative.  I was only trying to differentiate allegations or knowledge about "the world" (i.e. that which may or may not contain planet Earth, the universe, your toaster, etc.) from allegations and knowledge about e.g. mathematics, which can be obtained from input and could arguably justify themselves.  (So far I would guess from your remarks you are saying that input does not have to justify itself to be knowledge because justification is nonsense, which is an interesting tack to say the least.) 
     Wait, wait.  I see, looking back, that I used "world" in exactly the same sense that you had just previously done, so I presume that that wasn't the confusion (although I'll leave that paragraph up there).  I think I see the problem now.  You object to me saying "input" instead of "sense data" or "revelation", the types of input we have discussed, correct?  Well, that is not in fact a problem, as "revelation" is a subset of "input".  The reason I said "input" instead of revelation is that, as I recall, you have defined revelation as input of knowledge, so obviously it would be silly to say that input of knowledge does not give one knowledge.  Rather, the question is whether the input is revelation by that definition.  If I have misapprehended your definition, by all means tell me.  If you want me to say "revelation" whenever I mean "input alleged to be revelation" (and tell me so), I will try, although I would take no responsibility for any resultant confusion.  Or is "input alleged to be revelation" also nonsense according to your scheme?  That question may sound sarcastic but it's not -- I'm just honestly not sure and think it's an important question. 
     (b) I interpreted this basically as "let's deal with this later":  OK. 
     (c.) Yes, I understand how it is tiresome to see the same thing keep popping up, but I would rather err on the side of repetition than leave a point unstated if I think it is relevant.  Especially in this thread. 
     (d) I disagree.  Leaving aside the phrase you pointed out, it should be "Since I can demonstrate that your theory of revelation is impossible without exception I clearly cannot suggest it’s possible".  "Even hypothetically" in this case is redundant.  Is that any clearer? 

(6) Yes, I suppose if I wanted to redirect to the main issue I should have just done that literally (i.e. "See (5) and (3)."). 

(7) I disagree and think that my interpretation is consistent with the philosophical usage.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empiricism  Scientific empiricism is restricted to the five senses.  Philosophical empiricism seems to be dependent on input as opposed to innate or non-experience-based knowledge.  Is revelation not experienced?  Sure, revelation isn't an ordinary sense, so most discussions of empiricism would not deal with it, but it's certainly not part of rationalism, empiricism's counterpart, since revelation is in fact input (not coming from within) -- right?  (I recognize that even Wikipedia would call this "extreme oversimplification", but stand by the essence of this argument.)  Also, empiricism includes "senses" like pleasure AFAIK, which (and I could be wrong) didn't seem to be what you meant to include going by the two examples you gave.  (After all, different people get pleasure -- or not -- from the same taste.  (Maybe.))

And what does all this have to do with console sales?

I have to say, as ever I'm impressed how religious / atheist debates really get the thread length growing...

Futile Justification/Proof (Evidence/Reason/Support, etc.)

Keep in mind that we are looking to establish beliefs about reality and not that of the analytical/a priori (which, in itself, asserts nothing as to the existence in reality of its entities) and also not that of base sense data (of which I already acknowledge its status of knowledge).

Mere Definition

    (Realize I must use the terms interchangeably at times according to the general sense of the sentence.)

    The definitions of the former terms according to the specific sense we are reaching for in epistemology would indicate we are looking for evidence/reason sufficient to establishing a belief as true (or rather, conversely, establishing that everything in direct opposition of said belief is false). This could also be stated that we are looking for “infallible support” of a belief to ensure its truth. This is what is sought/meant in epistemic justification.

    Clearly we do not mean to find (or, rather, this does not mean), what one might express as, only “apparent”, probable, possible, or partial support/reason for a belief. We want justification, the actual, the solid, the inexorable, the absolute, etc. Anything less is not what we are looking for in epistemology lest we leave the door open once again to doubt/uncertainty.

    Keep in mind also that “proof” and other such terms can be ambiguous. We are not merely looking for a particular something that “lines up” with our belief, as many often use the term, but that which is inexorably sufficient to substantiate the belief as truth. That is to say, proof that a robber did in fact break into your house would be finding your door unlocked and your window broken. But those things may be proof for other beliefs too. So in terms of justification, the proof(s) we need is that which negates all the other possibilities - enabling us to say that our proof is sufficient to inexorably substantiate a belief. That is the meaning of epistemological justification.

Hypothetical Contradictions

    The Gettier problem, along with any other hypothetical situations offered by philosophers in which justification is reportedly established for a belief but then found to be unstable/questionable, must be meaningless as justification, by our specific epistemic definition, obviously did not take place. Justification did not occur as it did not deliver the certainty beyond all doubt we are looking for. Instead, it was an irrelevant or insufficient support that was offered. Thus such posited scenarios only do well to show that the means by which justification was sought failed to achieve justification at all. It was not sufficient to end all doubt, to establish as the inexorable truth.

    Specifically in the Gettier problem a man relies on, what is discovered to be, an insufficient interpretation of sense data. Although he happens to believe correctly as the scenario states he did not have justification for doing so since we see clearly his evidence/reason/proof was apparently open to another possibility (a proof that could support another belief). As it was clearly not sufficient to inexorably establish the truth it was therefore not justification. (Not getting of track but…the Gettier problem only exemplifies the problems of empiricism as criticisms have previously already shown.)

    For the sake of clarity, such scenarios would be comparable to suggesting “What if one actually knew (keeping in mind epistemic definition) that the earth was round but later discovered he was wrong?”. Or rather, what if one has sufficient evidence and reason to establish that the earth was in fact round… but later he discovered he was wrong. It’s plainly a contradictory suggestion. (To make it not so would take changes in the meanings of the terms knowledge and sufficient evidence. As if that was necessary to point out.)

The Problem of Justification

    The simple problem with justification/proof is that whatever is brought as justification/proof also necessarily falls subject to the question of epistemology once again. It is no exception. You must know whatever it is you’re offering of reality for support as well.

    Stated plainly, justification is requiring knowledge to sufficiently establish… knowledge. Again, whatever you bring up of reality to support a belief of reality you apparently already must know it.

    (As I stated in the beginning, keep in mind the analytical/a priori realm of definitions, categories, and calculations safely assert nothing as to the existence in reality of its entities. We are not looking to establish such mere “homeless” ideas.)

    For instance, as in a specific request for a “reason”, the belief that “Socrates is mortal” is inexorably supported by the reasons (aka beliefs…) that “Socrates is a man” and “All men are mortal”. But of course, now you are faced with providing a reason for (another belief to support) those. Then to justify those beliefs you must find support for them as well. This would go on ad infinitum.

    Every body or abstraction you assert to exist in reality will fall prey to the epistemic question once more. (Unless you are to be inconsistent with your ‘skepticism’.)

    (Keep in mind that while sense data is something I say you actually do know as it occurs, it is their interpretation [what it represents] that we are looking for here, which is why I say” any body you assert”. Base sense data does not give you propositions in that, while you may have several individual logical subjects, you will have no predicate to offer it [that is, further information of which to modify the logical subject with e.g. unify it with some entity, place it in a class of some entity, give it a characteristic or nature which involves knowing the existence of an abstraction, etc.])

    Side Note: Even if one can explain basic truths of reality that, like sense data, are literally impossible to deny by way of your meaning, realize you can’t do much else with them. You certainly wont be building a world out of something like “A consciousness exists”. I’m not asserting or denying this idea but just mentioning it’s futility either way in our efforts.

    In the instance of requesting evidence one would plainly bring up something about reality that, again, requires the same process of justification.

    In case it arises: perhaps there could be brought up a type of evidential circumstance called, for lack a better term, “direct evidence” - like someone looking up into the sky and saying “look, the sun obviously revolves around the earth”… but that also falls to the same epistemic question in which we would merely digress to numbering possible interpretations and the whole criticism of empiricism.

Establishing “Probable Belief”

    Even arguments for “probable” belief can be indicted in the same way. Not only does establishing that which is “probable” simply not mean what we mean by knowledge and justification, but also the very process of numerating possibilities or, rather, ‘weighing’ the probability of our reality requires the same inevitable establishment of some knowledge of reality.

Justified Belief (Knowledge) as “Input”

    As I’ve said before, we already accept this in: Sense data. There is no use in asking me how I know if I’m really experiencing what I call red. I, along with anyone else experiencing sense data, am simply forced into that knowledge it seems. I really do hope that requires no further explanation than that. (Dare we complicate it with certain irrelevant distinctions I have in mind.)

    Thus we certainly already accept this “imputation” of justified belief (that is, the imputation of knowledge).

Overview Note

I have not launched into anything else here yet about revelation as an answer to epistemology or the idea of accepting the conclusion that we can’t know anything or anything else. I only want to take this step by step. Do we merely agree on the previous points?

Other

5. The confusion was over the term as a whole but you could emphasize the word “input”, yes. I didn’t know what you were referring to exactly in regards to sense data and revelation.

    It seemed vague in a way that made me wonder if you were implying that revelation and empiricism essentially function the same way as “input”. This would be incorrect to me, of course, and indicate possible confusion in the difference between sense data and empiricism.

   Using your terms, yes, sense data and revelation could be categorized as “input” of knowledge. It is empiricism that represents a specific doctrine concerning sense data that I find problematic. (Gaining propositional knowledge about reality, as explained more fully in the ‘essay’ above)

Rather, the question is whether the input is revelation by that definition.  If I have misapprehended your definition, by all means tell me.  If you want me to say "revelation" whenever I mean "input alleged to be revelation" (and tell me so), I will try, although I would take no responsibility for any resultant confusion.  Or is "input alleged to be revelation" also nonsense according to your scheme?  That question may sound sarcastic but it's not -- I'm just honestly not sure and think it's an important question. 

Sorry, not sure what all that means.

c.  Go ahead and repeat but do me a favor and introduce it every time with a clear indication/heading of one general point (or use the word “again”) and also state whether or not it directly relates to the confirmation or denial of the specific point at hand.

    Otherwise, with all the confusion with our communication, I just personally find it difficult to tell if you’re actually making a new point. As well, within them, for the same reason stated previously, there is also the difficulty of detecting any further elements to your contention. So it seems more difficult than necessary for me to grasp it all, unite it all, and systematically address them concisely.

    I certainly don’t know want to respond to 85 points all restating the same unrelated thing or making slight additions to it within each occurance.

d. You’re disagreeing that it was clear because there’s a redundant phrase (repetition) at the end? (Of which I was merely using to make a clear connection with your use of the term previously and I really don’t find to be bad English.) Maybe I don’t know what you mean by ‘you disagree’.

7. There is some ambiguity in the term “experience” and I understand that is why you are categorizing revelation under it. Again, you may mean whatever you want with words but “experience” in empiricism was in reference, by such philosophers, to what we call our senses. (Some have argued there are as many as 9 senses btw and I’ve even heard a particular speaker claim there are 16.) (I would imagine “pleasure”, in a specific sense of the word, certainly could be categorized as a sense [omitting further clarification].) There may have been a broader meaning (that really doesn’t essentially move away from basic senses) but it’s been clearly in distinction to [propositional] revelation.

    In fact I think I could find some quotes wherein philosophers explicitly mention the distinction of empiricism to revelation (often in the form of ‘religious dogma’).

    One particular empiricist I’ve read that has made it very clear what he means by sense data and experience: Bertrand Russell. It was definitely not propositional revelation.

    Without looking at the way philosophers used the word, I think within this wikipedia article it can be understood. They do at least make the distinction between empiricism and revelation when used in the “scientific “sense.

"Mere Definition"
I agree.

"Hypothetical Contradictions"
I agree. 

"The Problem of Justification"
To the extent that you are saying justification* requires preexisting knowledge in order for it to be possible to justify a belief and make it knowledge (as well), I agree. 

If there was another vital point in here, please point it out.  The way I read it, your points were all in illustration of the above, and so if I replied to their specifics I would be distracting from the topic. 

* Of beliefs about reality outside of one's own mind -- see "JB(K)aI"

"Establishing "Probable Belief""
I agree, although this is merely a restatement of point(s) above. 

"Justified Belief (Knowledge) as "Input""
I agree with you as far as you saying (I think) that the belief that you are experiencing sense data is inextricably linked to the "true" experiencing of sense data.  In other words, when you think you're in pain, you ARE in pain.  Your belief IS justification in this case.  (Right?)  So justification still occurs -- this is an example of a self-justifying belief. 
     [edit2:  Deleted paragraph because, although it was thought-provoking, I feared it might potentially lead to misunderstanding.] 
     (NOTE:  This paragraph anticipates where I think you're going with this.  If you want to leave it for later, that is an option.)  But it is a different situation if an input makes a claim about reality outside of one's own mind (e.g. "A cat is hurting me").  Isn't that what revelation does?  When I think a cat is causing me pain, that doesn't necessarily make it true (Matrix etc.), although it is true that I am in pain. 

     Also, I see you're using "imputation" again.  I was never 100% sure what it meant and if you told me I don't remember anymore.  Please define it now, as the dictionaries I consulted did not offer up a solution that seemed to make sense to me.  (accuse, credit, give, (theological def.)).  In what way exactly does "imputation" differ from "input"? 

5. 
(a1) I don't see where you showed that revelation is not sense data. If you don't make that assertion, then I guess we might not actually disagree except on the use of the word itself?  [edit2: "empiricism", I believe (been a while since I wrote this).  In any case I'm suggesting that your sentiment might be along the lines of "I agree with what you mean, I just don't think you should use that word that way." If that is the case, see (7) (third paragraph).]

[edit2:  I don't know why I didn't notice this before, or if I did what possessed me to not address it, but: 
["You also know I’ve suffered some confusion on your use of empiricism, input, and your categorization of revelation under these."
["made me wonder if you were implying that revelation and empiricism essentially function the same way as “input”."
[It seems to me that the first quoted sentence, by "these", implies that revelation has been categorized by me "under" empiricism.  The second one said explicitly that you seriously thought I might consider empiricism a form of input.  Just to be absolutely clear:  I do not consider revelation a type of empiricism.  I do not consider empiricism a type of input.  Revelation, if it exists, is input, and empiricism is a doctrine of using input* to form beliefs about the world.  Revelation, if it exists, is (I allege), due to its status as input, 'fair game' for use in empiricism.

[* See (7), second paragraph.] 

(a2) I can understand that I explained myself in a complex way.  Let me restate the vital part:  I said "input" instead of "revelation" because you defined "revelation" to be input of knowledge and we are therefore fighting over whether input can be revelation, not whether revelation is input of knowledge.  So "input regarding the world" that somehow justified itself as true belief would be revelation.  (Or not justified, if you manage to throw out that requirement.)  "Regarding the world" was only meant to distinguish from e.g. input of mathematical knowledge.  Is that better? 

(c.) 85, lol.  I'll keep that in mind.

(d) You said you were being "concise".  So when I saw that there was repetition, I thought that you misunderstood something (perhaps the intended meaning of "hypothetical") because I didn't think that you could repeat yourself in a sentence and be concise.  You said "suggest it's possible even hypothetically" and, since "suggest it's possible" is in this case synonymous with [edit: or at least entirely within] "hypothesize", that's like saying "this is red even though it's red" [edit: or "this is a Toyota Camry even though it's a car"].  Do you see how I thought this was a strange thing to say?
     I apologize for not spelling out the connection between the fact that I "disagreed" and my criticism of the phrase that proved to be a redundancy. 

7. 
Quotes, if reasonably brief, might be helpful (especially from Bertrand Russell, given his apparent influence on you), although once we nail down exactly what "propositional revelation" consists of* perhaps I'll agree.  I don't, however, see the direct connection between "religious dogma" and your revelation, unless you're saying that the latter is dependent on the former ... which I presume you don't? 
     Anyway, as for experiences and our senses:  I just don't see the value in stipulating a form of conscious input-reception that isn't defined as a "sense".  Why not?  What else would it be?  (revelation, lol?)
     I think we're down to quarreling over whose use of the terminology is more appropriate, so this sentence is just a note that (if I'm right) we ought to be careful to not let this point get more attention than it deserves.  On a related note, the scientific use of "empiricism" is FAR more restrictive than the philosophical one, so saying that the former excludes revelation is neither surprising nor compelling. 

* By the way, I appreciate the attempt to refine what you mean by "revelation" but adding "propositional" honestly means nothing to me as I don't have the same background.  Hopefully you're getting to that.

"Justified Belief (Knowledge) as "Input""

(A)

Your belief IS justification in this case.  (Right?)  So justification still occurs -- this is an example of a self-justifying belief. 

    It seems like you’re saying what I’m saying. It’s just your use of “justification” here that makes me wonder - specifically when you say “justification still occurs”. I’ll briefly state the case of the last post and then conclude with it’s relation to the use of the word justification.

    I demonstrated the meaninglessness/futility (for lack of a better word) of “justification” in epistemology – in that requiring knowledge for knowledge doesn’t do any service to the epistemic question and so nor does it impose any “middle process” between "mere belief" and knowledge at all.

    I then gave the example of sense data in which we can clearly admit an instance of the reception (input) of knowledge (which we’ve been also calling ‘justified belief’ of course – and this is all leading up to explaining the use of that term) without some process in between: beginning with merely noting your mere belief, applying it to some process of justification, and only then to establish it as knowledge. That is to say, in the occurrence of sense data there is no doubt available of it. That is to say, in the occurrence of sense data there is no inclination to subject it to some process of justification (which, of course, we understand now to be meaningless [in the sense I described at the beginning]). Rather, you just find yourself knowing (e.g. “red” is 'apparent'/'being sensed').

     Therefore because justification is “meaningless” (as a wedge between belief and knowledge) and keeping in mind that we clearly accept knowledge being directly received (input), justification is no longer a contention to raise in this subject. Relating this to my introduction on your quote: The meaningless “justification” is not occurring, rather (or not in any other sense than), knowledge is occurring.

     Now I understand the inclination to still describe this instance of sense data as an instance of ‘justification’ or “an instance of self justifying belief” but that is only because we were using the term “justified belief” as a description for “knowledge” previously. Since it is now realized that justification is meaningless/futile (in the sense I described at the beginning) and that an “input” of knowledge does/can occur there is no use for the term, justification.

    I only used/accepted the term “justified belief” so I could, of course, knock it down.

(B)

But it is a different situation if an input makes a claim about reality outside of one's own mind (e.g. "A cat is hurting me").  Isn't that what revelation does?  When I think a cat is causing me pain, that doesn't necessarily make it true (Matrix etc.), although it is true that I am in pain. 

    I see a possible concern/contention of yours here but I’ll attempt to address it after we clear up any misunderstanding with the “Justified Belief (knowledge) as ‘Input’” section (or perhaps it will come up again on its own).

(C)

In what way exactly does "imputation" differ from "input"

    It doesn’t essentially. It’s just another word to use. Although where ‘input’ may only refer to reception, imputation further includes reference to it’s impartation (yes, “given”). I think the meanings are dependent on each other (or rather, carry the implication) and mean essentially the same thing in this discussion. Just a semantic difference I’m pretty sure, I could drop “imputation’ for now if you feel it’s really a problem.

5.

(a1) The first part of this point (not the quote below) I’ll relate to point 7.

I do not consider revelation a type of empiricism.  I do not consider empiricism a type of input.  Revelation, if it exists, is input, and empiricism is a doctrine of using input* to form beliefs about the world.  Revelation, if it exists, is (I allege), due to its status as input, 'fair game' for use in empiricism.

    I think in the first 2 sentences I’m catching the clarification on your meaning of empiricism in that you’re not equating it with the terms input or revelation. Good to know.

    The last 2 sentences I’ll relate to point 7.

(a2) Still not sure what you’re saying.

d. “Suggest it’s possible” could be taken synonymously with “even hypothetically”, sure. But actually I think it could be taken as a genuine specification. Wherein one might say “it’s possible” in the sense of the probability of something occurring within the accepted way things actually are in our reality as opposed to “it’s possible” in the sense of specifically admitting it’s not a contradictory idea so it has the potential, at least, to exist in some reality (which is what I tried to specify with “even hypothetically”). An example of the former might be in response to the question “Will the plane run out of fuel and crash?”. The latter might be in response to something like “Could flying, pink unicorns exist?” (Wherein the listener believes his understanding of reality negates the possibility for whatever reason, he can still admit in the intended sense that it’s possible if any reality were granted – what might be meant by hypothetically.)

    Taken synonymously, I added “even hypothetically” for the purpose of relating to your previous specific use of the term “hypothetically”. It was a precaution because honestly I thought perhaps you might not catch what I meant by “suggest it’s possible”. No offence intended, it’s just that I’ve felt you seem to sometimes unintentionally harness a possible ambiguity or mere difference in description to create an issue (aka sophistry). So I feel it was concise in regards to my concern over your understanding of the language.

    Further, I think such reiterated emphasis beginning with “even” is quiet common (though your example didn’t use it in the way I did). I don’t think it’s strange in English. Unnecessary, sure, if the person being spoken to understands what is meant already. I didn’t know if you would though. (The only example I can think of at the moment is something like “No one made it out alive, not even our beloved superhero.” lol, wherein the first phrase was truly sufficient, for some reason, an emphasis on an obvious implication can sound natural or useful for a reason I don't care to articulate at the moment.)

    The point was to show a clearer way to say what I thought you were saying. And I did. I don’t see how the two words at the end being, apparently clearly, redundant/unnecessary makes the meaning of the sentence unclear. The wording/structure of the original whole sentence you wrote I found very strange. It took me a while to figure what you might have meant.

7. I agree. This is definitely about what terminology is more appropriate or, rather, common. I’ll comment on its commonality.

    There also seems to be some confusion with our meaning either way on our terminology. I’ll try to clarify mine further. Now in most cases I’d comply with whatever terminology someone wishes to use but since I feel too rooted in these basic ones I’m just going to stick with mine.

Common Use of Empiricism

A quote from Bertrand Russell would be his entire book “Problems of Philosophy” in which he sets forth, entirely in reference to sense data (in my sense of the word – “red”, “cold”, etc. – not what I mean by propositional revelation), his empiricist doctrine. A particular aspect of his argument for the empirical “experience” involves what he calls “knowledge by acquaintance” which is indicative of, but not without sole reference to, sense data.

I’m not about to make a lengthy search for perfectly precise quotes I’ve heard in lectures or find them in books I've read… so here’s all I can come up with at the moment.

‘Empiricism: Any view which bases our knowledge, or the materials from which it is constructed, on experience through the traditional five senses.’ Alan Lacey ‘empiricism’ in Ted Honderich (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford, 1995) p. 226.

(The following two, while not directly about the difference, contain the distinction:)

‘Rationalism is the view that reason, as opposed to, say, sense experience, divine revelation or reliance on institutional authority, plays a dominant role in our attempt to gain knowledge.’ Peter J. Markie ‘rationalism’ in Edqard Craig (ed.) The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London and New York, 1999) p. 740.

Rationalism: 2. Philosophy The theory that the exercise of reason, rather than experience, authority, or spiritual revelation, provides the primary basis for knowledge.

-Dictionary.com

(The following only contains the distinction between revelation and the term "senses" - lol so maybe I just like the quote:)

“Those divines [theologians] who saw that nothing but revelation could provide man with perfect certainty were right. Human scientific inquiry cannot proceed beyond the limits drawn by the insufficiency of man’s senses and the narrowness of his mind.”

—Ludwig von Mises (Philosopher/Economist), Theory and History, p. 9 (?)

   Anyway, I can only say, while avoiding a great undertaking, revelation is not commonly meant as an 'input' of empiricism. I wager it would make for a good laugh or a blank stare though if one was to bring it to the table candidly with a group of philosophers.

   Now to be sure, there are probably many out there that would delight in categorizing revelation within that term, especially when someone is defending revelation as a theory of knowledge (for reasons I... just am sick of articulating things at this point). It's certainly not a stipulation to take empiricism as referring only to [Edit: dealing with] what is called the senses (also a term in which I'm not stipulating a meaning) (I understand moving to use it the way you want but either way I think it's not common to include [propositional] revelation within it and confusing since I'd have to find some other word now for 'sense data'/'sensory input' that only refers to the "portion of input" I've always understood it to refer to of which I really don't know any other distinct word.)

    However broad empiricism has ever been used, it's definitely not commonly intended to refer to propositional revelation.

    Even in the wikipedia article of empiricism, under "philosophical usage" brings the clarification to empiricism as "sense based experiences" and, when contrasted with rationalism, "senses". (Again with my understanding of the common use of the word 'senses' as well.)

    The religious dogma bit was just saying how certain philosophers would equate or refer to revelation with that term. It’s nothing important.

What I Mean By Propositional Revelation as Opposed to Sense Data

But it is a different situation if an input makes a claim about reality outside of one's own mind (e.g. "A cat is hurting me").  Isn't that what revelation does?  When I think a cat is causing me pain, that doesn't necessarily make it true (Matrix etc.), although it is true that I am in pain. 

    At first I thought the underlined portion seemed to indicate you understood what I meant by propositional revelation in juxtaposition to empiricism's reference to sense data. If not:

    What I mean by empiricism's "experience" is defined by sense data. What I mean by sense data is, for lack of better words, the receptions by what is believed to be, perhaps irrelevantly, 'sense organs'. That is to say sense data is counted as the reception/perception via interaction with and of the physical world. If there's some ambiguity there, examples would be: ‘red’, ‘cold’, or ‘pain, ect. (distinguished commonly in five categories but possibly up to sixteen).

    These are not including what I mean by propositional revelation (a term often interchangeable with just revelation in such a discussion) as the things I'm speaking of are... simply not propositions. The perceptions I call sense data carry no inherent propositions. That is to say, they do not "input" entities/bodies (concrete or abstract) and (by nature of propositions) draw a relationship between said body/entity to something else (another body/entity, concrete or abstract). (Or rather, in terms of a proposition, sense data does not bring a subject in relation to a copula in relation to a predicate.) Like your example: “A cat is hurting me”. (Whereas, in this scenario, sense data only gave things like “pain”, “orange”, “yellow”, “hissss”.)

    Is it clear what I mean now?

.....

I.  I believe you are referring to where you said that justification required knowledge, so without preexisting knowledge nothing can become known and therefore justification is an impossible requirement.  The consequence of this would not be that justification is unnecessary (see ONJ), but rather that knowledge is impossible.

Moreover, justification does not always require preexisting knowledge – see (IV.)

II.  I disagree that your example in fact bypasses justification, as I thought I had explained in my previous post.  When we take a sensation, e.g. of pain, and consider it, we can rationally prove that we are truly in pain, because pain occurs in our minds.  We believe we are in pain, therefore we know we are in pain.

It seems to me that what you have described is not actually “knowledge” but “belief”.  When you refer to our inability to doubt something (e.g. sense data) you are only repeating that we believe it (or saying that our belief is absolute).  When you say that we are not “inclined” to subject something to processes of proof this is natural behavior for one who believes it (if I am correctly understanding your use of “inclination”).  But that lack of inclination is irrelevant to the question of whether what is believed is also known.
     In other words, the inescapability of believing a belief does not qualify it as epistemological knowledge IMO.  If you disagree, this probably ought to be merged with (ONJ).

III.  I believe I have certainly shown that the first assertion relies on points not settled.  Also, see ONJ.

In response to “Relating…”:  when justification occurs, (1) a belief has to exist to be justified and (2) the belief must be true for justification to be possible.  So obviously knowledge (JTB) occurs in every instance that justification occurs.  But that does not make justification unnecessary in any way (see ONJ).

IV.  It sounds as if you are saying that justification is an impossible requirement, so you’re throwing it out, so there’s no need to talk about the fact that justification is occurring in this case.  That would clearly be silly, but I don’t know what you are saying if not that.
     You may have only been using that term in order to discredit it, but the example still shows IMO that this is a case in which justification is not impossible and, in fact, is a necessary consequence of belief.  (Which, obviously, is not always the case, so having justification is not redundant or useless either.)  Until and unless you can show that this is not true, it seems to me that your assertion that justification is impossible/meaningless/futile/etc. is groundless (since an example of a justified belief exists).

(ONJ) On the Necessity of Justification:  If you take the common definition of “knowledge” which is “justified true belief” and remove the “justified”, you are left with “true belief”.  Is this what you are saying knowledge is?  And, if so, isn’t it impossible to separate “false belief” and “true belief” without something akin – if not identical – to “justification”?
     And if that is not your definition of knowledge, then what, exactly, is?

V.  No, you can feel free to use it now that I know it’s just a synonym as used here, and not something with a different meaning.

VI.  I used “input” instead of “revelation” because I didn’t want to imply agreeing that the input in question is in fact “knowledge” as I believe you define “revelation” to be.

VII.  The original statement (yours) was “Since I can demonstrate that your theory of revelation is impossible without exception I clearly cannot suggest it’s possible even hypothetically.”  Now you are saying that “it’s possible” and “even hypothetically” weren’t completely redundant because it being “possible” could refer to literal possibility (i.e. "flying pink unicorns" are not) or practical (probability-based) possibility (i.e. running out of fuel is not).  You're saying you thought I might think you were saying one type of possibility was excluded, but not the other.  How could revelation be “impossible without exception” and yet have either of those types of possibility?  Or, for that matter, how can a theory be possible at all in terms of probability?  Either it’s proven or not, or disproven or not.  Theories can’t be “probably proven”.  Your objection makes no sense to me in the context of the statement we are talking about.
     And no, of course emphatic redundancy isn’t very strange in terms of speaking English, but repeating yourself is certainly strange in terms of being concise, which was my point.  You said you were being concise, and proceeded to not be concise, which caused me to wonder if you misunderstood something – naturally enough, IMO.

Empiricism, etc.
I’ll try to keep this brief:
-- I think that if revelation could be shown to produce knowledge then empiricists would be all over it; that the reason it is not part of empiricism is the fact that it does not.
-- (On the other hand, I appreciate that there is a very significant difference between senses like “red”, “cold”, etc., and revelation which has propositions as you explained in your post.  But I don’t know why that would exclude it from empiricism.)
-- I can see now that the difference of propositional and non-propositional input would justify two different groupings of input-reception, and I suppose there’s no reason not to apply the term “senses” to the grouping of only non-propositional input.  (Which is to say, I concede that point, I concede that there is a reason to not consider revelation “sensed”.)  Would I be right in thinking that there is no accepted or proposed propositional input other than revelation?

“WIMBPRAOTSD”
I believe I understand clearly, although propositional inputs that make a claim about one’s own mind would, I think, be a gray area outside of my statement of “what revelation does” but inside your explanation of propositional perception.
     Also, just to nitpick, I thought that our senses were not necessarily received from “the physical world”.  Rather, they are experienced – period.  If that wasn’t a boat you intended to rock, then never mind and feel free to ignore.

Is this that same thread? wow.

   Well, I did my best to categorize everything and bring it together but I found it difficult this time for some reason. I think you’ve overlapped some things or repeated some things so it’s been hard bringing any “systematic” clarity.
   There’s no need to argue paragraph by paragraph, just point by point. I’m not making new points just because there’s a paragraph necessarily.
   I’m very sorry for my sharpness in this post, I’m just very tired of trimming it out and finding less abrasive ways of saying things right now. I always seem to make a rough draft that’s very abrasive then slowly work it out 0_o. I’m not writing/categorizing as clearly as I’d like right now and it’s irritating me.

Justification
My Case Against It

(From IV.)
Until and unless you can show that this is not true, it seems to me that your assertion that justification is impossible/meaningless/futile/etc. is groundless (since an example of a justified belief exists).
(From I.)
The consequence of [justification required knowledge, so without preexisting knowledge nothing can become known and therefore justification is an impossible requirement] would not be that justification is unnecessary (see ONJ), but rather that knowledge is impossible.

A.   Apparently you haven’t understood/agreed with what I’m explaining as the ‘meaninglessness’ of justification. I’ll try to say it differently. (The next three paragraphs are just attempts to say it differently over and over again. Realize they are not separate points.)
    If we were to call justification ‘support’ I could say that the only support we can make for knowledge is knowledge. That is to say, knowledge is fundamental for the question of gaining knowledge. We recognize this clearly when trying to do this little ‘justification’ thing.
   Justification begs the question in epistemology. (Perhaps to be more specific, as with the example of rationalism: All that ‘supporting’ one proposition involved was finding other propositions you apparently already knew that implied the proposition you wish to conclude with.). The concept of support or evidence makes sense in other subjects but not for something fundamental like knowledge and the specific question of how to attain it.
   Thus, justification is not something we can say is “unnecessary” or “necessary” for epistemology; it would only represents already having knowledge. The word refers to nothing in the subject of epistemology – nothing aside from the concept of knowledge already. Thus it doesn’t represent some middle process in between belief and knowledge. It doesn’t arbitrate between them. It’s one of them already. It doesn’t represent any of the words we use in place of it (e.g. support, proof, evidence) because knowledge has no support for knowledge but itself (which is not a support at all in the sense people of epistemology or seeking – that is, gaining knowledge without actually having it in the first place).

B. To address a different issue you brought up, which is diverging a bit from just first understanding justification: I believe you’re claiming my position on justification makes knowledge impossible. (I don’t think you’re agreeing with my position of course since you argue for justification later, right?)
    This is the skeptic’s conclusion but if you notice… it doesn’t actually follow. Stated more clearly, “I don’t have any support (method to apply) for knowledge other than knowledge therefore I can’t have any knowledge”. Really, there’s an assumption there. It’s not a definitive statement – that is to say, concerning logic, the conclusion is not actually a necessary implication (putting the propositions into logical form would help show that as well). The only thing that follows is that we don’t have any support/method for knowledge. That is to say, we don’t have something to apply (again, which indicates knowledge) to a belief to test for knowledge.
    Thus, with meaningless justification offering no insight, if I were to assess the situation now: we’re just still… looking for knowledge. The question is still the same at this point, “How do we know?”. Well, not by finding support/evidence for knowledge obviously. Is that the only way to get knowledge? (No… but lets not get ahead of ourselves, even though you know where this is going.)
   Do we agree that justification is simply meaningless to epistemology?

    You seem inherently stuck on the notion of ‘proving’/‘justifying’ and I can certainly understand why because for some reason (perhaps some picture of the situation in our mind)  it’s easy to confine “obtaining knowledge” to something you must do through some process in your own mind as if that is the only means of obtaining it. But well, that’s not logically necessary. (Again, not pushing this further than that yet.)
   Of course I would refer to my example of sense data as obvious knowledge without any notion of justification but we’re arguing about that ahead… (sort of)

Your Case for Justification?
(From III. )
In response to “Relating…”:  when justification occurs, (1) a belief has to exist to be justified and (2) the belief must be true for justification to be possible.  So obviously knowledge (JTB) occurs in every instance that justification occurs.  But that does not make justification unnecessary in any way (see ONJ).

I’m not really sure what you’re saying or what relationship it could have with the subject.

On the Necessity of Justification
I have to say, you stated your contention here very well.
   My definition, or rather, further clarification of epistemic knowledge is not merely “true belief” but also “that which is indubitable”. This is certainly what is meant when we speak of knowledge in epistemology. *sigh* Preemptive: That’s what “I’m” talking about anyway. If one can doubt it, we’re right back to the criticism of Descartes which practically defined the whole subject to begin with. It’s not certain, it’s not indubitable, it’s not knowledge.
    When I say inability to doubt it, I mean it literally. I do not merely mean one doesn’t happen to doubt it. I’m speaking of its impossibility. There are many beliefs available to me that I can doubt. It’s not impossible. But, as in the example of experience alone - the sense data: the red, cold, etc. one literally can’t doubt. It’s impossible as it “won’t go away”. It’s just there and there aren’t any possibilities to make it go away. The experience is apparent. There’s nothing I’m ‘examining’ or ‘aware of’ other than the experience in this simple instance. It’s a very simple recognition. To sound pretentious I’ll bring up Russell. From this simple recognition he posed the basic axiom: “There are experiences” or rather “Experiences exist”. However you describe it, it inexorably means it’s known and prior to any further information about it and prior to any further information on it’s relationship to some process of the mind.
   Thus the ‘characteristic’ of indubitable (*wants to say indubitibility but it’s not a word*) is what separates true belief from false beliefs (or rather, just beliefs yet undetermined in truth value).
    (Again, this of course was what I meant to exemplify in the sense data example.)
    Now before challenging this point, can we please just come to a common understanding on justification in reference to ‘meaninglessness’?

Side Note
   Perhaps take this as a side note or just an expansion on my example of sense data previously. Ignore it if you still disagree and just address the specific sense data example following:
    There always seems to be an instance of accepting knowledge already without the notion of justification. Any time we grant being inherently aware of something it recognizes this. Whether just being “conscious of your own existence”, existence in general, experiences, or any other axiom argued by a philosopher. There is something being known without an apology, without a defense, without a case, without a progression of steps leading up to the inexorable conclusion. It’s just intrusively “entering” and you can’t make it go away, you can’t make it not what it is, and doubt is simply nonexistent.

The Example of Sense Data
Claim of Justification Still Occurring
II.
As I see the entirety of what you said here and previously on this as sophistry… I truly don’t know what you’re saying. But as for a few phrases that stuck out to me:

We believe we are in pain, therefore we know we are in pain.

    Um… I hope you realize how that statement seems to go against everything you’ve said. I think it’s ambiguous and a part of your explanation of something so I wont take it too literally. All I can tell is that you’re equating whatever it is you mean by it with “rationally proving” and I don’t see much further clarification for that here.
   Whatever you come up with for an explanation keep an eye out for assertions about reality (including the way your mind works) that you would have to know already.

Claim that Example is Belief not Knowledge
It seems to me that what you have described is not actually “knowledge” but “belief”.  When you refer to our inability to doubt something (e.g. sense data) you are only repeating that we believe it (or saying that our belief is absolute). 

   I’m a little confused here – You claimed that ‘justification’ was actually occurring in the example of sense data I gave (making it knowledge by your standards) but then here you’re saying my example only describes belief?
   I describe knowledge as something you can’t doubt, but you say that this is the characteristic of belief, not knowledge. Interesting. Knowledge is less certain than belief? The ‘inability to doubt” is a characteristic of belief but not knowledge, to which I ascribed it to?
   Perhaps you’re merely trying to say the “inability to doubt” is not a sign of knowledge. I’ll assume that for your sake. If that being the case, I think then there’s been a misunderstanding on what I mean by the inability to doubt. I address it in “ONJ”.

Other
VI. 
I used “input” instead of “revelation” because I didn’t want to imply agreeing that the input in question is in fact “knowledge” as I believe you define “revelation” to be.

No seriously, I have no idea what you’re talking about, like at all. Hopefully it’s some old confusion on terms.

VII.
You're saying you thought I might think you were saying one type of possibility was excluded, but not the other.  How could revelation be “impossible without exception” and yet have either of those types of possibility?

   What?... because if impossible was taken only to refer to the one sense of possibility I explained then “without exception”, being the qualification of that word, only refers to that one sense of possibility. The plane can’t possibly run out of fuel, without exception. Flying pink unicorns cannot possibly exist, without exception.

   Further I had the distinction between the “kinds” of possibilities in my mind when I first wrote it. I just wanted to avoid such a long explanation about something so trivial that seemed like it could come off as fairly impalpable. I half expected a giant argument on the distinction I made. (I’d really like to say something about that “distinction” and the way you took to it but… I better not.)
   I think there’s been a misunderstanding on the two types I gave anyway because I really don’t have a clue as to what you’re talking about in the next bit.

   I find this criticism of conciseness concerning two words in a qualification form at the end of the sentence very desperate compared to the original sentence’s insanity. We’re going from highly unclear to clearer and more concise, not scrutinizing a single distinct English device.

 Or, for that matter, how can a theory be possible at all in terms of probability?

…what?

Either it’s proven or not, or disproven or not.  Theories can’t be “probably proven”.  Your objection makes no sense to me in the context of the statement we are talking about.

   I really don’t get it. We’re merely talking about acknowledging the possibility of something here. Why, all the sudden, are we talking about whether the possibility/theory has been proven or disproven? ...Or whatever it is you’re talking about.
   It’s a possibility that this apartment building I’m in could catch on fire. That’s it. That makes sense right? Do I need to also state whether it’s proven or disprove as to whether or not it will catch on fire for the statement to have a meaning?
   There’s a possibility that there’s a man in Poland right now eating his shorts. There’s a possibility aliens exist. There’s a possibility God exists. I don’t know what being able to prove or disprove has to do with first acknowledging a possibility.

Empiricism
I think that if revelation could be shown to produce knowledge then empiricists would be all over it; that the reason it is not part of empiricism is the fact that it does not.

   For your sake I’ll say sure (even though I feel  tad ridiculous to embrace a ‘hypothetical’ use of a word… I’d feel embarrassed in front of empiricists), yet the point here has been that the common use of the word empiricism refers to the use of senses and building knowledge from it (making an even clearer divide between it and propositional revelation which doesn’t need ‘building’ in that sense at all). That’s just what they mean by it. And thus that’s what I meant by it. Revelation wasn’t meant by it, whether one believes it’s possible, impossible, proven, or disproven.
   An interesting thing to point out is that you seemed to accept the distinction between empiricism and rationalism without quibble yet there actually have been empiricists who’ve believed and posed that rationalism and all it represents is also subsumed in the category of “sense experience”.
   And “shown”? That anything like ‘prove’? Really funny thing to say in regards to revelation if it’s the only means of knowledge and also if justification happens to be in question.

Would I be right in thinking that there is no accepted or proposed propositional input other than revelation?

   That question is difficult for me to articulate for some reason. I think it’s just unclear to me. I mean, obviously rationalists and empiricists think they can account for propositions so you might say they think there’s an ‘input’ in whatever sense they’d define it. Obviously I hold that they can’t account for them so in that sense and from the implications of killing justification, revelation is the only one… but that’s avoiding some menial, mostly irrelevant clarification I don’t find useful to articulate.

Old Argument
-- I can see now that the difference of propositional and non-propositional input would justify two different groupings of input-reception,

   I must point something out now. By making this distinction between “propositional input” and “non-propositional input” (sense data) I’ve, in a different way, had you acknowledge the problem of empiricism (as it only deals with ‘non-propositional input’).
   Whereas one method of exposing the problem of empiricism (as we started off long ago) goes into all the “possible interpretations” of sense data and asks how one chooses among them as they are all an equal possibility, one can cut right to the heart of the matter and clarify/define sense data – exposing that sense data, since it doesn’t give any propositions (also including ‘entities’ in a specific sense), doesn’t therefore give any interpretations in the first place (interpretations are of course composed of propositions). Therefore any interpretation of sense data at all would already be imposed and not derived from sense data.
   (Another way of saying this I’ve heard is: you can’t get ‘metaphysics’ from sense data.)

“WIMBPRAOTSD”
I believe I understand clearly, although propositional inputs that make a claim about one’s own mind would, I think, be a gray area outside of my statement of “what revelation does” but inside your explanation of propositional perception.

Not sure what you mean. In particular regard to “a claim about one’s own mind”.

Also, just to nitpick, I thought that our senses were not necessarily received from “the physical world”.  Rather, they are experienced – period.  If that wasn’t a boat you intended to rock, then never mind and feel free to ignore.

   Right right, not necessarily received from the idea of a “physical world” (contrast with the usual matrix, dream, etc.). Just trying to use a common ‘root’ in typical education for explaining the meaning of the word “senses”. I should have added some explanation in parenthesis, making it officially the millionth clarification by way of parenthesis.

(1.1)  Where in the example I laid out is other knowledge required to gain the knowledge that I am in pain, given the belief that I am in pain?  Do you mean "knowing" how to do logic? 

(1.2)  If you don't know what I'm saying, where do you get off calling it sophistry?  [edit:  Oops, I may have misread this.  Sorry.  You're saying you see it as sophistry, but you're giving me the benefit of the doubt and supposing that instead you simply don't understand me?]

(1.3)  I believe you are correct that you have not understood what I have said.  Perhaps the best solution is to take this specific part into a chat session where we can actually talk instead of spew giant text-walls at each other. 

(2)  This is tied deeply into the other question of the definition of knowledge, and in fact hinges entirely on it.  According to the common definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" then you are obviously wrong; even if justification is nonsense/impossible/unobtainable it is still a requirement that must be met (without which there is not knowledge).  If some other definition obtains then there is a possibility that there is another way to arrive at knowledge.  (Such as in what I respond to in (4).)  

(3)  It seemed to me [edit2: and still does; this was originally written for the second (3) marker] that you were saying that if justification made any sense at all, it was redundant with knowledge and should be disregarded on that grounds.  ("The meaningless “justification” is not occurring, rather (or not in any other sense than), knowledge is occurring.")  I was trying to show how justification could never occur separately from knowledge and yet still be an important consideration.  

(4.1)  Yes, I understand.  What I don't understand is why the fact that a belief cannot be doubted makes it knowledge rather than what one might call "absolute belief" (without dragging up the prior mess).  Undoubtable belief is IMO simply that and not knowledge -- it is not true by virtue of its indubitability.  

(4.2)  Sorry but I can't resist.  Also, it seems to me that this argument is very similar to that which I respond to in (4.1) as you can see by my grouping.  I do disagree because I don't think that one's acceptance of something as knowledge makes it knowledge, even if it is impossible to not accept it as knowledge.  

(5)  Go ahead and say indubitability.  I'll back you up.  (See (4.1).)  

[edit: (6.1)  No, the example of sensing red is knowledge, but what you described, i.e. undoubtable belief, was only belief.  In the case of this example it so happens (here we agree) that the subject also has knowledge of that sensation*, but (here we disagree) not IMO for that reason (simply because he indubitably believes it, without justification being necessary for knowledge).]

[*Hopefully that's not unclear enough to start another war?]

[edit2:  To expand:  In the cases we have so far discussed, sensations like red/pain/etc., the indubitable belief of sense-experience necessarily coincides with knowledge of sense-experience, but this is a situation that would not apply to, say, an indubitable belief that I have a body sitting in a chair right now.  I'm not completely sure that you would say this second belief could be indubitable, but since I presume you're going to tie this in with revelation ...  Anyway, this may be getting into ground you didn't intend to cover yet but hopefully you now understand me.]

(6.2)  [edit2:  Your assumption is correct.  But I didn't misunderstand.]  When I say that it (indubitability) is a characteristic of belief, not knowledge, I mean that if you point to this and say "AHA!  This is evidence (or whatever) of knowledge." I say, "No, only of belief."  I do not mean that knowledge could not be indubitable.  So sure, it can be a characteristic of knowledge, but that does nothing to support your point about indubitable belief necessarily/always being knowledge. 

(7)  If you've forgotten the subject, in this case, let's bury it.  

(8.1)  I can kind of understand why my response confused you.  But to backtrack somewhat:  you said you were trying to differentiate between "“it’s possible” in the sense of the probability of something occurring" and "“it’s possible” in the sense of specifically admitting it’s not a contradictory idea so it has the potential, at least, to exist in some reality".

But when you are speaking in the context of disproving a theory (which you were), that does not apply.  I can't disprove the theory of revelation in the sense of "this isn't at all likely to occur".  The only way I could disprove it is in the sense of "this is absolutely not right".  In that way your justification for putting in that extra phrase is invalid.  Unless, as you say, I am still misunderstanding your two types of possibility.  But as I understand it, the only possibility that exists in the context is the potential for disproving (or proving) a theory.  A theory can't be "probably" disproven, and once it's disproven the disproof can't "probably" be true.  

(8.2)  The reason I am criticizing your conciseness is because of the misunderstanding that resulted when you repeated yourself.  Because of your claim of conciseness, I thought that when you apparently repeated yourself that you had actually misunderstood something, because it would be silly to repeat yourself and then say you were being concise.  Also looking back at it you shortened things all the way from 24 words to 21 (I think) so you probably meant "clear" anyway.  Which I don't think it was (more than mine). 

(9.1)  That was merely the most recent point; AFAIK the reason this point even arose was my trying to use your revelation empirically.  So if empiricists would embrace revelation if it was proven I don't see that as irrelevant.  

(9.2)  How juvenile.  Aren't you trying to "prove" that your idea of revelatory knowledge is possible?  

(9.3)  But you already said "sure" (revelation is not part of empiricism just because empiricists don't believe it produces knowledge, and if it did then it would be embraced), which seems to me to go directly against your claim here that revelation definitionally could not ever be considered by empiricism.  

(10)  I thought that rationalists' propositions came from within themselves.  Your own thoughts are not "input" -- or do you disagree?  If you disagree that would alter my entire concept of your position!

(11)  I mean as in the example I've been using of justification (leaving aside for this point whether the example is valid or whatever).  The sensation of pain is happening in one's own mind.  So far we have used examples of propositional claims about what is outside one's own mind (i.e. red car, etc.), and that is what I spoke of when I referred to "what revelation does".  But "propositional perception" could perhaps ALSO include propositional claims about what is inside one's own mind.  (I have not given much thought to what such claims/perceptions might be.)

I'm a little pressed for time, but I was almost done with the double-checking phase so I'm sending it off.  Hopefully nothing was horribly overlooked.

[edit:  Added number markers to (your) quoted post -- oops!  Also added (6.1).]

edited previous post